@agenticprimitives/attestations

Agent reputation needs public, revocable claims pinned to a persistent identity — not to a key that rotates away. When an agent's track record lives on chain, three things must be true: the subject is an address that survives credential recovery, the claim cannot be anchored against a different subject by replaying a signature, and a "joint" claim genuinely carries both parties' consent. This package is the SDK for AttestationRegistry.sol, the single on-chain registry where those guarantees are enforced — bilateral consent is verified on chain from both party signatures, not assumed from a stored reference.

It is EAS-aligned where alignment helps (UID model, schema IDs, refUID chaining) and deliberately stricter where EAS is loose: one registry, credential types as discriminators rather than per-type contracts, and no issuer-unilateral revocation entrypoint at all.

Part of agenticprimitives — the trust substrate for the agent economy: one canonical Smart Agent identity with custody, delegation, naming, credentials, and audit evidence designed as one system.

What ships today

The W1 foundational slice — the cryptographic spine the contract and downstream packages already rely on:

• CREDENTIAL_TYPE — keccak discriminators for Association, Evidence, Outcome, Validation, TrustUpdate, JointAgreement, PaymentReceipt (one registry, many types — ADR-0024 Decision 2).
• computeAttestationUid(...) — recomputes the on-chain UID per AttestationRegistry._computeUid.
• JOINT_CONSENT_TYPEHASH + jointConsentDigest(...) — the digest BOTH parties sign to consent to a joint agreement. assertJointAgreement recomputes it on chain and verifies both signatures (ERC-1271 / ECDSA); a stored consent reference is not consent (RW1-1, ADR-0027). chainId and the registry address are bound, so consent cannot be replayed cross-chain (ATT-3).
• JOINT_ISSUER_TYPEHASH + jointIssuerDigest(...) — the issuer signs parties, schema, credential type/hash, agreement commitment, chain, and registry — never a bare hash (ATT-1).
• ASSOCIATION_ATTESTATION_TYPEHASH + associationAttestationDigest(...) — binds the subject, so a known credential hash cannot be anchored against someone else (SC-2).
• Request payload shapes — AssociationAttestationRequest, JointAgreementAttestationRequest, matching the contract ABI.

Every typehash above MUST byte-equal its AttestationRegistry.sol constant — enforced by the cross-stack check:eip712-typehash-equality CI gate.

Planned for later waves per the W1 implementation wave plan: assertion builders (buildAssociationAssertion, buildJointAgreementAssertion), the AttestationClient read client, and revocation encoders (holder-only / either-party / validator-only per type).

How it's different

Against EAS and Verax, three concrete deltas:

1. Contracts and SDK are one artifact. The EIP-712 typehashes in this package are CI-locked to the Solidity constants. In EAS-style stacks the client SDK and the chain are separate codebases that drift; here drift fails the build.
2. Bilateral consent is verified, not asserted. A joint attestation requires both parties' signatures over a digest the contract recomputes. There is no resolver/module hook where consent semantics can be customized away (ADR-0023, D2).
3. No issuerRevoke. Holders revoke their own associations; joint agreements revoke by either party; issuer revocation is off-chain via StatusList2021 (D-18). An issuer cannot unilaterally erase a subject's record.

The credential bodies themselves are W3C VCs from verifiable-credentials (type-only dependency); only their canonical hashes touch the chain. Vault-resident bodies stay private unless explicitly opted into public assertion (D-46).

Status

Foundational (W1) — code shipped; not production enforcement. The digest math, typehashes, and payload shapes above are real and gate-checked; the full builder/client surface lands in Wave 4 per the wave plan. See AUDIT.md.

Testnet/pilot-ready. Production launch is gated on the public checklist in the root README — including third-party contract audit and governance key rotation. Track every security finding live in docs/audits/findings.yaml.

Owns spine layers: 12–15. Authoritative spec: specs/242-trust-credentials-and-public-assertions.md — see spec.md for the symlink. Bounded surface: CLAUDE.md + capability.manifest.json.

Build

pnpm --filter @agenticprimitives/attestations typecheck
pnpm --filter @agenticprimitives/attestations test
pnpm --filter @agenticprimitives/attestations build