@dpo2u/client-sdk

TypeScript client for dpo2u-solana — on-chain compliance attestations, DPDP India Consent Manager, and AES-GCM encrypted off-chain storage.

Built for LGPD (Brazil), GDPR (EU), DPDP (India), MiCAR (EU), PDPA (Singapore), and ADGM (UAE) compliance workflows on Solana.

Install

npm install @dpo2u/client-sdk
# or
pnpm add @dpo2u/client-sdk

The package ships the IDLs it needs (compliance_registry.json, consent_manager.json) bundled in dist/idl/ — no Anchor build required on the consumer side.

CLI

A global CLI ships with the package. Use it directly via npx:

npx dpo2u-cli --help

# LGPD / GDPR — submit a ZK-verified attestation
npx dpo2u-cli attest \
  --cluster devnet \
  --keypair ~/.config/solana/id.json \
  --subject-label "did:br:cnpj:12.345.678/0001-99" \
  --proof ./proof.bin \
  --public-values ./public_values.bin \
  --upload ./dpia.pdf \
  --backend shdw \
  --shdw-storage-account <PDA> \
  --encrypt-key $(openssl rand -hex 32)        # AES-GCM encrypt before upload

# DPDP India — record an on-chain Consent Event
npx dpo2u-cli consent record \
  --cluster devnet \
  --keypair ~/.config/solana/id.json \
  --user <USER_PUBKEY> \
  --purpose-code 1 \
  --purpose-text "marketing_communications" \
  --upload ./consent_terms.pdf \
  --encrypt-key <hex32>

# DPDP India — user revokes consent (§6(4))
npx dpo2u-cli consent revoke \
  --cluster devnet \
  --keypair <USER_KEYPAIR> \
  --consent-pda <PDA> \
  --reason "DPDP_SEC12_REQUEST_2026-04-22"

# LGPD Art. 18 — erase off-chain payload + revoke on-chain attestation
npx dpo2u-cli erase \
  --cluster mainnet-beta \
  --subject <SUBJECT> \
  --commitment 0x... \
  --reason "LGPD_ART_18_REQUEST_2026-04-22"

Library usage

1 — Compliance attestation (LGPD/GDPR)

import { DPO2UClient } from '@dpo2u/client-sdk';
import { Keypair } from '@solana/web3.js';
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';

const signer = Keypair.fromSecretKey(
  Uint8Array.from(JSON.parse(readFileSync('./wallet.json', 'utf-8')))
);
const client = new DPO2UClient({ cluster: 'devnet', signer });

const { signature, attestationPda, explorerUrl } = await client.attestWithProof({
  subject: signer.publicKey,
  proof: readFileSync('./proof.bin'),
  publicInputs: readFileSync('./public_values.bin'),
  storageUri: 'ipfs://QmYourDPIADoc',
});

console.log(`Attestation → ${attestationPda.toBase58()}`);
console.log(`Explorer    → ${explorerUrl}`);

Automatically prepends ComputeBudgetProgram.setComputeUnitLimit({ units: 400_000 }) because the SP1 Groth16 CPI pairing check consumes ~156k CU.

2 — DPDP India Consent Manager

import { DPO2UConsentClient } from '@dpo2u/client-sdk';

const consent = new DPO2UConsentClient({ cluster: 'devnet', signer });

// Fiduciary records consent
const { consentPda } = await consent.recordConsent({
  user: userPubkey,
  purposeCode: 1,
  purposeText: 'marketing_communications',
  storageUri: 'ipfs://QmTermoAssinado',
});

// User later revokes — only the user may revoke (on-chain enforced)
await consent.revokeConsent({
  consent: consentPda,
  reason: 'DPDP_SEC12_REQUEST',
});

3 — Encrypted storage (AES-256-GCM envelope)

Wrap any StorageBackend with client-side encryption so public gateways (Shadow Drive, IPFS) never see plaintext PII:

import {
  ShdwDriveBackend,
  EncryptedStorageBackend,
  keyFromHex,
} from '@dpo2u/client-sdk';
import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';

const inner = await ShdwDriveBackend.init({ connection, wallet, storageAccount });
const key = new Uint8Array(randomBytes(32)); // or: keyFromHex(process.env.DPO2U_KEY)
const encrypted = new EncryptedStorageBackend(inner, key);

// Upload is automatically encrypted (magic | nonce | tag | ciphertext)
const url = await encrypted.upload(pdfBytes, 'dpia.pdf');
// Fetch decrypts transparently
const plaintext = await encrypted.fetch(url);

// Inner backend (what Shadow Drive actually stores) sees only ciphertext.
// Erasure: delete() is unchanged semantics.

Wire format: [magic("DPO2U\x01") | nonce(12) | auth_tag(16) | ciphertext]. Tamper attempts and wrong keys fail cleanly with EncryptedBackendError.

4 — Compliance erasure flow (LGPD Art. 18 / DPDP §12)

import { DPO2UClient, ShdwDriveBackend } from '@dpo2u/client-sdk';

// 1 — delete off-chain payload
await backend.delete(rec.storageUri);

// 2 — revoke on-chain (keeps audit trail)
await client.revokeAttestation({
  attestation: attestationPda,
  reason: 'LGPD_ART_18_REQUEST_2026-04-22',
});
// PDA now has { revoked_at: <timestamp>, revocation_reason: "..." }
// Commitment hash remains as non-PII evidence

Layout

| Module | Purpose | |---|---| | DPO2UClient | compliance-registry — verified-attestation + revoke + fetch | | DPO2UConsentClient | consent-manager — record / revoke / fetch consent (DPDP India) | | EncryptedStorageBackend | AES-256-GCM envelope over any storage backend | | ShdwDriveBackend | Shadow Drive v1 (mainnet-only, mutable, LGPD-compliant) | | IpfsBackend | Public IPFS gateway (read-only) | | MockBackend | In-memory backend for tests | | PROGRAM_IDS / CONSENT_MANAGER_PROGRAM_ID / VERIFIER_PROGRAM_ID | Canonical devnet program addresses |

Regulatory mapping

| Primitive | Satisfies | |---|---| | create_verified_attestation (SP1 ZK CPI) | LGPD Art. 38 DPIA · GDPR Art. 35 · DPDP §10(2)(c) | | record_consent + SHA-256 purpose_hash | DPDP §6(1) (clear and specific purpose) | | revoke_consent (user-only signer check) | DPDP §6(4) (withdrawal as easy as grant) | | EncryptedStorageBackend + delete() | LGPD Art. 18 · GDPR Art. 17 · DPDP §12(3) | | ComputeBudgetProgram.setComputeUnitLimit(400k) | Solana CU budget for pairing check (~156k CU) |

License

MIT © DPO2U