attestto-trust

Independent public mirror of national digital signature trust roots and intermediates. Hash-pinned, version-controlled, git history is the audit trail.

Browse the live directory at trust.attestto.org — every mirrored root and intermediate, per country, with its SHA-256 fingerprint, validity window, key algorithm, CRL/OCSP endpoints, and a one-click .pem download.

@attestto/trust is a critical trust infrastructure piece for the Attestto Open ecosystem. Most national PKI repositories are partially broken — wrong content-types, half-deployed HTTPS, mixed-case URL quirks, missing branches, dead links. Every developer integrating a country's digital signature stack hits the same wall. This repo mirrors the binary bytes published by each country's issuing authority as-is, hash-pinned, and version-controlled. The legal source of truth remains the issuing authority in each country. We are not a Certificate Authority — we do not issue, reissue, sign, or vouch for any certificate. Always verify the SHA-256 against the issuing authority's repository when you can reach it.

Architecture

graph LR
    A["National PKI<br/>Authorities"] -->|publish certs| B["attestto-trust<br/>mirror"]
    B -->|hash-pinned<br/>version-controlled| C["Git history<br/>audit trail"]
    B -->|CA chains| D["attestto-verify"]
    B -->|CA chains| E["attestto-desktop"]
    B -->|trust roots| F["@attestto/verify<br/>web component"]

Quick start

Install

git clone https://github.com/Attestto-com/attestto-trust.git
cd attestto-trust
pnpm install  # for script dependencies

Use in your app

Copy certificates to your trust store:

cp attestto-trust/countries/cr/current/*.pem your-app/trust-store/cr/

Verify against the bundle:

openssl verify -CAfile attestto-trust/countries/cr/current/chain.pem your-signed-doc.pem

Verify a cert's hash:

sha256sum attestto-trust/countries/cr/current/root-ca.pem
# compare against attestto-trust/countries/cr/current/manifest.json

Countries

| Country | Package export | Live page | Authority | |---|---|---|---| | Costa Rica | cr/ | trust.attestto.org/cr | BCCR / SINPE / MICITT Firma Digital | | Brazil | br/ | /br | ITI — ICP-Brasil | | Argentina | ar/ | /ar | AC Raíz de la República Argentina | | Spain | es/ | /es | FNMT-RCM (Ceres) | | Austria | at/ | /at | RTR / Telekom-Control-Kommission (TKK) eIDAS Trusted List | | Belgium | be/ | /be | FPS Economy (Federal Public Service Economy) eIDAS Trusted List | | Czech Republic | cz/ | /cz | DIA (Digitální a informační agentura) eIDAS Trusted List | | Denmark | dk/ | /dk | Digitaliseringsstyrelsen (Danish Agency for Digital Government) eIDAS Trusted List | | Estonia | ee/ | /ee | RIA — SK ID Solutions / Zetes (eIDAS) | | Finland | fi/ | /fi | Traficom (Liikenne- ja viestintävirasto) eIDAS Trusted List / DVV FINeID | | France | fr/ | /fr | ANSSI eIDAS Trusted List (~20 QTSPs) | | Germany | de/ | /de | Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) eIDAS Trusted List | | Greece | gr/ | /gr | EETT (Hellenic Telecommunications and Post Commission) eIDAS Trusted List | | Hungary | hu/ | /hu | NMHH (National Media and Infocommunications Authority) eIDAS Trusted List | | Italy | it/ | /it | AgID eIDAS Trusted List (~25 QTSPs) + CIE national eID | | Latvia | lv/ | /lv | DDUK (Digitālās drošības uzraudzības komiteja) eIDAS Trusted List / LVRTC eParaksts | | Lithuania | lt/ | /lt | RRT (Ryšių reguliavimo tarnyba) eIDAS Trusted List | | Netherlands | nl/ | /nl | RDI (Rijksinspectie Digitale Infrastructuur) eIDAS Trusted List | | Norway | no/ | /no | Nkom (Nasjonal kommunikasjonsmyndighet) eIDAS Trusted List | | Peru | pe/ | /pe | INDECOPI — IOFE (RENIEC, ONPE, ECERNEP) | | Poland | pl/ | /pl | NCCert (Narodowe Centrum Certyfikacji) / NBP eIDAS Trusted List | | Portugal | pt/ | /pt | GNS — Autoridade Credenciadora / SCEE eIDAS Trusted List | | Sweden | se/ | /se | PTS (Post- och telestyrelsen) eIDAS Trusted List |

More countries are staged and land after a per-country promotion review: Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, Panama, and other European trusted lists. Italy's full qualified-signature list (229 accredited-QTSP CAs), Germany's (101 accredited-QTSP CAs), Greece's (105 accredited-QTSP CAs), France's (79 accredited-QTSP CAs), the Netherlands' (30 accredited-QTSP CAs), Belgium's (52 accredited-QTSP CAs), Austria's (39 accredited-QTSP CAs), Portugal's (30 accredited-QTSP CAs), Poland's (29 accredited-QTSP CAs), Hungary's (62 accredited-QTSP CAs), the Czech Republic's (34 accredited-QTSP CAs), Norway's (26 accredited-QTSP CAs), Finland's (12 DVV/VRK FINeID CAs), Lithuania's (11 accredited-QTSP CAs), Sweden's (8 accredited-QTSP CAs), Denmark's (5 accredited-QTSP CAs), and Latvia's (5 accredited-QTSP CAs) are now live, promoted wholesale after verifying each national Trusted List's XAdES signature through the EU LOTL chain of trust (see scripts/monitors/verify-eu-tsl.mjs).

Global / organizational anchors

Beyond national PKI, the directory mirrors global organizational-identity roots under anchors/. The first is GLEIF vLEI (anchors/gleif-vlei/), the GLEIF root of trust and its authorized Qualified vLEI Issuers, hash-pinned and version-controlled. vLEI is KERI/ACDC (not X.509), pinned as an AID key-state rather than a CA certificate. We mirror what GLEIF publishes and do not issue or vouch for any credential. See trust.attestto.org/gleif.

Key concepts

Certificate manifest

Each country has a manifest.json listing all certificates with their hashes and metadata:

[
  {
    "filename": "root-ca.pem",
    "sha256": "a1b2c3...",
    "subject": "CN=CA RAIZ NACIONAL - COSTA RICA v2, ...",
    "issuer": "CN=CA RAIZ NACIONAL - COSTA RICA v2, ...",
    "validFrom": "2015-07-09",
    "validTo": "2035-07-09",
    "role": "root"
  },
  ...
]

Use this to audit what's installed and verify against the issuing authority's published repository.

Audit trail

Every cert added, rotated, or retired is a git commit with a clear message describing what changed and why. The full git history is the source of truth for the certificate lifecycle.

git log --follow countries/cr/current/

Repository layout

attestto-trust/
├── README.md                      ← you are here
├── scripts/
│   ├── extract-chain-from-pdf.mjs ← extract certs from signed PDFs
│   ├── generate-exports.mjs       ← regenerate JS/TS exports from PEM files
│   └── refresh-manifest.mjs       ← regenerate manifest.json + chain.pem
├── countries/
│   └── <iso2>/
│       ├── README.md              ← country-specific notes + CA hierarchy
│       ├── current/               ← certs currently active
│       │   ├── *.pem
│       │   ├── chain.pem          ← all-in-one bundle
│       │   └── manifest.json      ← sha256, subject, issuer, valid dates
│       ├── archive/               ← superseded certs, kept forever
│       └── samples/               ← signed docs (when redistributable)
└── .github/workflows/verify.yml   ← CI: verify all cert hashes on every push

Using the certificates

Drop into your trust store

git clone https://github.com/Attestto-com/attestto-trust.git
cp attestto-trust/countries/cr/current/*.pem your-app/trust-store/cr/

Verify against the bundle

openssl verify -CAfile attestto-trust/countries/cr/current/chain.pem some-signer.pem

Verify a cert's hash before using it

sha256sum attestto-trust/countries/cr/current/root-ca.pem
# compare against attestto-trust/countries/cr/current/manifest.json sha256 field

Updating an existing country

When the issuing authority rotates a cert (root or intermediate):

1. Move the old PEM from countries/<iso2>/current/ into countries/<iso2>/archive/<year>/
2. Drop the new PEM into countries/<iso2>/current/
3. Run node scripts/refresh-manifest.mjs — rebuilds manifest.json + chain.pem
4. Run node scripts/generate-exports.mjs — regenerates JS exports + .d.ts types
5. Commit with a clear message: "cr: rotate CA SINPE PERSONA FISICA v2 → v3, expires 2032"
6. Push

Adding a country

mkdir -p countries/<iso2>/{current,archive,samples}

# Extract intermediates from any signed sample document for that country
node scripts/extract-chain-from-pdf.mjs ~/Downloads/some-signed.pdf /tmp/out

# Inspect, then move the relevant intermediates into countries/<iso2>/current/
cp /tmp/out/*.pem countries/<iso2>/current/

# Generate manifest + chain.pem + JS exports
node scripts/refresh-manifest.mjs
node scripts/generate-exports.mjs

# Write country-specific notes + CA hierarchy diagram
vi countries/<iso2>/README.md

# Commit
git add countries/<iso2> index.js
git commit -m "<iso2>: initial trust mirror — N certs"

Update the country table in this README and open a pull request. CI will verify all hashes.

Publishing a release

The package is published to npm as @attestto/trust. Publish whenever the certificate set changes (a country added, or a cert rotated).

1. Land the cert changes on main and confirm CI is green.
2. Bump the version so the registry and git stay in lockstep — patch for a cert rotation, minor for a new country:

   npm version patch   # or: npm version minor

3. Publish (the scoped package requires public access; prepublishOnly runs the test suite first):

   npm publish --access public

4. Push the version commit and tag:

   git push --follow-tags

Never republish an existing version — bump first. The files allow-list in package.json ships only the JS exports, PEMs, and manifests (no scripts, samples, or archive).

Limitations

We are not a Certificate Authority — we don't issue, reissue, sign, or vouch for any certificate. We are not an OCSP/CRL responder — revocation is time-sensitive, get it from the issuing authority directly. We deliberately don't mirror CRLs because a stale CRL is worse than none. If our mirror disagrees with the issuing authority's published repository, the authoritative source wins — open an issue and we'll fix it.

Ecosystem

| Repo | Role | Relationship | |---|---|---| | attestto-verify | Web verification component | Uses these trust roots for signature verification | | attestto-desktop | Desktop signer/verifier | Verifies documents against these roots | | attestto-anchor | Solana hash anchoring | Anchors identity & signature metadata | | cr-vc-schemas | Costa Rica credential schemas | Defines the vLEI/Firma Digital signing mechanism |

Build with an LLM

This repo ships a llms.txt context file — a machine-readable summary of the API, data structures, and integration patterns designed to be read by AI coding assistants.

Recommended setup

Use the attestto-dev-mcp server to give your LLM active access to the ecosystem:

cd ../attestto-dev-mcp
npm install && npm run build

Then add it to your Claude / Cursor / Windsurf config and ask:

"Explore the Attestto ecosystem and help me set up [this component]"

Which model?

We recommend Claude Pro (5× usage vs free) or higher. Long context and strong TypeScript reasoning handle this codebase well. The MCP server works with any LLM that supports tool use.

Quick start: Ask your LLM to read llms.txt in this repo, then describe what you want to build. It will find the right archetype, generate boilerplate, and walk you through the first run.

Contributing

We welcome contributions. To add a country, open a PR following the layout above. CI will verify all certificate hashes automatically. For questions about trust roots or PKI hierarchy, open an issue with a reference to the issuing authority's published repository.

License

The certificates are public-key X.509 published by national issuing authorities; freely redistributable. Scripts and documentation are Apache-2.0. See LICENSE.

Provenance: Maintained by Attestto as part of public-good work on national digital identity infrastructure. See https://attestto.org/ark.

If you find a cert that's missing, expired, or mishashed, open an issue with a sample signed document we can extract from, and we'll get it in.