@absolutejs/agent-sandbox

Deny-by-default capability sandboxing for agent actions. Grants are scoped to one durable run and one signed agent identity, expire, carry per-capability use limits, and are verified through an issuer-agnostic callback.

HTTP access is restricted by origin, method, path, body/response size, and credential binding. Each broker alias is bound to an exact header or process input name; transport-controlled headers and process-loader variables remain denied even if requested. Filesystem access uses boundary-safe absolute roots. Process access uses exact executable allowlists, argument prefixes, working roots, timeouts, and output limits. Credentials are resolved inside adapters and never returned to the agent.

The broker persists an operation before executing it. Repeating the same grantId + requestId returns the recorded result instead of repeating the external action. Use the Postgres store in production or the memory store in tests. The built-in fetch adapter rejects redirects so an allowed origin cannot bounce an agent to an ungranted destination.

An adapter failure is deliberately left locked for reconciliation: the remote system may have accepted the effect before the error reached the broker, so an automatic retry would risk duplication. Filesystem adapters must resolve symlinks/real paths before access; process adapters must enforce the grant's timeout and output ceilings at the operating-system boundary.