@absuitecore/edge-run

Cron scheduling, task queueing, retries and self-healing execution for AI agents.

Every mutating endpoint is guarded by a CapKit capability token, so authority is issued and revoked centrally rather than per service.

What it does

• Cron scheduling — full 5-field cron with ranges, steps, lists, names and @daily-style aliases. Correct day-of-month/day-of-week OR semantics.
• Priority queue — high/normal/low, delayed tasks, bounded concurrency and a queue limit.
• Retries — fixed or exponential backoff with full jitter, so a batch of tasks that fail together does not retry in lockstep.
• Self-healing — a circuit breaker per target. After repeated failures it opens, then half-opens after a cooldown and admits a single probe.
• Live logs — Server-Sent Events at /runtime/logs.

Running

CAPKIT_HMAC_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32) pnpm --filter @absuitecore/edge-run dev

API

# Schedule a recurring task
curl -X POST localhost:8082/schedule -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"id":"sync","cron":"*/15 * * * *","task":{"type":"http","url":"https://api.example.com/sync","method":"POST"}}'

# Queue a one-off task
curl -X POST localhost:8082/queue -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"id":"probe","priority":"high","task":{"type":"http","url":"https://example.com/health"}}'

curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" localhost:8082/queue/probe/status
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" localhost:8082/runtime/health   # breaker state

Required scopes: schedule:create, schedule:read, queue:write, queue:read, runtime:read.

Security

Script tasks are disabled by default. An HTTP API that spawns processes is a remote-code-execution vector, so script tasks only run when EDGERUN_SCRIPT_ROOT is set, and only for paths that resolve inside that directory — ../ escapes are rejected. Scripts are spawned without a shell.

EDGERUN_ALLOWED_HOSTS restricts which hosts an http task may call. Unset means any host — a wide-open default, not a neutral one. Only http: and https: are ever permitted.

Link-local addresses are refused whether or not an allowlist is set. 169.254.0.0/16 and IPv6 fe80::/10 are where every major cloud puts instance metadata, so an http task pointed there is a way to read the machine's IAM credentials — and AWS IMDSv1 is HTTP-only, so requiring https would not have stopped it. metadata.google.internal is refused by name as well, because it resolves only inside GCP.

Redirects are checked hop by hop. Checking only the URL you queued is not partial protection against a redirect — it is none. A permitted host answering 302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/… reached the metadata service and returned the body in output, past a check that had classified the first hop correctly. Every hop is now classified, and the refusal says which one failed.

The metadata endpoints are refused even when allowlisted. AWS also serves IMDS over IPv6 at fd00:ec2::254, which is unique-local — a range this package allows on purpose — so these are tracked as endpoints rather than as a range. EDGERUN_ALLOWED_HOSTS scopes which hosts may be called; that is a different statement from yes, read this machine's cloud credentials, and it no longer makes it. EDGERUN_ALLOW_METADATA=true does, and says so.

The allowlist binds every hop. It used to be enforced only on the URL you queued, so an allowlisted host answering a 302 reached anywhere — which made it a check on the request rather than a restriction on the runtime.

Private and loopback addresses still work: calling http://10.0.0.5/reindex on a schedule is what this package is for, and naming a host in EDGERUN_ALLOWED_HOSTS still wins for every ordinary internal address.

Configuration

| Variable | Default | Purpose | |---|---|---| | EDGERUN_PORT | 8082 | Listen port | | EDGERUN_MAX_CONCURRENT | 10 | Tasks in flight | | EDGERUN_QUEUE_LIMIT | 100 | Max pending tasks | | EDGERUN_TASK_TIMEOUT_MS | 30000 | Per-task timeout | | EDGERUN_SCRIPT_ROOT | unset | Enables script tasks under this directory | | EDGERUN_ALLOWED_HOSTS | unset | Comma-separated host allowlist | | EDGERUN_ALLOW_METADATA | false | Permit the cloud metadata endpoints | | EDGERUN_FAILURE_THRESHOLD | 5 | Failures before the breaker opens | | EDGERUN_COOLDOWN_MS | 30000 | Time before a half-open probe | | CAPKIT_HMAC_SECRET | — | Shared with CapKit to validate tokens | | CAPKIT_REVOCATION_FILE | unset | Shared revocation store |

Known limitations

Schedules and queued tasks are held in memory. A restart loses pending work and registered schedules. Durable storage is the next step for multi-replica deployments.

Part of ABSuite

The black box for AI systems — record what happened, prove it happened, preserve the evidence.

| | | |---|---| | Source | https://github.com/iamGodofall/ABSuite-core | | Verify a trace in your browser | https://iamgodofall.github.io/ABSuite-core/verify.html | | Getting started | GETTING-STARTED.md | | Reporting a vulnerability | SECURITY.md — never a public issue | | What this project refuses to build | PRINCIPLES.md |

Published from CI with a signed Sigstore provenance attestation — check it with npm audit signatures rather than taking our word for it.

MIT licensed.