npm package discovery and stats viewer.

Discover Tips

  • General search

    [free text search, go nuts!]

  • Package details

    pkg:[package-name]

  • User packages

    @[username]

Sponsor

Optimize Toolset

I’ve always been into building performant and accessible sites, but lately I’ve been taking it extremely seriously. So much so that I’ve been building a tool to help me optimize and monitor the sites that I build to make sure that I’m making an attempt to offer the best experience to those who visit them. If you’re into performant, accessible and SEO friendly sites, you might like it too! You can check it out at Optimize Toolset.

About

Hi, 👋, I’m Ryan Hefner  and I built this site for me, and you! The goal of this site was to provide an easy way for me to check the stats on my npm packages, both for prioritizing issues and updates, and to give me a little kick in the pants to keep up on stuff.

As I was building it, I realized that I was actually using the tool to build the tool, and figured I might as well put this out there and hopefully others will find it to be a fast and useful way to search and browse npm packages as I have.

If you’re interested in other things I’m working on, follow me on Twitter or check out the open source projects I’ve been publishing on GitHub.

I am also working on a Twitter bot for this site to tweet the most popular, newest, random packages from npm. Please follow that account now and it will start sending out packages soon–ish.

Open Software & Tools

This site wouldn’t be possible without the immense generosity and tireless efforts from the people who make contributions to the world and share their work via open source initiatives. Thank you 🙏

© 2026 – Pkg Stats / Ryan Hefner

@emilia-protocol/attest

v0.3.0

Published

Bind relying-party-pinned identity bytes and subject to a work-product hash in a signed EP receipt; no identity, authority, or execution overclaim.

Readme

@emilia-protocol/attest

Bind relying-party-pinned identity bytes to a work-product hash and signature.

This is the standardized, drop-in version of the "Identity Manager" pattern that keeps showing up when people build serious AI tooling: hash an agent's identity file, compare it to a known-good hash, bind the separately pinned subject, and sign the work product. The result is an EP‑RECEIPT‑v1 whose hashes and signature can be recomputed offline with @emilia-protocol/verify. Acceptance still requires the relying party to authenticate and pin the identity mapping and signer public key outside the presented receipt.

It's the "one wire" that turns a terminal/IDE/agent console into a purpose-bound-compute evidence surface: every receipt binds a pinned subject identifier and identity-file hash to a work-product hash. It does not prove who was authorized, what actually executed, or whether the work was correct.

Two calls

import { verifyIdentity, signWorkReceipt } from '@emilia-protocol/attest';
import { verifyReceipt } from '@emilia-protocol/verify';

// 1. Verify the agent identity against the hash you stored in your vault.
const { verified, computedHash } = verifyIdentity({
  identity: fs.readFileSync('c-dawg-identity.txt'),
  knownGoodHash: '<sha256-from-keeper>',
});

// 2. Sign the work product, bound to that verified identity. Fail-closed:
//    throws if the identity does not match the known-good hash.
const { document, public_key } = signWorkReceipt({
  identity:        fs.readFileSync('c-dawg-identity.txt'),
  knownGoodHash:   '<sha256-from-keeper>',
  knownGoodSubject:'ep:agent:c-dawg',       // pinned alongside the hash
  work:            fs.readFileSync('sprint-plan.md'),
  workName:        'sprint-plan.md',
  subject:         'ep:agent:c-dawg',
  signerPrivateKey: ed25519PrivateKey,        // KeyObject or b64u PKCS#8
  issuedAt:        new Date().toISOString(),
  anchor:          true,                       // optional EP-MERKLE-v2 anchor
});

// 3. A relying party verifies under its own pinned signer key:
verifyReceipt(document, PINNED_SIGNER_SPKI);    // { valid: true, checks: {...} }

What the receipt binds

payload.identity.hash  = SHA-256(identity file)   ← pinned bytes (re-derivable)
payload.subject        = pinned subject id        ← exact mapping (not self-asserted)
payload.work.hash      = SHA-256(work product)    ← artifact bytes (not execution)
signature              = Ed25519 over JCS(payload)
anchor (optional)      = EP-MERKLE-v2 (domain-separated, payload-bound leaf)

A tampered signed payload breaks the signature; mismatched identity bytes or a relabeled subject make signWorkReceipt refuse. The optional Merkle structure proves local inclusion only; without an independently trusted log checkpoint or witness it is not a timestamp, publication proof, or transparency guarantee.

Boundary

This package proves a cryptographic binding under caller-supplied trust material. It does not establish real-world identity, authority, human presence, execution, effects, trusted time, revocation, or issuer trust. Never verify with the public_key returned beside an untrusted receipt; compare or replace it with the relying party's independently pinned signer key.

In-repo this imports its siblings by relative path (../issue, ../verify); the published build imports them by package name (declared in dependencies).