@aldegad/safedeps

v2.18.1

Published

9 hours ago

Dependency install safety gate with OSV-backed advisory checks, approved-spec ledger enforcement, and reorg rollback hooks

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aldegad

safedeps security supply-chain advisory osv reorg claude-code hooks package-lock rollback

safedeps

Stop your AI coding agent from installing vulnerable or unapproved dependencies — and roll back the ones that slip through.
safedeps gates every dependency install your Claude Code or Codex CLI agent runs. It pre-approves packages against OSV / CISA KEV / GitHub Advisory, re-verifies the closure that actually lands in your lockfile, and auto-rolls-back anything that diverges. Local-only, with zero runtime dependencies. (한국어 README → README.ko.md)

Pre-approve — every pkg@version, plus its full transitive closure for npm, is cleared against OSV (canonical), CISA KEV, and GitHub Advisory before it installs.
Enforce the real effect — after the install, the actual package-lock.json closure is re-checked, so a wrapped or obfuscated command can't sneak a package past the gate.
Roll back — anything unapproved or newly-vulnerable is reverted to the last confirmed safe snapshot, or to the state before the command when a project has none yet, and the message says which. On Claude Code safedeps adds --ignore-scripts to each npm install, so that a rejected package's lifecycle scripts do not run during the install. That is the design, not a promise: whether npm keeps the flag is decided by shell state the command does not show, so safedeps reports only that it added the flag.

A real catch. The pre-commit audit flagged a vulnerable transitive hono advisory that Dependabot missed — by re-querying the advisory DB at commit time. A CVE disclosed after you installed a package ("looked safe then, flagged now") surfaces at your next commit, not weeks later.

Quickstart

# 1. Install the CLI — the npm package is scoped, note the @aldegad/ prefix
npm install -g @aldegad/safedeps

# 2. Wire the hooks into Claude Code / Codex (idempotent)
cd "$(npm root -g)/@aldegad/safedeps" && node scripts/install/install-safedeps-hooks.mjs

# 3. Done — every dependency install your agent runs is now gated.

safedeps is the CLI command; the npm package is @aldegad/safedeps — the unscoped safedeps on npm is an unrelated package. Prefer the full skill source tree? See Installation.

safedeps withholds a vulnerable install, then clears the patched version

Distribution Model

Safedeps has two distribution surfaces:

Agent skill + hooks (canonical) -- the repo itself is the skill folder. SKILL.md, hook scripts, provider/ledger libraries, and install helpers stay together in one directory.
npm package (CLI convenience) -- @aldegad/safedeps installs the safedeps command. npm does not make Claude Code or Codex automatically discover the skill; after npm installation, users still need to run the hook/skill installer or manually register the skill folder.

Use the GitHub release when you want the full skill/hook source tree as the canonical artifact. Use npm when you mainly want a versioned global CLI.

Terminology: safedeps is an agent security skill backed by Claude/Codex hooks and a local CLI. It is not a Codex plugin bundle unless it is later wrapped with a plugin manifest.

Two Lanes

safedeps owns two security lanes (full design in ARCHITECTURE.md §1):

Install-time (the focus of this README) — advisory check + approved-spec ledger + fast PreToolUse guard + PostToolUse effect enforcement + post-install reorg. Per-package, around the install command and its actual lockfile effect.
Release-time — safedeps gates run, safedeps scan secrets [--repo|--worktree|--staged], safedeps audit [npm|pnpm|yarn|bun], safedeps hooks install|check. Repo-tree secret scan, dependency audit, repo-local git hook install/check before push/release, plus opt-in remote repository posture checks. Repo-specific policy (gitleaks config, privacy paths) stays in the target repo; safedeps owns local execution. (Absorbed the former security-release-gates.)

The secret-leak side of the release-time lane is per-repo and opt-in. safedeps doctor is its repo-entry check: it diagnoses the repo's .gitleaks policy, .githooks/pre-commit, the active core.hooksPath, and scanner availability (and reports the global install-time gate too), then safedeps doctor --fix scaffolds a starter policy (safedeps hooks init) and activates it (safedeps hooks install). That local pre-commit setup is automatic once you choose --fix; it does not spend remote CI minutes. The scaffold is non-destructive — an existing repo-owned .gitleaks.toml is never overwritten — and the pre-commit hook runs a secret scan (safedeps scan secrets --staged) plus, on every commit in a repo with a supported lockfile, a dependency audit (safedeps audit, auto-detecting npm/pnpm/yarn/bun): a real finding blocks (fail-closed), while an unreachable advisory DB only warns and lets the commit through (observable offline failover). Remote enforcement is split: blocking direct pushes to main with a branch rule is recommended no-runner posture, while GitHub Actions workflows and required status checks remain explicit cost-bearing opt-in because hosted runners can cost money. See Secret-Leak Lane (per-repo).

How It Works

safedeps works in two moves around every install:

Before — safedeps check clears a package against OSV (canonical), CISA KEV, and GitHub Advisory, then records the approval in a local ledger. For npm it resolves the package's full dependency closure and checks every transitive package too.
After — the PostToolUse hook re-reads what actually landed, from the lockfiles npm writes, and reorgs (rolls back) anything that isn't in the ledger or that the advisory databases now flag.

The registered command for both hook events is a small entry shim (safedeps-hook-entry.sh). The hooks run live from the repo checkout through a symlink, so a checkout that is temporarily broken (a merge in progress, a half-saved edit) used to either block every Bash call with a bare syntax error or silently disable the gate, depending on the exit code. The shim turns both into an explained fail-closed deny: it names what broke, whether a merge is in progress, and how to recover. It also denies a call during which the machine could not start a process, instead of letting the call through ungated. Details: ARCHITECTURE — Phase 0.

Running out of time is an answer, not a gap. The agent runtime gives each hook a fixed budget and kills it when that expires — and the tool call then proceeds, so a gate that runs long simply disappears. Since the command scan gets more expensive with command length, padding a command was enough to cross that line. The pre-install guard now keeps a smaller budget of its own and, if it cannot finish judging in time, blocks and says so: the message leads with UNDECIDED, not unsafe so nobody reads a timeout as a finding. Commands short enough to be nowhere near the budget are unaffected.

A command it could not read is treated the same way. The guard reads each command through awk, grep and sed, and a failed one returned nothing, which used to read as "no install". Now a failed reading is recorded, and before the guard lets anything run it checks: if the command names a package manager anywhere, it is blocked as UNDECIDED; if not, it runs, and the failure goes to stderr and ~/.safedeps/advisory.log. A deny that would report a finding after a failed reading reports UNDECIDED instead. The guard reads a command the way the shell does -- quotes, comments, heredocs and nested substitutions in one pass -- so a heredoc, a comment with an apostrophe or a multi-line string cannot hide the install after it, and a command that never closes is treated as unread. An assignment in front of the install (FOO="a b" pip install ...) is read the same way, so its value cannot hide the install either, and so is an install in a case arm or a nested substitution. Where bash, zsh and dash would read a command differently, the guard reads it the way each of them does and judges every install any of them would run. It adds --ignore-scripts only where all three agree on where the npm installs are, and otherwise blocks the command as UNDECIDED.

The pre-install command hook (PreToolUse) is a fast advisory nudge — it blocks obvious unapproved installs and risky command forms so the agent gets immediate feedback. But for npm the real authority is the post-install effect gate: it judges what was actually installed, not what the command looked like, so a wrapped or obfuscated install command can't slip a package past it.

Script safety (inert install). On Claude Code, the PreToolUse hook rewrites an npm install to add --ignore-scripts. The aim is an inert install: packages land on disk, and their lifecycle scripts run only through the rebuild below, once the closure verifies. That is the aim, not a promise. Whether npm keeps the flag is decided by the shell the command runs in, so safedeps says only that it added the flag. The flag goes where npm reads it as true. npm keeps the last value an option is given, so the hook first puts it after the install's last argument, where --ignore-scripts=false or --no-ignore-scripts in the install cannot turn its scripts back on. It then reads the install with the flag in place, the way npm reads it, and keeps that place only if the flag comes out true and nothing else changed. A last word such as --cache takes the next word as its value, so there the flag would become the cache directory; it goes before that word instead. Every rewrite also keeps the rewrite safedeps made before it read the install's words: one flag at the end of a one-statement command, and one right after each verb otherwise. It also puts one right after each verb in every case. That is a floor. Delete some of the flags the hook added and you get that earlier rewrite, so npm always receives at least what that rewrite gave it, even when the hook misreads a word or the shell changes one. Where the hook cannot place the flag by reading, as for an install in a double-quoted script handed to a shell, a one-statement command still gets the earlier rewrite's flag at its end, and the downgrade is recorded. A word the shell changes when it runs the command could be anything. The hook does not list what the shell expands. It lists what it leaves alone: a word counts as written only when every character outside quotes is a letter, a digit or one of . _ / @ : + , = % -, and the word does not start with ~ or =. Anything else, such as a tilde, a brace, a $, a glob or a parenthesis, means the shell may decide the word at run time. A $ inside double quotes counts too, because it still expands there. An install that holds such a word cannot be read in advance. It keeps both flags, and advisory.log records that nobody could read which one npm keeps. The post hook never claims that an install ran no scripts. For such an install it adds that its scripts may have run. An install that asks for its scripts, as with --ignore-scripts=false, is recorded there too, and its scripts run only through the rebuild below. The hook leaves an install alone only when its own arguments already set the flag true, read the way npm reads them, and the earlier rewrite left it alone too. The same text in an echo or another statement does not count. The hook reads each install's arguments as the shell joins them, so a quoted line that looks like the flag is part of an option's value. An install with a -- before its verb leaves npm no place to read the flag as an option, so it keeps only the floor and is recorded as a downgrade. The effect gate then verifies the closure; only if it passes does the PostToolUse hook run npm rebuild to execute the now-verified scripts. A package the gate rejects is reorged before any of its scripts run. The rebuild covers only the tree the gate read: it runs in the directory the gate read with --global=false --location=project, so a project .npmrc cannot point it at the global tree. The rebuild runs over the whole tree, so it asks about the whole tree, not only about what this install changed. It is skipped, with a warning that names the package, when node_modules carries no .package-lock.json record, or when npm says the rebuild would run over any of these: a package, or a version of one, that neither lockfile records; a package the lockfiles do not record as coming from the public registry (a private registry, a git URL, a tarball); a package they do record there that npm fetched from another registry; or a directory that is not a declared workspace member (a file: directory dependency). npm is asked that with npm query '*', which follows a file: dependency into its own node_modules the way npm rebuild does. If npm does not answer, the rebuild is skipped too. A record on registry.npmjs.org does not say where the bytes came from: npm's default replace-registry-host=npmjs fetches such a URL from whatever registry npm is configured with, and writes the URL down unchanged. So npm is also asked which registry it fetches from, with npm config ls --json: once with the install's own arguments and environment before the command, and once in the directory the gate read after it. A record counts as the public registry's only when both answers say so. (This uses the Claude Code hook updatedInput capability. Codex CLI does not expose it, so on Codex the install runs normally and the effect gate is detect-and-rollback — a malicious install script can run once before the rollback.)

This effect-primary model is npm-only for now. pip, cargo, go, gem, maven, and nuget stay on the v2.1 command-gate + reorg model until their closure resolvers land.

                         PreToolUse                          PostToolUse
                  (safedeps-pre-guard.sh)          (safedeps-post-verify.sh)
                            |                                    |
  install cmd ──> [ Advisory/ledger UX ] ──> [ Execute ] ──> [ npm effect gate ]
                     |            |                           |       |
                  Block obvious Snapshot                  Clean?  Suspicious?
                  misses/risk   lock/manifest files,        |       |
                                package listings          Confirm  REORG
                                                              |       |
                                    |                       v       v
                                    +--- parent_snapshot_id ──> confirmed
                                                                    |
                                                              Rollback to last
                                                              confirmed snapshot

Phase 1: Advisory Check (`safedeps check`)

Before an agent installs a dependency, it should run:

safedeps check <ecosystem> <pkg>@<version|range> --json

That command queries OSV (canonical), CISA KEV (hard-risk overlay), and GitHub Advisory (enrichment). For npm, it first creates a script-free temp lockfile with npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts, extracts the full dependency closure, and queries OSV /v1/querybatch. Clean or safely narrowed specs are written to ~/.safedeps/approved-specs/; npm entries also record transitive_specs.

Yarn project-scoped closure. When the target directory is a Yarn Berry project with a root resolutions entry, check resolves the closure from that project's actual yarn.lock via yarn info, instead of a fresh published-package probe. This lets a project that pins a vulnerable transitive dependency to a patched version through resolutions get approved on its real, resolved dependency tree -- the published package closure alone would still show the vulnerable version and deny the install. The approval only covers that exact project: the ledger key folds in a hash of the project directory, resolutions, and yarn.lock content, so it cannot satisfy the check for a different project or after resolutions/yarn.lock changes. If resolutions is declared but the requested package can't be verified in the project's resolved graph, or the lockfile isn't a supported Yarn Berry lockfile, the check stays fail-closed.

Yarn candidate materialization (v2.11.0). The closure above needs the package to already be in yarn.lock, which is not true for the case that matters most: checking a dependency you are about to add. For that candidate, check builds the closure in a private mirror instead of denying. safedeps copies a temporary mirror of the project's canonical resolution inputs -- the root and workspace package.json files, yarn.lock, .yarnrc.yml, and the .yarn/releases, .yarn/plugins, and .yarn/patches files. Nothing else is copied; node_modules, caches, unplugged packages, install state, and VCS data stay out. The candidate is added to the mirror's manifest only, then Yarn resolves it there with yarn install --mode=update-lockfile --no-immutable. That mode updates lock resolution without the link step, so no lifecycle script from the candidate ever runs, and your own project tree is never written to.

The approval records what produced it: a hash of the exact input set, the list of input files, the hash of the generated lockfile, the candidate locator, the exact Yarn command, and the private-project-mirror isolation mode. The ledger rejects an entry missing any of them. safedeps re-hashes the project inputs before and after Yarn runs; if a manifest, resolutions, config, or lockfile changed in between, the candidate is invalidated rather than approved against a mixed project state. Any failure to copy the inputs, run Yarn, or resolve the candidate in the generated lockfile denies with project-candidate-materialization-unavailable. There is no fallback to the published-package closure -- a materialization that cannot be verified is a denial, not a downgrade.

npm overrides awareness (v2.12.0). The same problem exists for plain npm. overrides is the standard way to pin a vulnerable transitive to a patched version, but the closure probe used an empty manifest, so it resolved the published tree and denied installs that the repo had already fixed. check now discovers the consuming repo's overrides and applies them to the probe, so it resolves transitives the way the real install will. Discovery reads SAFEDEPS_NPM_OVERRIDES_JSON if set, otherwise the nearest package.json with a non-empty overrides, walking up from the working directory and stopping at the repository root -- including a worktree root, whose .git is a file rather than a directory. Only concrete version pins are honored; $-references like "$react" are dropped, because they have no meaning in a standalone probe.

Honoring overrides cannot hide a vulnerability. The probe still resolves each override to a concrete version and OSV is queried for that exact version, so an override pointing at a still-vulnerable release is flagged like any other. If the overrides cannot be applied to the probe manifest, safedeps says so and continues without them, which only makes the check stricter.

Because the closure now depends on the consuming project, the approval is scoped to it. A published-package approval is global precisely because it is project-independent; one derived from overrides is not. The ledger entry therefore carries the project root, the override set, and a hash of both, and the key folds that hash in. An approval earned in a repo that patched a transitive does not satisfy the check in a repo that did not, whose real install would resolve the vulnerable version. Changing the override set changes the key. Repos with no overrides are unaffected and keep the ordinary global approval.

Phase 2: Fast Command Guard + Snapshots (PreToolUse)

When Claude Code or Codex CLI is about to run npm install, pip install, cargo add, go get, gem install, or similar commands, the guard hook provides a fast advisory/UX layer:

Snapshots the current package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, and package.json into ~/.safedeps/snapshots/.
Records metadata including a parent_snapshot_id linking to the previous confirmed snapshot (forming a chain, just like blocks).
Captures pre-install state of node_modules (package listings and binary listings) for diff-based detection later.
Fast-checks the approved-spec ledger for explicit pkg@version install commands.
Runs pre-flight checks and blocks the command entirely if it detects:
- Typosquatting package names (lod_sh, reacct, axois, etc.)
- A non-standard registry (anything outside registry.npmjs.org and registry.yarnpkg.com) named on the command line with --registry. A registry npm reads from an .npmrc or npm_config_registry is not blocked, because a company registry, a mirror or a proxy is set up that way and there is no way yet to approve one. npm is asked which registry it fetches from, with the install's own arguments and environment, and the post-install hook keeps what such a registry serves under a public-registry URL, but safedeps does not run npm rebuild for it. A new package recorded from the registry's own URL is a non-standard source and is rolled back (the table below). safedeps records the bytes it kept, so no other project on this machine that receives them rebuilds them either, and this version has no way to release that record (see the boundaries)
- Piped remote execution patterns (curl ... | bash)
- Explicit disabling of install script safety (npm config set ignore-scripts false)

If the ledger gate or a pre-flight check fails, the command is blocked before execution -- nothing is installed. This command guard is intentionally best-effort; it improves the agent loop and catches direct misses, while npm authority lives in the post-install effect gate.

What the command guard reads. An install spelled the way its manager documents it, or the way the shell allows it: aliases (npm i, pnpm i, bun a) and, for npm, every command word its parser accepts (npm upd, npm installTest), options before the verb (pip --quiet install), versioned interpreters (pip3.11, python3.11 -m pip), runners that fetch and execute a package (npx, npm exec, pnpm dlx, yarn dlx, bunx, uvx, pipx run, go run <module>@<version>), each manager's create (npm create vite and npm init vite run create-vite, so create-vite is the package checked and recorded; pnpm create, yarn create, bun create), grouping and control statements (( ... ), if ...; then ...), quoted specs, and line continuations. Backslashes and quotes are read the way the shell reads them. Which word is the command, which is an option's value and which is a package is read from each manager's own option tables, so npm --prefix x install [email protected], pnpm --dir x add, cargo --config x install and pip install --log x are read as the installs they are, and npm is read the way both npm 11 and npm 10 read their options. Until v2.18.0 most of these spellings passed the gate with no verdict and no record.

What the command guard does not see, and what that costs per ecosystem. Text handed to a shell is recognized only in the forms the guard enumerates -- sh -c, eval, command substitution, a pipe into a shell. A sh -c or eval script is read as the word the shell passes it, escaped quotes and all, so the install inside it is judged with the real package. A pipe into a shell is asked the same question beside an install the guard reads as alone, and that question counts the visible install's own words, so such a pipe beside an install is denied: a command that mixes an install with an unrelated pipe into a shell, such as npm install x && cat setup.sh | sh, is denied; run the two as separate commands. A pipe inside a command substitution, a backquote, a double-quoted sh -c or eval is asked of that inner text only, so one that rebuilds the install's words from $_ passes with no record, as it did in v2.17.2; v2.18.2 takes it. Forms outside that list get through: a herestring, a command line built by xargs, a script written to a file and then run. So do argv-passing wrappers that run the install unchanged: sudo, timeout, nohup, nice. The guard also does not recognize a command word or a runner's package that the shell assembles from quotes: 'pip' install x==1, and npx "[email protected]" with nothing but options after the package. Nor does it see past a word the shell decides at run time between the manager and its verb, such as pip $x install x==1, where an empty x leaves pip install x==1. v2.17.2 missed these too, and reading them the way the shell does is planned. For npm this is delayed detection, not a miss, because the effect gate reads the live lockfile and catches the result regardless of how the command was written -- while the gate finishes inside its 30s hook budget, which is a measured range and not a given (see below). For pip, cargo, go, gem, maven, and nuget there is no closure resolver behind the guard, so the same form is a complete miss -- it is recorded as UNVERIFIED in ~/.safedeps/advisory.log and nothing else happens. Do not read "the guard does not parse this form" as npm-shaped. The boundary is measured and pinned in scripts/test/consumer-forms.sh, and ARCHITECTURE.md explains why widening it is not the fix.

How far "delayed detection" actually reaches. The effect gate is registered at 30s and the runtime kills it there, so npm's delayed detection is real only while the gate finishes. Its cost rides on the size of the project's lockfile closure. It used to ride on the size of your approved-spec ledger too -- the gate asked the ledger about every closure package separately, and each question read the whole ledger directory -- which on a 738-entry ledger put it past 30s at a closure of four packages. v2.16.0 reads the ledger once per closure; the ledger axis is now flat, and on the same machine with a cold advisory cache the gate crosses 30s at a closure near 390 packages. Below that the backstop is there; above it -- a large application's lockfile -- the gate is killed and does not judge the install. The crossing point moves with the machine, the network, and the cache, so measure yours: scripts/measure/effect-gate-cost.sh <package-lock.json> --ledger ~/.safedeps/approved-specs.

If a rollback is cut off, safedeps says so. When the gate rejects a closure it rolls the project back: restore the lock and manifest files, then remove the project's own node_modules. Until v2.16.0 the log entry and the report came last, so a hook killed mid-rollback left no record at all -- in some cases with the project already reverted, which looks like an install that silently undid itself. The gate now writes what it is about to do before it does it, and clears that note once the rollback has reported itself. A note that outlives its run is an unfinished rollback: the next command reports it once, records it in ~/.safedeps/rollback-incidents/, appends REORG INTERRUPTED to ~/.safedeps/reorg.log, and says which stage it reached, what a test of the process that ran it returned, and which of the project's dependency files are not what the snapshot holds. It gives no cause and no repair command; how to read it is below. "Outlives its run" means the process that wrote it is gone, not merely that the note is there -- a rollback still working has its note on disk on purpose, so an unrelated command during one stays quiet (v2.16.1).

An install with no version pin is not gated either, and it says so. The ledger check runs on a parseable pkg@version operand. pip install evil, cargo add evil, go get example.com/evil, and gem install evil name a package without pinning one, so no spec is produced and the ledger gate never runs. No wrapper is needed for this -- omitting the version is enough. Where the effect gate reads the result, it still enforces on it. That is an npm CLI install that left its trace in the directory the gate reads. npm records such an install in package-lock.json, or only in node_modules/.package-lock.json when told not to save (--no-save, --no-package-lock), and the gate reads both. Everywhere else the install proceeds unverified: pip, cargo, go, gem, maven and nuget, and also pnpm, yarn and bun, an npm install that the project's or the user's .npmrc keeps off the record, npm link <pkg>, which installs a package the global tree lacks, also behind a path (npm link ../lib <pkg>), an npm install inside a sh -c or eval payload, whose landing is decided inside it, and runners such as npx that fetch a package without touching a lockfile. That case is now recorded as UNGATED in ~/.safedeps/advisory.log, naming the command and each package it installs without a pin. An npm install that left no trace where the gate looked is recorded too, by the post-install hook: a global one (however npm reads it: -g, -gf, --location=global, npm_config_global=true, or global in an .npmrc; npm is asked, so no list of spellings decides it), or one moved by something the shell decides at run time (cd "$DIR"). See "An install is read only where it left a trace" below. The unit is the package as written, not its name: pnpm add [email protected] && pnpm add left-pad pins one install and not the other, so the second is recorded. The record reads the command the way the gate does, so a version passed as a flag (gem install rails -v 7.1.0) counts as pinned, and a package the gate misread shows up in the record instead of disappearing. A few records are harmless and kept on purpose: pip resolving pip install x==1 x to the pin, a second install of a pinned package that changes nothing, a runner whose binary the first half of the command is about to install, and a flag the record does not know takes a value. The record does not block: refusing every unpinned install is a policy change that would break ordinary cargo add x workflows, so it stays a decision for the repo owner -- one the record makes answerable from evidence. Routine installs stay out of the log on purpose, and the line is drawn at whether a package is named rather than at which flags appear -- which flags carry a value is a property of the tool, so pip's -t/-f take one while go's and gem's do not. pip install -r requirements.txt and npm install name none, and neither does pip install ., which builds from the working tree instead of fetching. A runner of a binary the project already has, such as npx tsc, fetches nothing and stays out too. A source flag consumes only its own argument, so pip install -r requirements.txt evil still installs evil and is still recorded. A record that fires on every install is noise rather than signal, but one that goes quiet whenever a flag appears is worse -- it reads as coverage it does not have.

An npm install that saves nothing is still read. Before v2.18.0 the effect gate read package-lock.json alone, in the directory the command started in. npm install x --no-save, --package-lock=false, the same settings from the environment or an .npmrc, npm -C sub install x and cd sub && npm install x all left that file untouched, so the gate confirmed each of them clean. On Claude Code that confirmation is what triggers npm rebuild, so the inert install then ran the unverified package's install scripts. Measured with a real npm against a local registry, npm still records every one of these installs: the ones that do not save in node_modules/.package-lock.json, the relocated ones in the other directory's package-lock.json. The gate now reads the hidden lockfile and follows -C and a literal cd, and each of these forms is rolled back. Every check reads it, not only the closure. The install-script and source checks below once ran only when package-lock.json or package.json changed, so a tarball carrying an approved name and version, from a file or an http URL, passed them when it was not saved, and the rebuild ran its scripts. They now read what the install brought into either record, saved or not. It follows them to where npm installs, which is not always the directory named, and it asks npm where that is (npm prefix and npm root, with the install's own arguments). npm walks up to the nearest directory with a package.json or a node_modules, and from a workspace member on to the root that declares it, unless the member was reached through a symlink. cd src && npm install x, with no package.json in src, writes the project's lockfiles, and so does an install run inside packages/a of a workspace. The gate reads those. A copy of npm's rules in bash got the symlinked member wrong, which is why npm is asked now. Where npm cannot be asked or does not answer in time, or the command hands it something the shell decides at run time, the gate says why and looks in the cwd. In a workspace the root lockfile keys each member by its path. The gate no longer reads that path as a package name, and a rollback now restores the member's package.json as well as the root's, so npm install x -w packages/a is undone on disk too. An .npmrc that keeps the install out of both records is a different case, covered in the boundaries below. scripts/test/lockless-forms.sh runs them end to end.

An install is read only where it left a trace. Picking the directory from the command text went wrong in three rounds of review, and each time the result was a silent pass. false && cd sub; npm install x installs in the current directory, and the gate followed the cd that never ran. command cd sub; npm install x installs in sub, and the gate did not follow that spelling. Either way it read a directory the install never touched and called it clean. No list of spellings closes this, because a command can also change what npm reads, by running npm init or writing an .npmrc first. So the text now only picks where to look. Just before the command runs, safedeps notes the time and npm's two lockfiles there. Afterwards it checks whether either was rewritten. npm rewrites node_modules/.package-lock.json on every install that installs anything, even a reinstall of what is already there. If neither was rewritten, the install is recorded as UNGATED with the check that found nothing, no install trace in <dir>: neither npm lockfile there is newer than the baseline taken before this command or has another inode. Nothing is rebuilt there, and on Claude Code you are told. safedeps does not say whether the install landed elsewhere or installed nothing, because it cannot tell. A --dry-run or a failed install shows up the same way, which is noise rather than a pass. Two npm installs in one command with something between them, such as npm install a; cd sub; npm install b, are recorded too, because the first one's trace would answer for the second. A cd that may not run is followed only as far as it provably ran, so false && cd sub; npm install x is read in the current directory and rolled back, and cd sub || exit is still followed. scripts/test/effect-trace-grid.sh runs every form end to end.

Phase 3: Post-install Effect Enforcement (`safedeps-post-verify.sh` -- PostToolUse)

After the install command completes, the verify hook analyzes what changed. For npm, this is the primary enforcement surface: it reads the actual closure from package-lock.json and npm's hidden node_modules/.package-lock.json, verifies every package against approved direct entries and their transitive_specs, and re-checks the closure with OSV batch.

npm effect gate -- Reorgs if any lockfile package is unapproved, KEV-blocked, vulnerable, or cannot be verified fail-closed.
Install script analysis -- Scans the packages the install brought in for preinstall, install, and postinstall scripts. Those are the packages new in node_modules, and the ones either npm record now holds at a version, source or integrity no record held before the command. It looks for:
- Network access (curl, wget, fetch, http, socket, dns)
- Dynamic code execution (eval, exec, spawn, child_process, Function())
- Sensitive path access (~/.ssh, .env, .aws, credentials)
- Obfuscated content (base64, atob, Buffer.from, hex/unicode escapes)
Lock file diff analysis -- Compares the lock files with the copies taken before the command. For npm, the sources come from both records, and a source counts only when no record held it before the command:
- Resolved URLs pointing to non-standard registries. Only a URL that starts with https://registry.npmjs.org/ or https://registry.yarnpkg.com/ is the public registry, and only where npm says it fetched it from there (npm fetches such a URL from its configured registry unless replace-registry-host is never). A directory dependency the install linked is a non-standard source too, unless it is one of the project's declared workspaces
- Insecure protocols (http://, git://) in resolved URLs
- Unusually large dependency additions (>50 new resolved entries in package-lock.json, indicating potential dependency confusion)
Binary inspection -- Checks node_modules/.bin/ for newly added native binaries (ELF, Mach-O, shared objects) that should not appear in a JavaScript project.

Confirm or Reorg

All checks pass -- The lock and manifest files, as the verified install left them, are recorded as a new snapshot, and that snapshot is marked confirmed in ~/.safedeps/confirmed_<dir hash>. This becomes the new safe baseline, so a later rollback keeps this install.
The baseline used to be the snapshot taken before the verified install, which put it one install behind. Measured with a real npm against a local registry: an approved npm install a, then an unapproved npm install b, rolled the project back to one without a in package.json, the lockfile or node_modules. Now a stays and only b goes, on Claude Code and Codex alike (scripts/test/lockless-forms.sh).
The baseline is the files, not node_modules. The rollback removes node_modules, and the next install builds it again from the restored files. So a verified install that saved nothing (--no-save) is not part of the baseline, and its packages leave with node_modules at a later rollback. If the verified state cannot be recorded, the baseline stays where it was and you are told that a later rollback would undo this install too.
The files are copied before the checks read them, and the copy becomes the baseline only if the project still holds the same bytes when the checks finish. If another install changed them in the meantime, what is there now was not checked, so the baseline does not move and you are told why.
Any check fails -- A reorg is triggered:
1. Lock files are restored from the last confirmed snapshot. A project with none yet goes back to the snapshot taken just before the command. Nothing verified that state, and it may still hold what was rejected, so the message, reorg.log and advisory.log all say that the snapshot was taken before this command and that no confirmed snapshot names it.
2. package.json is restored if it was modified.
3. The project's own node_modules is removed to purge any malicious artifacts, when the command is seen to have written the project: an install trace, a package.json or lockfile that differs from the snapshot taken just before the command, or a node_modules that differs from the listing taken then or was modified after it. A command that wrote nothing leaves node_modules in place, and the message lists each check that found nothing. The rollback runs no package manager, so it runs no install script, and it gives no reinstall command. It says what it restored and removed, and what a test of package.json, package-lock.json and npm-shrinkwrap.json returned afterwards. Where a reinstall would write is npm's to decide; the gate checks that install like any other. A restore or a removal that fails is a line with the exit status, and the rollback goes on with the rest. A rollback never follows a symbolic link out of the project. When node_modules, package.json or a lockfile is a link to another directory, that step is refused and named in the message and in reorg.log (REORG REFUSED), with the place the link points to.
4. The event is logged to ~/.safedeps/reorg.log, in the same lines the message carries.
5. Claude Code receives a system message detailing the detected threats and rollback actions.

Reading what safedeps says after a rollback

A rollback message, a refused step, a skipped rebuild and the report of an unfinished rollback are written in one closed set of lines. Each line is something safedeps did, or the result of a check it ran when it wrote the line. No line says why something happened, what npm would do, what a directory contains, or what to do next. The rules behind the lines are here instead.

| Line | What it means | |---|---| | Rollback snapshot: <id>, a confirmed snapshot | The project's confirmed record names this snapshot: an install safedeps verified left these files. | | Rollback snapshot: <id>, taken before this command; no confirmed snapshot names it | The project had no confirmed snapshot. The files went back to what they were before the command. Nothing verified that state, and it can still hold the package that was rejected. | | restored <path> / removed <path> | The file now equals the snapshot, or the path is gone. safedeps looked after it acted. | | not restored <path>: cp exit <n>; ... / not removed <path>: rm exit <n>; <path> exists | The step failed. The line says the exit status and what a test of the path returned. It says nothing about what is left inside a directory: rm -rf removes what it can before it fails. | | not restored <path>: <path> exists and is not a regular file | The path is a directory or another kind of file, so safedeps did not copy onto it. cp into a directory writes a file inside it. | | refused restore of <path>: ... / refused removal of <path>: ... | The path is a symbolic link, and the line says where it leads. safedeps does not follow a link or write outside the project it read. | | kept <path>, then one line per check | No check showed that the command wrote node_modules, so it was not removed. The lines after it are the checks. When node_modules is a symbolic link, the next line says so and where it leads, and the checks read what it leads to. The package lists read package.json files at most three levels below node_modules, so a package written deeper (node_modules/<a>/node_modules/<b>) does not show in them. | | A reason, then removed <path>/node_modules | The first check that showed the command wrote node_modules: an install trace, a node manifest or lockfile that differed from the snapshot taken just before the command, an entry that snapshot's listing lacks, something newer than that snapshot, or no snapshot from before the command at all. | | <path> exists / <path> does not exist / <path>/package.json has the key workspaces | What the project root holds after the rollback. safedeps does not reinstall packages, and it does not judge where a reinstall would write. It removes only the project's own node_modules, never a workspace member's. | | The rollback changed nothing. | No step ran cp or rm. A step that ran and failed is not called no change: rm -rf removes what it can before it fails. | | no install trace in <dir>: ... | Neither npm lockfile in that directory changed during the command, so nothing there shows this install. | | safedeps added --ignore-scripts to this install | The pre-guard record this hook used says safedeps rewrote the install with the flag, and the command the post hook received is the command that record holds, byte for byte. The record is this call's own (below). The command safedeps wrote carried the flag. A command that runs npm rebuild on its own still runs install scripts, as with a skipped rebuild. | | safedeps asked for --ignore-scripts on this install; the command this hook received is not the one safedeps wrote | The pre-guard record this hook used says safedeps rewrote the command, and the post hook received a different one: the runtime did not run the rewrite as safedeps wrote it. Treat the install's scripts as having run. | | safedeps did not add --ignore-scripts to this install | The pre-guard record this hook used says safedeps did not rewrite the command. On Codex it cannot. A pre-guard that cannot write the record does not rewrite the command, and says so in advisory.log. Where the record file is missing, no line is said (below). | | ... did not run npm rebuild: <fact> | safedeps rebuilds only where package.json, the lockfiles and node_modules at the project root are not links, and only in a directory that shows this install's trace. The line says what safedeps did. It does not say whether install scripts ran: a command that rebuilds on its own has run them. | | ... ran npm rebuild: exit <n> | The rebuild safedeps ran failed with that status. |

These three lines say what safedeps did, not what the command carries. safedeps does not read the command for the flag. "did not add" does not say whether install scripts ran: the command may set the flag itself, in its words, its environment or an .npmrc. On Codex safedeps cannot add it.

Each of the three is said only where the post hook found the pre-guard's record of this command. A rollback by the backstop has none of them. The backstop runs because the post hook found no such record, found one whose snapshot has no meta file, found one that names no snapshot, or found a record that is not one JSON object, and its headline says which ("this hook found no record of this command from before it ran", "this hook found a pre-guard record, and the snapshot it names has no meta file", "this hook found a pre-guard record, and the record names no snapshot", or "this hook found a pre-guard record, and the record is not one JSON object"). For a call that names no tool_use_id the record may still exist under a key the post hook did not compute, and a snapshot with no meta file, or none at all, holds no record of the rewrite, so the backstop does not say what safedeps did.

Each line is said only from a fact the record states. A record carries a version, and only a version 2 record, written since v2.18.0, states these facts. In it, "safedeps did not rewrite the command" is the value false, and "safedeps rewrote it" is the value true together with the command it wrote. A v2.17.2 record has no version and states neither. Its false did not mean no rewrite, because its write could fail while the rewrite still went out, and its true holds no command to compare. A record like that, a missing one, or one that does not state either fact gets none of the three lines, and advisory.log names the record. A record the post hook could not read, such as a file that is not one JSON object, gets none either, and advisory.log says it could not read it. Each of these used to get "did not add" or "asked" from a value the record did not hold, and the line could be false.

The record a post hook uses is the record of its own call. The pre-guard keeps the record of an install under the call's tool_use_id, which both hooks of one call receive and no other call does, and the post hook reads that record and no other. When two sessions run the same command in the same directory at the same time, each post hook uses its own call's record. A call refused after the pre-guard let it through runs no post hook, and neither does a call cancelled while it runs. Its record waits for the 24-hour cleanup; no later call reads it. Until v2.18.1 the record was found by the directory the command ran in and the command, and in both cases a post hook could use the other call's record: every line that came from it could be about the other call, and a rollback with no confirmed snapshot restored the other call's snapshot, so an edit made between the two calls was lost. A hook input that names no tool_use_id is still matched that way, and advisory.log says so; Claude Code and Codex both send one. A failed call is judged too. Claude Code runs PostToolUseFailure, not PostToolUse, after a Bash call that ran and failed, and the installer registers the post hook for both, so a failed install is checked like any other and leaves no record. Codex runs PostToolUse after a failed Bash call. The one record per machine that a pre-guard kept before records were kept per install (current_state, current_snapshot_id) names no call and is not read. A record can also outlast its snapshot: a record lasts 24 hours, and the snapshot cleanup can remove its snapshot sooner. A call whose record names a snapshot with no meta file goes to the backstop, and advisory.log names the record. So does a call whose record names no snapshot, which only a damaged record does, and a call whose record is not one JSON object. Until v2.18.0 the post hook stopped at the first two, said nothing, and did not check the install. The third ended it with an error on every call of that command for 24 hours. A record that names no project directory is judged in the directory the command ran in, never in the hook's own working directory. A rollback to a confirmed snapshot always uses the confirmed snapshot of the directory being judged, whatever else a damaged record says. The tests run two overlapping calls of one command, one per engine, and check that each speaks from its own record.

The report of an unfinished rollback has the same shape. Its Rollback snapshot: line says whether the project's confirmed record names that snapshot when the report is written, as the rollback message does. Owner: is the test that showed the process is not at work: it is not running, it is a zombie, its pid belongs to a process that started later, or it is stopped. A stopped owner has not died. The rollback resumes if the process is continued, so decide what to do with that process before you repair the project. Under Checked at the time of this report the report says what node_modules is and lists only the monitored files that are not what the snapshot holds. Check those files before you trust them, then reinstall.

Warnings about a registry that is not the public one, and about a tree safedeps would not rebuild, are still sentences. They tell you to confirm with the user before you rebuild, and that is on purpose.

Why "reorg"?

The name borrows from blockchain, where a reorganization (reorg) invalidates a sequence of unconfirmed blocks and reverts the chain to its last confirmed safe state. safedeps treats every install the same way: an unconfirmed block candidate until it passes a battery of supply-chain checks. If the installed effect diverges, the tool performs a reorg. It rolls the lock file and package.json back to the last confirmed safe snapshot, or to the state before the command when the project has none yet. It removes node_modules when the command is seen to have written it, and the next install puts it back through the gate.

But the reorg is the backstop, not the front line. Most bad installs never reach it: the pre-approval gate denies an unapproved or flagged package before it runs, and on Claude Code the install runs inert (--ignore-scripts) so lifecycle scripts do not execute until the closure verifies clean. The reorg fires for the residual case -- an approved direct package that pulls in an unapproved or vulnerable transitive, or a wrapped command that slips past the advisory layer -- and even then it rolls back files that never got to run.

Fast advisory feedback, observable rollback, and no hidden fallback. The command guard is best-effort UX; the installed effect is the backstop.

The Blockchain Analogy

| Blockchain Concept | Safedeps Equivalent | |---|---| | Block candidate | Snapshot taken before npm install | | Block validation | Post-install effect checks (npm closure, scripts, lock diff, binaries) | | Finality / confirmation | The verified post-install state, recorded as a snapshot and written to ~/.safedeps/confirmed_<dir hash> | | Chain reorganization | Rollback to the last confirmed snapshot, or to the state before the command when there is none, and node_modules removed when the command wrote it | | Parent hash linking | parent_snapshot_id in each snapshot's _meta.json | | Chain pruning | Old unconfirmed snapshots cleaned up, confirmed chain preserved |

Detection Rules

| Category | What it catches | Phase | Action | |---|---|---|---| | Typosquatting | Known misspelling patterns of popular packages | PreToolUse advisory guard | Block | | Pipe execution | curl \| bash, wget \| sh | PreToolUse advisory guard | Block | | Registry hijack | A registry outside the public ones, named with --registry | PreToolUse advisory guard | Block | | Configured registry | A registry outside the public ones, from an .npmrc or npm_config_registry (asked of npm) | PostToolUse effect verify | Keep, no rebuild | | Script safety bypass | npm config set ignore-scripts false | PreToolUse advisory guard | Block | | Command indirection | eval "npm install ...", subshell expansion, variable indirection | PreToolUse advisory guard | Guard | | npx/dlx execution | npx, npm exec, pnpm dlx, yarn dlx, bunx, uvx, pipx run package execution, and npm create/npm init <initializer>, pnpm create, yarn create, bun create | PreToolUse advisory guard | Guard | | Unapproved transitive dependency | npm package-lock.json package missing from direct ledger or transitive_specs | PostToolUse npm primary effect gate | Reorg | | Vulnerable closure package | npm direct/transitive package with OSV/KEV hit | PostToolUse npm primary effect gate | Reorg | | Malicious install scripts | Network calls, eval/exec, sensitive path access in hooks | PostToolUse effect verify | Reorg | | Obfuscated code | Base64, hex encoding, Buffer.from in install scripts | PostToolUse effect verify | Reorg | | Non-standard sources | A resolved URL outside the public registries, or a linked directory that is not a declared workspace, that the install brought in (a committed lockfile installs as recorded; see the boundaries) | PostToolUse effect verify | Reorg | | Insecure protocols | An http:// or git:// resolved URL that the install brought in | PostToolUse effect verify | Reorg | | Dependency confusion | >50 new dependencies in a single install | PostToolUse effect verify | Reorg | | Native binaries | Compiled executables in node_modules/.bin/ | PostToolUse effect verify | Reorg |

Secret-Leak Lane (per-repo)

The install-time gate is global, but stopping a secret or a real .env from being committed is per-repo and stays opt-in — its detection policy lives in each repo, not in safedeps. safedeps doctor is the entry point that closes that gap.

# Diagnose this repo's posture (read-only). Exits non-zero if the secret lane has gaps.
$ safedeps doctor
safedeps doctor — repo security posture
repo:    /path/to/repo
profile: public

Secret-leak lane (per-repo)
  ✓ git worktree
  ✗ gitleaks config (.gitleaks.toml)             → safedeps hooks init --root "/path/to/repo"
  ✗ .githooks/pre-commit (present)               → safedeps hooks init --root "/path/to/repo"
  ✗ git hooks active (core.hooksPath=<unset>)    → safedeps hooks install --root "/path/to/repo"
  ✓ secret scanner available (gitleaks)

Dependency-install gate (global, all repos)
  ✓ dependency-install gate installed (~/.claude/skills/safedeps)

Remote repository governance (opt-in; no-runner vs CI-cost)
  ! remote PR security workflow (opt-in; may spend CI minutes)              → safedeps gates run --root "/path/to/repo" --strict
  – main direct-push protection for main (no runner minutes; opt-in)        → no-runner opt-in: require pull requests before updating main; do not require status checks unless CI cost is accepted
  – required PR status checks for main (CI-cost opt-in)                     → cost-bearing opt-in: add a safedeps workflow, then require it before merging main

3 gap(s) in the secret-leak lane.
Fix all at once:  safedeps doctor --fix --root "/path/to/repo"

# Scaffold the starter policy + activate the hooks (non-destructive).
$ safedeps doctor --fix

What the lane is made of:

safedeps hooks init scaffolds a starter .gitleaks.toml (or .gitleaks.private.toml for a private repo) and a .githooks/pre-commit. Existing files are kept, never overwritten — the repo owns the policy.
safedeps hooks install activates the repo-local hooks (core.hooksPath = .githooks).
The pre-commit hook runs two checks:
- Secret scan (safedeps scan secrets --staged) on every commit, fail-closed. If the scanner (local gitleaks or Docker) cannot run, it blocks the commit instead of skipping silently.
- Dependency audit (safedeps audit) on every commit in a repo that has a supported lockfile. It auto-detects the ecosystem from the lockfile(s) present — npm (package-lock.json), pnpm (pnpm-lock.yaml), yarn (yarn.lock), or bun (bun.lock) — and delegates to that tool's native audit. This catches a vulnerable direct or transitive dependency — including a CVE that was published after you installed the package ("looked safe then, flagged now"), the kind of thing a human never reviews by hand. Running it every commit (not only when the lockfile changes) is the point: it re-queries the advisory DB so a newly-disclosed CVE on an already-installed dependency surfaces at the very next commit. The verdict and an availability failure are kept apart: a real finding blocks (fail-closed), but if the advisory DB is unreachable (offline / registry error) the hook warns and lets the commit through — an observable availability failover, never a silent skip. (CI and the daily re-check then re-cover what the offline commit could not verify.)
The only intentional bypass is git commit --no-verify, which the human owns.

The scaffolded .gitleaks.toml is a starter you tune: it extends gitleaks' default ruleset, adds a rule for a committed .env with an assigned secret (the .env.example/.sample/.template variants are allowlisted), and leaves a repo-owned [allowlist] block for your fixtures. safedeps owns execution — running gitleaks via safedeps scan secrets — not the policy content.

safedeps doctor --json returns { command, repo, profile, gaps, ok, checks[] }; gaps/ok reflect the per-repo secret-leak lane only. Remote posture appears as lane: "remote" checks, but missing remote workflows, branch rules, or required status checks do not change ok. doctor --fix is local-only: it scaffolds repo hooks and never creates .github/workflows, enables GitHub Actions, or mutates branch protection. A no-runner branch rule that blocks direct pushes to main is recommended when the user asks for "install everything that does not cost money"; Actions-backed required checks are not included in that no-cost bundle.

Installation

Prerequisites

Claude Code with hook support
jq -- JSON parsing (hooks exit gracefully if missing)
shasum or sha256sum -- hash computation
file (optional) -- binary detection

# macOS
brew install jq

# Ubuntu / Debian
sudo apt-get install jq

Setup From GitHub (Skill + Hooks)

1. Clone the repository:

git clone https://github.com/aldegad/safedeps.git
cd safedeps

2. Install the skill + hooks:

node scripts/install/install-safedeps-hooks.mjs

The installer is idempotent. It symlinks the skill into ~/.claude/skills/safedeps and ~/.codex/skills/safedeps when those roots exist, patches the matching hook config, and — with --link-bin — can also place safedeps on PATH through ~/.local/bin. That PATH link is optional: the hooks name an absolute fallback path in their block messages, so the gate is self-contained and works with zero PATH setup.

3. Manual hook registration, if needed:

The registered command is the entry shim with pre or post, not the hook script itself — that is what the installer writes, and it is what turns a broken checkout into an explained fail-closed deny instead of a silently disabled gate. Registering the hook scripts directly still gates installs, but without that protection.

Edit .claude/settings.json (project-level) or ~/.claude/settings.json (global):

{
  "hooks": {
    "PreToolUse": [
      {
        "matcher": "Bash",
        "hooks": [
          {
            "type": "command",
            "command": "~/.claude/skills/safedeps/scripts/safedeps-hook-entry.sh pre",
            "timeout": 30
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "PostToolUse": [
      {
        "matcher": "Bash",
        "hooks": [
          {
            "type": "command",
            "command": "~/.claude/skills/safedeps/scripts/safedeps-hook-entry.sh post",
            "timeout": 30
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "PostToolUseFailure": [
      {
        "matcher": "Bash",
        "hooks": [
          {
            "type": "command",
            "command": "~/.claude/skills/safedeps/scripts/safedeps-hook-entry.sh post",
            "timeout": 30
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}

Claude Code runs PostToolUseFailure, not PostToolUse, after a Bash call that ran and failed, so the post hook is registered for both: an install that fails can still have written the project's tree. Codex runs PostToolUse after a failed call too and documents no PostToolUseFailure, so its config gets PreToolUse and PostToolUse only.

4. Verify permissions:

chmod +x ~/.claude/skills/safedeps/scripts/safedeps-hook-entry.sh
chmod +x ~/.claude/skills/safedeps/scripts/safedeps-pre-guard.sh
chmod +x ~/.claude/skills/safedeps/scripts/safedeps-post-verify.sh

That's it. The guard activates automatically whenever Claude Code or Codex CLI runs a package install command.

Setup From npm (CLI First)

npm install -g @aldegad/safedeps
safedeps version

npm puts safedeps on PATH through its standard bin entry. It does not register the agent skill or hooks for Claude Code / Codex. To enable the hooks from the npm-installed copy, run the installer from the installed package root:

cd "$(npm root -g)/@aldegad/safedeps"
node scripts/install/install-safedeps-hooks.mjs

The installer is idempotent and only adds symlinks/hook entries. The --link-bin flag is only useful when you installed via GitHub clone instead of npm — npm already places the CLI on PATH, so the flag is redundant in this path.

If you want the skill folder itself to be the canonical local source, prefer the GitHub setup above.

Daily Re-check With macOS Alerts

Install a per-user LaunchAgent to re-check the approved-spec ledger once per day:

node scripts/install/install-safedeps-recheck-agent.mjs install --hour 9 --minute 0

This runs safedeps re-check --json against ~/.safedeps/approved-specs/. It does not use LLM tokens; it only calls the advisory providers used by safedeps. If a new CVE/KEV is found, a spec is revoked, a provider check is skipped, or a ledger entry has no matching advisory.log approval record (a suspected forgery), the wrapper writes ~/.safedeps/recheck-alerts.jsonl and raises a macOS notification.

Useful commands:

node scripts/install/install-safedeps-recheck-agent.mjs status
node scripts/install/install-safedeps-recheck-agent.mjs uninstall
tail -f ~/.safedeps/recheck.log

Real-World Attack Coverage

safedeps is designed to catch the patterns behind real supply-chain incidents:

event-stream (2018) -- Malicious postinstall script with obfuscated code that exfiltrated cryptocurrency wallet keys. Caught by: install script analysis (obfuscation + network access detection).
ua-parser-js hijack (2021) -- Compromised package added a preinstall script that downloaded and executed cryptominers. Caught by: install script analysis (network access + code execution).
colors / faker sabotage (2022) -- While these were author-initiated, the abnormal dependency behavior would trigger the dependency explosion check.
Typosquatting campaigns -- Ongoing campaigns publishing packages like crossenv (instead of cross-env) or babelcli (instead of babel-cli). Caught by: pre-flight typosquatting pattern matching.
Dependency confusion attacks --