@dwk/webdav

A WebDAV (RFC 4918, Class 2) façade over a Solid pod, so the storage a user already owns can be mounted as a network drive by the file managers built into every major OS — macOS Finder, Windows Explorer, the GNOME/KDE managers, iOS Files — with zero install and no app.

It is one pod, a second door: WebDAV exposes the same resources @dwk/solid-pod serves, not a parallel tree, so the files you reach in Finder are your pod. Solid gives the pod meaning (RDF, LDP, WAC, N3 Patch); WebDAV gives the user a way to touch their files from hardware they already own.

Status: in progress. This package is being built bottom-up from spec/packages/webdav.md. It now ships the protocol core and the Class 2 verb router (createWebdav) plus the lock and app-password DO-SQLite stores; the concrete SolidPodObject backend adapter that resolves the WebdavBackend seam onto the per-pod Durable Object is the remaining increment. See the spec for the four load-bearing decisions.

What's implemented today

Class 2 verb router

• createWebdav(config) — the RFC 4918 Class 2 request handler: OPTIONS (advertising DAV: 1, 2), PROPFIND (Depth: 0/1), PROPPATCH (live/known-only), MKCOL, GET/HEAD, PUT, DELETE, COPY/MOVE, and LOCK/UNLOCK. It generates the multistatus / lockdiscovery XML, infers content types, applies the optional OS-litter denylist, and maps backend errors to 412/409/423. Auxiliary .acl / .meta resources are 404 to every verb and omitted from listings. (spec §3)
• Auth bridge — HTTPS-only HTTP Basic resolving an app password to a WebID, with scope ∩ WAC least privilege. (spec §1)

Authoritative DO-SQLite state

• LockStore — exclusive write locks in DO SQLite: opaquelocktoken:<uuid> tokens, Depth: 0 resource and bounded Depth: infinity collection locks (forbidden on the storage root and above a configurable depth), refresh/unlock, and opportunistic expiry pruning. (spec §2)
• CredentialStore — app-password persistence (hash-only) with per-credential failed-attempt throttling and constant-time verification. (spec §1)

The router runs over an injected WebdavBackend seam (the explicit Durable Object boundary), so it unit-tests at full DO-SQLite fidelity without standing up the whole pod.

Protocol core

All pure, Workers-runtime-free, and unit-tested:

• Bounded, XXE-safe XML (parseXml, escapeXml) — a hand-rolled generator and recursive-descent parser for the small WebDAV bodies, with caps on size and nesting depth, DOCTYPE/external-entity rejection, UTF-8-only enforcement, and predefined-entity-only decoding. (spec §4)
• Scoped app passwords (mintAppPassword, verifyAppPassword) — the auth bridge for OS clients that speak Basic only: a ≥128-bit secret bound to (WebID, label, scope, expiry), presented under a colon-free credential id, stored only as a salted PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 hash, verified in constant time. (spec §1)
• Strict If: parser (parseIfHeader) — a documented subset (one untagged list of one lock token and/or one ETag); anything more complex is reported unsupported. (spec §4)
• OS-client quirks (inferContentType, isOsLitter) — extension-based content-type inference for generic PUTs, and OS-litter detection. (spec §3)

License

ISC