@bolyra/delegation v0.2

SD-JWT (draft-20) + KB-JWT delegation receipts with IETF status-list (draft-20) revocation.

@bolyra/delegation is the lightweight on-ramp into the Bolyra protocol. A human (or upstream agent) issues a scoped, holder-bound receipt; the holder presents it with a fresh key-binding JWT; middleware verifies before the agent calls a tool. Standards-aligned wire format means downstream verifiers can audit the receipt with off-the-shelf SD-JWT tooling.

Wire format

<issuer-jws>~~<kb-jwt>

• Issuer JWS — typ: "bolyra-delegation+sd-jwt", alg: "EdDSA", _sd_alg: "sha-256". Payload includes cnf.jwk (holder pubkey) and _sd: [] (zero disclosures in v0.2).
• KB-JWT — typ: "kb+jwt", signed by the holder. Payload {aud, nonce, sd_hash, iat} per SD-JWT draft-20 §4.3.
• The empty middle segment between the two ~ separators is the zero-disclosure slot mandated by draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-20.

Install

npm install @bolyra/delegation

API

import {
  allow,
  present,
  verify,
  staticIssuerResolver,
  fetchStatusList,
} from "@bolyra/delegation";

// Issuer signs a scoped, holder-bound receipt.
const receipt = await allow(
  {
    iss: "https://issuer.example",
    sub: "did:bolyra:holder",
    aud: "https://merchant.example",
    act: "spend",
    perm: "FINANCIAL_SMALL",
    agentPubKey: holderPublicKey,
    ttlSeconds: 3600,
    max: { amount: 5000, currency: "USD" },
  },
  { privateKey: issuerPrivateKey, kid: "k1" },
);

// Holder produces a presentation with a fresh KB-JWT.
const presented = await present(receipt, holderPrivateKey, {
  audience: "https://merchant.example",
  nonce: "fresh-server-nonce",
});

// Verifier validates the receipt + KB-JWT + (optionally) status-list.
const trustedIssuers = staticIssuerResolver({
  "https://issuer.example": { k1: issuerPublicKey },
});

const result = await verify(presented, {
  audience: "https://merchant.example",
  action: "spend",
  perm: "FINANCIAL_SMALL",
  kbNonce: "fresh-server-nonce",
  amount: 1000,
  currency: "USD",
  trustedIssuers,
  // Optional: revocation via IETF status-list draft-20.
  checkStatus: (uri, idx, expectedIss) =>
    fetchStatusList(uri, idx, expectedIss, { verifyKey: trustedIssuers }),
});

if (!result.ok) throw new Error(`delegation rejected: ${result.reason}`);
// proceed with the call

Permission model

The 8-bit cumulative encoding mirrors circuits/Delegation.circom so receipts are upgrade-compatible with full ZKP delegation later.

| Bit | Permission | Notes | |-----|------------|-------| | 0 | READ_DATA | | | 1 | WRITE_DATA | | | 2 | FINANCIAL_SMALL | < $100 | | 3 | FINANCIAL_MEDIUM | < $10K (implies bit 2) | | 4 | FINANCIAL_UNLIMITED | implies bits 2 + 3 | | 5 | SIGN_ON_BEHALF | | | 6 | SUB_DELEGATE | | | 7 | ACCESS_PII | |

In v0.2, perm is passed as the string label (e.g. "FINANCIAL_SMALL"); the verifier expands cumulative implication internally.

Migration from v0.1

• v0.1 plain-JWS receipts still verify if you pass acceptLegacyV01: true to verify(). The result includes legacyV01: true.
• New issuance must use allow() (v0.2 only — produces SD-JWT issuer form).
• Holders must sign the KB-JWT with the private key matching cnf.jwk in the receipt.
• Status-list revocation is opt-in: set claims.status.status_list = { uri, idx } at issuance and pass checkStatus to verify().

Failure reasons

VerifyFailureReason is a discriminated union of 51 enumerated reasons (plus "UNKNOWN" as a catch-all default). Every enumerated reason is exercised by at least one test under test/conformance/. The negative-space gate (test/conformance/negative-space.test.ts) enforces full coverage in CI.

Reasons partition into five families:

• Envelope — BAD_FORMAT, INVALID_SIGNATURE, UNSUPPORTED_ALG, TYP_MISMATCH, KID_MISSING, KID_RESOLVER_ERROR, UNKNOWN_ISSUER_KID, LEGACY_V01_REJECTED
• Claims — EXPIRED, FUTURE_NBF, WRONG_ISSUER, WRONG_AUDIENCE, WRONG_SUBJECT, WRONG_ACTION, MISSING_CLAIM, PARENT_NOT_FOUND, DELEGATION_LOOP, PERMISSION_VIOLATION, AMOUNT_EXCEEDS_CAP, CURRENCY_MISMATCH
• Selective disclosure — DISCLOSURE_TAMPERED, DISCLOSURE_HASH_MISMATCH, UNDISCLOSED_CLAIM_REQUIRED, DUPLICATE_DISCLOSURE, MALFORMED_DISCLOSURE, SD_ALG_UNSUPPORTED, SD_JWT_MALFORMED
• Key binding — CNF_MISSING, CNF_KEY_MISMATCH, CNF_JWK_INVALID, KB_MISSING, KB_NONCE_REQUIRED, KB_BAD_FORMAT, KB_INVALID_SIGNATURE, KB_WRONG_NONCE, KB_WRONG_AUDIENCE, KB_WRONG_SD_HASH, KB_TYP_INVALID, KB_ALG_UNSUPPORTED, KB_IAT_FUTURE, KB_IAT_TOO_OLD, KB_BINDING_MISMATCH
• Status list — STATUS_REVOKED, STATUS_SUSPENDED, STATUS_CHECK_UNCONFIGURED, STATUS_LIST_INVALID, STATUS_LIST_SIG_INVALID, STATUS_LIST_ISSUER_MISMATCH, STATUS_LIST_UNREACHABLE, STATUS_INDEX_OUT_OF_RANGE

Standards

• SD-JWT: draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-20
• KB-JWT: same draft, §4.3
• Status list: draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-20 (2-bit slots, zlib RFC 1950, base64url)
• JWK thumbprint: RFC 7638
• Media types: application/bolyra-delegation+sd-jwt, application/statuslist+jwt, application/kb+jwt

Roadmap

• v0.1: EdDSA-signed plain JWS receipts (back-compat shim retained in v0.2).
• v0.2 (now): SD-JWT + KB-JWT + IETF status-list revocation.
• v0.3: ZKP-wrapped receipts (via @bolyra/sdk + Circom Delegation circuit). Privacy-preserving issuer + agent identity.

License

Apache-2.0. Patent grant per Apache 2.0 §3 (US provisional 64/043,898 filed 2026-04-20). DCO sign-off required for contributions (see CONTRIBUTING.md in repo root).