@absolutejs/agent-conformance

Provider-neutral adversarial test runners for AI agent security boundaries. Adapters expose a tiny harness; the package attacks it with replay, concurrent maximum-use races, confused-deputy identity, scope escalation, lookalike URL origins, mutated approved inputs, denied lease issuance, failed-execution replay, and task-owner isolation.

import {
  assertConformance,
  runCapabilityConformance,
} from "@absolutejs/agent-conformance";

const report = await runCapabilityConformance(() => yourHarness());
assertConformance(report); // throws with the complete report when any case fails

The runners return data rather than depending on a test framework, so they work inside Bun test, Vitest, Jest, CI scripts, or provider certification jobs.

The effect-adapter suites separately prove global certification, descriptor-driven reconciliation setup, tenant-scoped installation, and execution-time behavior. The execution suite verifies that authorization happens before secret resolution, only installed aliases are resolved, tenant/effect/destination/idempotency context reaches the driver, driver capabilities match the certified descriptor, and unknown provider outcomes enter durable quarantine.

The effect-evidence suite verifies that provider signatures are checked before persistence, duplicate deliveries remain single-copy while reconciliation can resume after a crash, retained delivery identities cannot be rebound across effects or tenants, and only normalized evidence crosses the durable boundary.

The reconciliation-runtime suite proves that scheduled provider queries authorize before resolving credentials, use a cross-replica lease, retain only normalized evidence, reduce failures to safe health codes, and keep an operator-triggered tenant run from querying another tenant's effects. It also proves that reference-gated queries stop before credential resolution when no exact provider resource is retained and that stale attempts cannot quarantine a newer lease.

Version 0.3 adds discovery signature/search, durable runtime recovery/budget, provenance/taint, scoped memory, and verified inbox suites. Passing reports can be combined into a deterministic, optionally signed absolutejs-agent-first-1 certification artifact and linked from an agent's public discovery descriptor.

Version 0.4 adds provider-neutral conformance harnesses for A2A 1.0, MCP 2025-11-25, Arazzo 1.1, and the July 2026 WebMCP draft. They test protocol negotiation, task/session isolation, required extensions, unsafe callback URLs, dependency ordering, policy-before-effect, unsupported-feature atomicity, input validation, metadata poisoning, cross-origin exposure, and abort cleanup.

import {
  runA2aConformance,
  runArazzoConformance,
  runMcpConformance,
  runWebMcpConformance,
} from "@absolutejs/agent-conformance";

Implement only the harnesses relevant to your package:

• ActionConformanceHarness for approval binding and execution leases.
• CapabilityConformanceHarness for credential grants, delegations, spend mandates, or other bounded capabilities.
• TaskConformanceHarness for durable task ownership and cancellation.

Rejections must name their control

Every scenario that expects a rejection asserts on a token from the control's own vocabulary — "lease", "owner", "private", "host", "replay", "denied", "bound", "scope", "actor", "destination". Your implementation's error message has to contain it.

This is a real obligation, and it exists because the alternative is worse. A scenario that accepts any rejection passes on failures that have nothing to do with the control it claims to test:

fetch("https://api.example.com.evil.test")
  -> "Unable to connect. Is the computer able to access the url?"
fetch("https://169.254.169.254/latest")
  -> "The operation timed out."

Both throw. Before 0.15.0 both satisfied the egress scenarios on any machine — so a suite meant to prove SSRF and lookalike-origin defences proved nothing, and reported a green tick while doing it. .evil.test is a reserved TLD that can never resolve, which means that scenario could not have failed for the right reason even in principle.

An unnamed rejection is indistinguishable from an accident. Naming the control is what makes a pass mean something.

License

MIT