@atlasent/safeguard-manifest

Versioned, deterministic projection of the authoritative safeguard package (contract/safeguard-pack/) into the design / EXPECTED facts a consumer needs to render the console SafeguardMap — per protected action: owner, authority, expected evidence sources, and expected gates.

What this is (and is NOT)

• IS: expected/design truth. What each safeguard is designed to require.
• IS NOT: runtime observed state. It carries no enforcement mode in effect, verification status, coverage, or observed gaps. Those stay live in the runtime and are joined by the consumer.

The manifest exists so the console never hand-maintains a semantic copy that can drift from the Canon / package. This is the single authoritative feed.

The three states it enables

The consumer joins this manifest with live runtime facts to produce a reconciliation view over three distinct states:

| State | Source | |---|---| | Expected | this manifest (versioned safeguard package) | | Configured | runtime — current configuration (enforcement mode, bound bundle) | | Proven | runtime — execution + verification evidence (verification_events, coverage) |

A safeguard is not "covered" merely because it is in the package (Expected) or configured in runtime (Configured) — coverage requires observed runtime + acceptance evidence (Proven). Where Expected and Configured/Proven disagree, the consumer displays the discrepancy as a gap; it must not reconcile or reinterpret it.

Regeneration & determinism

The JSON is generated by scripts/generate-safeguard-manifest.py (in the repo root) from the authoritative YAML. It is deterministic — same inputs produce byte-identical output, so CI fails on any unexpected regeneration diff:

python3 scripts/generate-safeguard-manifest.py           # regenerate
python3 scripts/generate-safeguard-manifest.py --check    # CI: fail if stale

Do not hand-edit safeguard-manifest.json. Change the authoritative contract/safeguard-pack/* YAML and regenerate.

Provenance

• provenance.source_files[] records the SHA-256 of each authoritative input — identifying the exact inputs deterministically (no volatile git SHA / timestamp in the artifact, so --check stays stable).
• Release/commit provenance is bound at publish time via npm --provenance (Sigstore keyless, same trust model as the other AtlaSent published packages).

Distribution & pinning

Published through the existing packages release path (v1_1-release.yml packs + cosign-signs every non-private packages/* on a version tag). Consumers pin an explicit manifest_version / package version — never silently consume "latest" — and validate the manifest against safeguard-manifest.schema.json (schema_version + provenance) before use.

Usage

import {
  safeguardManifest,
  getSafeguardAction,
  SAFEGUARD_MANIFEST_VERSION,
} from "@atlasent/safeguard-manifest";

const deploy = getSafeguardAction("production.deploy");
deploy?.owner_role;                 // expected owner (design)
deploy?.expected_evidence_sources;  // expected evidence sources (design)