App Store Connect MCP Server

Give Claude your App Store Connect account without giving it the keys to your pricing. An MCP server covering the App Store Connect API and the App Store Server API (StoreKit 2) — 1,293 operations behind 13 tools, for Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor and anything else that speaks Model Context Protocol.

1,293 operations · 13 tools · key never on disk · Apple signatures verified

flowchart LR
    A["Claude<br/>Cursor · any MCP client"] -->|"search · call · write"| B["app-store-connect-mcp<br/>13 tools"]
    B --> C{"risk tier"}
    C -->|"READ · 811 ops"| D["Apple<br/>App Store Connect API"]
    C -->|"WRITE · 482 ops"| E["ask a human first"]
    E -->|approved| D
    E -->|declined| F["nothing is sent"]
    B --> G["App Store Server API<br/>StoreKit 2 · signatures verified"]

    style E fill:#ffe8b3,stroke:#c98a00,color:#000
    style F fill:#ffd6d6,stroke:#c00,color:#000
    style D fill:#d6f5d6,stroke:#2a2,color:#000
    style G fill:#d6f5d6,stroke:#2a2,color:#000

Don't install this

Genuinely. There are cheaper ways to spend your afternoon, and several kinds of person should close the tab now:

You want an agent that just does things. This one stops and asks before it changes a price, deletes anything, or touches who can access your account — and it asks you, not itself. If that sounds like friction, it is. That is the product.

You want every endpoint as its own tool. Some servers register 890. Yours would spend six figures of context on tool definitions before answering a single question. This registers 11 and finds the rest by searching.

tool definitions loaded into context, before you ask anything

  one tool per endpoint   ███████████████████████████████████   >100k tokens
  this server             ▌                                       ~1k tokens

You're on Windows or Linux and wanted Keychain. Keychain storage is macOS only. You can use a file path elsewhere, but the best part of this is macOS-shaped.

You want it to write your App Store copy. It will fetch your reviews and your localisations. It will not invent marketing prose and push it live, and there is no flag to make it.

You're evaluating this for a product you sell. Read the licence first. Internal use is free; reselling it isn't.

Still here? Then the rest is probably for you.

What it refuses to do

Most of the engineering here went into restraint, so it is the honest place to start.

It won't run generated code. The elegant way to cover a huge API is to let the model write JavaScript and eval it in a sandbox. Node's vm is not a sandbox — its own documentation says so — and any host object handed in leaks the whole realm back through its prototype chain:

spec.constructor.constructor('return process.env.HOME')()   // → /Users/you

That is a reproduction of a real shipping MCP server's sandbox, and it returns your home directory. Its 15-second timeout doesn't help either: it bounds only synchronous code, so an async loop runs forever. This server dispatches parameters, not code. Same coverage, same token cost, nothing to escape.

It won't let a write pretend to be a read. Reads and writes are separate tools. asc_write carries _meta["anthropic/requiresUserInteraction"], which Claude Code honours even under bypassPermissions. There is no flag that turns that off, because a safety you can disable is a safety you will disable.

It won't decide your pricing intent for you. preserve_current_price is a required parameter with no default. Apple defaults it to false — meaning your existing subscribers get moved to the new price. Making it required forces that decision into the open, where a person can see it.

It won't create ongoing commitments to answer a question. Fetching analytics needs a report request, and accessType: ONGOING is a standing obligation on your account, not a query. The tool reads reports; it will not create one silently.

It won't pretend it sanitised your reviews. Customer review text is written by strangers and lands in your model's context verbatim. Results carrying it lead with a note saying it is data to report on, not instructions to follow. It is deliberately not filtered for injection phrases — that is a game attackers iterate against, and passing such a filter would imply a safety it cannot deliver.

It won't tell you a signature is fine when it hasn't checked. See below.

Install

Claude Code, one line:

claude mcp add --scope user app-store-connect \
  --env ASC_KEY=keychain:my-asc-key \
  --env ASC_BUNDLE_ID=com.example.app \
  --env ASC_APP_APPLE_ID=1234567890 \
  -- npx -y @abd3lraouf/app-store-connect-mcp

Nothing to clone or build. Or from source, if you'd rather read it first:

git clone https://github.com/abd3lraouf-studios/app-store-connect-mcp
cd app-store-connect-mcp && npm install && npm run build

Or, for Claude Desktop, Cursor and friends:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "app-store-connect": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@abd3lraouf/app-store-connect-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "ASC_KEY": "keychain:my-asc-key",
        "ASC_BUNDLE_ID": "com.example.app",
        "ASC_APP_APPLE_ID": "1234567890"
      }
    }
  }
}

Then ask it "check the App Store Connect connection" — that runs asc_status, which verifies your credentials with one lightweight request and tells you exactly what is missing if anything is.

Your key belongs in the Keychain

Apple lets you download a .p8 exactly once. A plaintext copy on disk is a copy that can leak.

ASC_KEY=keychain:my-asc-key          # recommended
ASC_KEY=/path/to/AuthKey.p8          # works, but plaintext
ASC_PRIVATE_KEY='-----BEGIN…'        # discouraged: ps -E exposes it

Store it as base64 JSON so the identifiers travel with the key material — ASC_KEY_ID then cannot drift out of sync with the key it names, a mismatch that surfaces only as an opaque 401:

security add-generic-password -s my-asc-key -a api -w "$(
  jq -nc --arg i "$ISSUER" --arg k "$KEYID" --arg p "$(cat AuthKey.p8)" \
    '{issuerID:$i,keyID:$k,privateKeyPEM:$p}' | base64
)"

The thirteen tools

Five core, covering everything:

| Tool | | |---|---| | asc_status | Credentials, reachability, remaining rate-limit budget. Run this first when anything fails — it separates a bad key from a bad request. | | asc_search_endpoints | Search 1,293 operations across both APIs by keyword, method, tag or risk tier. | | asc_describe_endpoint | Parameters, request-body schema with real field names, risk tier. | | asc_call | Reads. Path and query parameters, pagination, both APIs. | | asc_write | Everything that changes data. Confirmation, dry_run. |

Eight composite, for chains the raw API cannot express in a single call. A tool that merely saved one request was left out — it would need keeping in step with Apple forever and buys nothing asc_call doesn't already do:

| Tool | What it collapses | |---|---| | asc_pricing_get | ~175 lookups → a handful, for subscriptions and one-time purchases. The currency lives on the territory, not the price row, so reading prices by hand gives ambiguous numbers. | | asc_pricing_set | The same chain plus the write, with the subscriber decision forced into the open. | | asc_preflight_version | Six resources → GO / NO-GO, each gap naming the operation that fixes it. | | asc_listing_screenshots | A request per locale → four, via included. | | asc_upload_screenshot | Apple's reserve → PUT-at-offsets → commit-with-MD5 sequence, across two hosts. | | asc_upload_iap_screenshot | The same sequence for an in-app purchase's review screenshot — the field that keeps an IAP in MISSING_METADATA. | | asc_availability_set | One PATCH per territory (up to 175; Apple has no bulk endpoint), then re-reads every one and reports what did not take. | | asc_analytics_report | Five hops → signed URL → gunzip → rows, with every segment stitched. |

Apple's asset flow spans two hosts and ends in a checksum that fails silently if you get it wrong — the upload simply sits in AWAITING_UPLOAD looking like nothing happened. uploadOperations appears in Apple's OpenAPI document only as a value in a fields[] enum, so an agent reading the spec can see the field exists and still have no idea it must act on it.

sequenceDiagram
    participant M as Claude
    participant S as this server
    participant A as App Store Connect
    participant U as Apple asset host

    M->>S: asc_upload_screenshot(set, file)
    S->>A: POST /v1/appScreenshots (fileName, fileSize)
    A-->>S: id + uploadOperations[]
    loop each byte range
        S->>U: PUT bytes at offset, Apple's headers
        Note over S,U: pre-signed URL — no bearer token sent
    end
    S->>A: PATCH uploaded=true + MD5 checksum
    A-->>S: assetDeliveryState
    S-->>M: state, and how to clean up if it failed

Plus four resources (@asc:cookbook, @asc:enums, @asc:risk, @asc:sources) and four workflows as slash commands: /mcp__asc__release-readiness, pricing-audit, review-triage, testflight-status.

Write safety

An HTTP method is a poor proxy for consequence. PATCH /v1/subscriptionPrices and PATCH /v1/appInfos/{id} are both writes; only one changes what customers are charged, and neither is undone by repeating it. So every operation carries a tier (counts are App Store Connect; StoreKit 2 adds 14 reads and 16 writes):

| Tier | Count | | |---|---|---| | READ | 797 | No change. | | WRITE | 238 | Changes data. | | REVENUE | 61 | Pricing, subscriptions, entitlements. | | DESTRUCTIVE | 132 | Deletes. | | RELEASE | 12 | Builds, submissions, what ships. | | ACCESS | 12 | Who can reach the account. | | INFRASTRUCTURE | 11 | Certificates, identifiers, callback URLs. |

flowchart TD
    A["asc_write called"] --> B{"--read-only?"}
    B -->|yes| Z["blocked"]
    B -->|no| C{"risk tier"}
    C -->|"WRITE"| S["send it"]
    C -->|"REVENUE · DESTRUCTIVE<br/>INFRASTRUCTURE · ACCESS · RELEASE"| D{"client supports<br/>elicitation?"}
    D -->|yes| E["ask the person<br/>method · path · body · tier"]
    D -->|no| F["issue a token<br/>hash-bound to this exact request"]
    E -->|accepted| S
    E -->|declined| Z
    F --> G["caller repeats the call<br/>with the token"]
    G --> S

    style Z fill:#ffd6d6,stroke:#c00,color:#000
    style E fill:#ffe8b3,stroke:#c98a00,color:#000
    style F fill:#ffe8b3,stroke:#c98a00,color:#000
    style S fill:#d6f5d6,stroke:#2a2,color:#000

The bottom five ask before running. Where your client supports elicitation, it asks you directly, showing the method, path, body and tier. Otherwise it issues a confirmation token bound by hash to the exact operation, path, query and body — so one obtained for a cheap call cannot be spent on an expensive one. A client that claims elicitation but fails to deliver it falls back rather than sailing through.

--read-only    block every write       --confirm     confirm every write
--no-confirm   never confirm           (default)     confirm the five tiers above
--dry-run      report the exact request without sending it

Signature verification

Decoding a JWS tells you what the bytes say. Verifying it tells you Apple said it. That distinction matters here more than most places, because these payloads are the evidence behind "is this person a paying subscriber?" — and a decoded but unverified transaction is exactly the shape a forged one takes.

Every signed field is checked against Apple Root CA - G3, vendored in certs/ so verification cannot be switched off by a network failure. Chain validation, expiry, revocation and the bundle/environment checks go through Apple's own library, because those are precisely where a plausible-looking implementation accepts bad input.

Outcomes are per field, not per response — one bad signature in a history of two hundred is the case that matters:

"signedTransactionInfo_decoded":      { "productId": "premium.monthly" },
"signedTransactionInfo_verification": { "verified": true }

Where it cannot run, payloads are still decoded and every field says so. Silence would be the dangerous outcome.

How it compares

| | Approach | Kept | Rejected | |---|---|---|---| | Hand-wrapped tools | One tool per endpoint | Typed, discoverable arguments | 70–900 tool definitions, >100k tokens, stale the moment Apple ships a version | | Code Mode | Model writes JS, server evals it | Two tools, ~1k tokens, full coverage | Runs generated code in a process holding a signing key | | Meta-tools | search → call with parameters | Same context win, no code execution | — |

Credit where due: several ideas here were adapted from reading erayendes/app-store-connect-mcp and TrialAndErrorAI/appstore-connect-mcp. No code was copied. Heimdall in particular is the most developed server in this space, and if you want 890 typed tools organised into profiles, use it instead — it is good, and it is a different trade to this one.

Receipts

Claims are cheap. These are checkable:

378 tests · 90% line coverage · offline, no credentials, runs on every PR

• Both directions of signature verification. A verifier that rejected everything would look just as healthy as a correct one, so a generated chain carrying the two Apple OIDs the verifier insists on proves the accept path, while forged, tampered, wrong-bundle and wrong-environment payloads are all rejected.
• The protocol version is measured, not assumed. Claude Code 2.1.235 negotiates MCP 2025-11-25 and declares elicitation — recorded by having it connect to a probe server. That is why this stays on SDK v1: the v2 packages implement 2026-07-28, which replaces elicitation with MRTR, and elicitation is what makes asc_write ask a human.
• MSW, not nock, for HTTP mocking — nock patches node:http, and Node's global fetch is undici, which bypasses it entirely. It would have intercepted nothing, silently.
• One test spawns the real binary and asserts every stdout line parses as JSON, because a single stray console.log corrupts the JSON-RPC channel and no in-process harness can catch it.

npm test              # 378 tests, offline
npm run verify        # 14 read-only checks against the live APIs
npm run fetch:specs   # re-download both API descriptions from Apple

Keeping current with Apple

Coverage is a property of Apple's spec, not of how many endpoints somebody got around to wrapping.

• App Store Connect — 1,263 operations, spec v4.4.1. Apple publishes an OpenAPI document; it is downloaded and compiled into a slim index (360KB against a 3.3MB spec).
• App Store Server — 30 operations. Apple publishes no OpenAPI document for this one, so the endpoint set is parsed out of Apple's own client library at a pinned release tag, and diffed against this repo's catalogue on every verify run.
• Enum tables are generated, all 90 of them. A widely-copied cookbook elsewhere lists an eventState value Apple does not have and omits two it does; generating them makes that impossible here.
• A weekly job re-fetches both and opens a branch if Apple moved.

Transports

node dist/index.js                       # stdio (default)
node dist/index.js --transport http --http-token "$(openssl rand -hex 32)"

HTTP binds to loopback and refuses to start without a bearer token. It validates Host and Origin too: a browser page can otherwise reach a loopback-bound server as same-origin, where a token alone is no defence.

Docker builds distroless and runs as non-root. Note that stdio needs docker run -i and must not get -t — a TTY mangles the JSON-RPC stream.

The skill

The server answers questions. It cannot stop a model drawing the wrong conclusion from a correct answer — an empty list because a territory was written US instead of USA, one page of thirty read as the whole account, "no subscriptions" for an app that sells a one-time purchase. There is no error to catch in any of those; the response was a 200.

That judgement ships as a Claude Code skill:

npx -p @abd3lraouf/app-store-connect-mcp asc-mcp-skill

It installs into ~/.claude/skills/app-store-connect (--scope project for ./.claude/skills, --link to symlink a checkout so edits are live). It adds nothing to settings.json.

The skill is a list of checks that fire before a conclusion, not a tour of the API. It hand-copies nothing that can be derived — no enum tables, no endpoint lists — and a test asserts that every tool name, resource URI, prompt and enum-shaped value in it still traces back to src/ or to Apple's spec.

Failures are recorded

Today a failure exists only as a tool result in a transcript. When the conversation ends, so does Apple's x-request-id — the one value Apple support asks for — along with any evidence of which operations a model tried and could not find.

Both halves now write to failures.jsonl: the server records its own HTTP, network and swallowed failures, and the skill records the ones the server cannot see, the interpretation failures that arrived as a 200.

npm run triage        # what keeps failing, and what the cookbook never warned about

Where it writes, in order: ASC_FAILURE_LOG_DIR if set (and then nowhere else — an explicit destination that silently becomes a different destination is worse than none); otherwise a working checkout of this package, identified by carrying src/ and .git/, which npm pack publishes neither of; otherwise the installed skill's own directory; otherwise ~/.claude.

On a machine with no checkout and no installed skill, it writes nothing unless ASC_FAILURE_LOG=1 says otherwise. ASC_FAILURE_LOG=0 disables it everywhere.

What it will not write: request headers or request bodies, ever — only body keys, because appStoreReviewDetails carries a live demoAccountPassword in a plain body. Response payloads are reduced to Apple's error object. Pre-signed asset URLs are recorded as a hostname, since the signature is in the path. JWTs, bearer tokens, PEM blocks and email local-parts are scrubbed as a second line of defence.

Records are appended as single bounded writes to an O_APPEND descriptor, so the server and the skill can share one file without a lock. That guarantee is POSIX's and does not hold on NFS — point ASC_FAILURE_LOG_DIR at local disk.

Known limits

Stated plainly, because you will find them anyway:

• Risk tiers are pattern-matched from method and path. Deliberately cautious, but heuristics. Read asc_describe_endpoint before a write.
• Keychain storage is macOS-only. Elsewhere, use a file path with restrictive permissions.
• --no-confirm disables the gate. It exists for CI and is a poor default anywhere a person is present.
• --no-online-checks skips OCSP, which means accepting a revoked certificate.
• The failure log's lock-free append relies on O_APPEND atomicity, which network filesystems do not honour. npm run triage skips torn lines rather than failing, but a network mount can lose records.
• The accept path for signatures is proven against a substituted trust anchor, not Apple's — getting a genuinely Apple-signed payload needs a real customer transaction. The chain logic is Apple's own library.

Releasing

Bump, merge, done. Both registries authenticate with the workflow's own OIDC identity, so there is no token to rotate and no tag to remember:

npm run release:version patch     # or minor, major, or an exact version
git commit -am "Release v1.0.1" && git push

CI notices a version that is not yet on npm, runs the full gate, then publishes to npm and the MCP Registry, tags the commit and opens a GitHub Release. The trigger is the version rather than a tag, which makes the job idempotent — re-running it publishes nothing.

Licence

Business Source License 1.1. Free for internal use, evaluation and development; offering it to third parties as a hosted or embedded service, or redistributing it inside a commercial product, needs a licence. Converts to Apache-2.0 on 2030-08-19.

Apple's OpenAPI description and root certificate are vendored here under Apple's terms, not this licence — see NOTICE.

Apple, App Store, App Store Connect, StoreKit and TestFlight are trademarks of Apple Inc. This project is not affiliated with Apple.