SSH MCP Server

Universal SSH MCP Server for managing remote servers via AI assistants (Cursor, Claude Desktop).

GitHub: @hypnosis | License: MIT | npm: @hypnosis/ssh-mcp-server

⚠️ IMPORTANT for binaries and large files: use ssh_upload / ssh_download (SFTP, binary-safe, sha256 verify, atomic rename) — NOT base64-chunks through ssh_exec or ssh_file_write heredoc. Heredoc-based writes corrupt binaries and have no atomic / integrity guarantees. See Transfer tools and docs/transfer.md.

✨ Features

14 Powerful Commands:

Core (8):

1. ssh_exec - Universal command execution (single or batch)
2. ssh_file_read - Read files (single or multiple); binary: true for base64
3. ssh_file_write - Write files (single or multiple); verify / atomic / binary
4. ssh_file_list - List files in directory
5. ssh_log_tail - Last N lines from logs (single or multiple)
6. ssh_log_search - Search logs with grep (single or multiple)
7. ssh_snapshot - Instant system health check
8. ssh_monitor - Monitor connections, reload profiles, test connections

Transfer — SFTP (2, v1.3.0+): 9. ssh_upload - Binary-safe file/directory upload (sha256 verify, atomic rename, sudo via install) 10. ssh_download - Binary-safe file/directory download (sha256 verify)

Audit — read-only deep checks (4, v1.3.0+): 11. ssh_audit_baseline - One-shot system audit (replaces 5+ ssh_exec calls) 12. ssh_tls_check - TLS expiry + SAN + issuer + Let's Encrypt renew_hook 13. ssh_disk_breakdown - df + top-N du + docker df + journald + caches 14. ssh_service_status - systemctl status + journalctl tail in one call

Key Features:

• ✅ REST approach - arrays where logical
• ✅ Security - warnings for dangerous commands, path validation, safe quoting
• ✅ Tilde expansion - ~/file automatically expands to $HOME/file
• ✅ Path security - optional whitelist/blacklist per profile
• ✅ sudo support - parameter in every command
• ✅ Profiles - multiple SSH configurations
• ✅ Retry logic - automatic retries on network errors
• ✅ Connection pooling - reuse SSH connections for better performance

📦 Installation

# Global install
npm install -g @hypnosis/ssh-mcp-server

# Or run on demand without installing
npx @hypnosis/ssh-mcp-server

Latest published version: see npmjs.com/@hypnosis/ssh-mcp-server.

🚀 Quick Start

1. Create Profile Configuration

Create file ~/.cursor/ssh-profiles.json:

{
  "default": "production",
  "profiles": {
    "production": {
      "host": "server.example.com",
      "username": "admin",
      "port": 22,
      "privateKeyPath": "~/.ssh/your_private_key"
    },
    "staging": {
      "host": "staging.example.com",
      "username": "deploy",
      "port": 22,
      "privateKeyPath": "~/.ssh/your_private_key"
    }
  }
}

Note: You can use the same profiles file as Docker MCP Server. SSH MCP will automatically skip profiles with mode: "local" and use profiles with host and username.

1.1. Optional: Path Security Configuration

You can add optional security rules to restrict file access per profile:

{
  "default": "production",
  "profiles": {
    "production": {
      "host": "prod.example.com",
      "username": "admin",
      "port": 22,
      "privateKeyPath": "~/.ssh/id_rsa_prod",
      
      "pathSecurity": {
        "allowedPaths": ["/home/admin", "/var/www", "/var/log"],
        "deniedPaths": ["/etc/shadow", "/root", "/etc/ssh"],
        "allowTraversal": false,
        "maxPathLength": 1000
      }
    }
  }
}

Path Security Options:

• allowedPaths (optional): Whitelist of allowed directories. If specified, only paths starting with these prefixes are allowed.

  • Example: ["/home/admin", "/var/www"]
  • Subdirectories are allowed: /home/admin/subdir/file.txt ✅

• deniedPaths (optional): Blacklist of forbidden paths. Paths starting with these prefixes will be rejected.

  • Example: ["/etc/shadow", "/root", "/etc/ssh"]
  • Takes priority over allowedPaths

• allowTraversal (optional): Allow path traversal (../) in paths. Default: true

  • Set to false to prevent directory traversal attacks
  • Example: ../../../etc/passwd ❌ rejected

• maxPathLength (optional): Maximum allowed path length. Default: unlimited

  • Example: 1000 (paths longer than 1000 chars rejected)

Security Notes:

• Path security is optional. If not configured, all paths are allowed.
• Blacklist (deniedPaths) is checked before whitelist (allowedPaths)
• These rules apply to: ssh_file_read, ssh_file_write, ssh_file_list, ssh_log_tail, ssh_log_search
• Tilde (~) paths are supported and automatically expanded to $HOME

2. Configure Cursor

Add to ~/.cursor/mcp.json (example):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "ssh": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["/path/to/ssh-mcp-server/dist/index.js"],
      "env": {
        "SSH_PROFILES_FILE": "~/.cursor/ssh-profiles.json"
      }
    }
  }
}

3. Restart Cursor

Done! AI can now manage your servers.

📚 Usage Examples

ssh_exec - Execute Commands

⚠️ Important: Array Syntax

For batch commands, use double quotes in JSON format:

• ✅ Correct: command: ["cmd1", "cmd2"]
• ❌ Incorrect: command: ['cmd1', 'cmd2']

MCP tools require valid JSON syntax. Single quotes will cause errors.

// Single command
ssh_exec({
  profile: "production",
  command: "systemctl status nginx"
})

// Batch commands (use double quotes!)
ssh_exec({
  profile: "production",
  command: [
    "systemctl status nginx",
    "docker ps",
    "df -h"
  ]
})

// With sudo
ssh_exec({
  profile: "production",
  command: "systemctl restart nginx",
  sudo: true
})

// With working directory
ssh_exec({
  profile: "production",
  command: "npm install",
  cwd: "/var/www/app"
})

ssh_file_read - Read Files

Note: For multiple files, use double quotes: path: ["file1", "file2"]

Tilde Support: Paths with ~ are automatically expanded to $HOME

// Single file
ssh_file_read({
  profile: "production",
  path: "/etc/nginx/nginx.conf"
})

// Tilde paths (automatically expanded)
ssh_file_read({
  profile: "production",
  path: "~/.bashrc"  // Expands to $HOME/.bashrc ✅
})

// Multiple files (use double quotes!)
ssh_file_read({
  profile: "production",
  path: [
    "/etc/nginx/nginx.conf",
    "~/.ssh/config",        // Tilde works! ✅
    "/etc/hosts"
  ]
})

// With sudo
ssh_file_read({
  profile: "production",
  path: "/root/.ssh/config",
  sudo: true
})

ssh_file_write - Write Files

// Single file
ssh_file_write({
  profile: "production",
  files: {
    path: "/var/www/app/.env",
    content: "APP_ENV=production\nDB_HOST=localhost",
    mode: "600"
  }
})

// Multiple files
ssh_file_write({
  profile: "production",
  files: [
    {
      path: "/etc/nginx/sites-available/app.conf",
      content: "server { ... }",
      mode: "644",
      sudo: true
    },
    {
      path: "/var/www/app/.env",
      content: "APP_ENV=production",
      mode: "600"
    }
  ]
})

v1.3.0+ Per-File Flags: verify, atomic, binary

ssh_file_write is back-compat by default but now supports three new per-file flags. Internally any of these — or content size > 256KB — routes the write through SFTP instead of the legacy heredoc fast path.

| Flag | Default | What it does | |------|---------|--------------| | verify | false | Compute local sha256, compare against remote sha256sum (fallback openssl dgst -sha256) after write | | atomic | false | Write to <path>.tmp.<rand> next to target, then mv (atomic on the same FS) | | binary | false | content is base64; decoded and uploaded via SFTP. Use this for non-text payloads |

// Verified atomic config write (text)
ssh_file_write({
  profile: "production",
  files: {
    path: "/etc/nginx/conf.d/app.conf",
    content: "server { listen 80; }\n",
    mode: "644",
    sudo: true,
    atomic: true,
    verify: true
  }
})

// Binary payload (e.g. small image, certificate, .pem)
ssh_file_write({
  profile: "production",
  files: {
    path: "/etc/ssl/private/app.pem",
    content: "<base64-encoded-bytes>",
    binary: true,
    mode: "600",
    sudo: true,
    atomic: true,
    verify: true
  }
})

For files larger than ~1 MB, prefer ssh_upload — it streams chunks directly and avoids loading content into the LLM context.

v1.3.0+ ssh_file_read — binary: true

Reads via SFTP and returns base64-encoded bytes, byte-for-byte safe (legacy cat over PTY corrupts binaries due to encoding/CR-LF translation).

ssh_file_read({
  profile: "production",
  path: "/etc/ssl/certs/app.crt",
  binary: true   // returns base64
})

ssh_file_list - List Files

// List directory
ssh_file_list({
  profile: "production",
  path: "/var/log/nginx"
})

// With pattern filter
ssh_file_list({
  profile: "production",
  path: "/var/log",
  pattern: "*.log"
})

// Recursively
ssh_file_list({
  profile: "production",
  path: "/etc/nginx",
  recursive: true
})

ssh_log_tail - Last Log Lines

Note: For multiple logs, use double quotes: path: ["log1", "log2"]

// Single log
ssh_log_tail({
  profile: "production",
  path: "/var/log/nginx/error.log",
  lines: 100
})

// Multiple logs (use double quotes!)
ssh_log_tail({
  profile: "production",
  path: [
    "/var/log/nginx/error.log",
    "/var/log/nginx/access.log"
  ],
  lines: 50
})

ssh_log_search - Search Logs

// Search for errors
ssh_log_search({
  profile: "production",
  path: "/var/log/nginx/error.log",
  query: "error|fatal"
})

// With context lines
ssh_log_search({
  profile: "production",
  path: "/var/log/syslog",
  query: "docker",
  context: 3
})

// Multiple logs
ssh_log_search({
  profile: "production",
  path: [
    "/var/log/nginx/*.log",
    "/var/log/syslog"
  ],
  query: "500|502|503"
})

ssh_snapshot - System Health Check

// Full system snapshot
ssh_snapshot({
  profile: "production"
})

// Returns:
// - Hostname, uptime
// - Service status (nginx, docker, postgresql, etc)
// - Resources (CPU, Memory, Disk)
// - Docker containers (if available)
// - Open ports and connections
// - Recent errors from logs

ssh_monitor - Monitoring & Diagnostics

// Get connection pool statistics
ssh_monitor({
  action: "stats"
})
// Returns: cache hit rate, active connections, session metrics
// Note: Metrics reset automatically when all connections close (session-based)

// Reload SSH profiles (without server restart)
ssh_monitor({
  action: "reload"
})
// Reloads SSH_PROFILES_FILE and shows new profiles

// Test connection to profile
ssh_monitor({
  action: "test",
  profile: "production"
})
// Tests connection and shows connect/command timings

// List available profiles
ssh_monitor({
  action: "list"
})
// Shows all available profiles with default marked

📦 Transfer tools (v1.3.0+)

Binary-safe SFTP transfer, piggy-backed on the same connection pool used by other tools. Use these instead of base64-chunks through ssh_exec — heredoc / cat > file corrupts binaries, has no atomic semantics, no integrity verification, and pulls the whole payload into Node memory.

Defaults: atomic=true (write to <path>.tmp.<rand>, then mv), verify=true (local sha256 vs remote sha256sum / openssl dgst -sha256 fallback).

File-size guidance:

• ≤ 256 KB, text only → ssh_file_write (legacy heredoc, slightly faster — no second sha256 round-trip)
• 256 KB – 1 MB, text → ssh_file_write with atomic: true, verify: true (auto-routes to SFTP)
• Anything binary, or > 1 MB → ssh_upload (streams chunks, never loads file into LLM context)

For full API and architecture see docs/transfer.md.

ssh_upload — Binary-safe upload

| Parameter | Type | Default | Description | |-----------|------|---------|-------------| | profile | string | "default" | SSH profile name | | local_path | string | required | Local file or directory path | | remote_path | string | required | Remote destination path | | mode | string | — | Octal file mode, e.g. "644" | | recursive | boolean | auto | Force directory mode (auto-detected via local stat()) | | atomic | boolean | true | Write to <path>.tmp.<rand>, then mv | | verify | boolean | true | Compare local and remote sha256 after upload | | sudo | boolean | false | Stage in /tmp, then sudo install into target | | owner | string | — | When sudo=true: "user:group" for install -o/-g | | overwrite | boolean | true | Allow overwriting an existing remote file | | concurrency | number | 4 | Parallel SFTP chunk concurrency for fastPut |

// 1) Single file with sha256 verify and atomic rename (defaults)
ssh_upload({
  profile: "production",
  local_path: "./build/app.tar.gz",
  remote_path: "/srv/releases/app-2026-05.tar.gz",
  mode: "644"
})
// SFTP fastPut → write to .tmp.<rand> → sha256 verify → mv → chmod

// 2) Recursive directory upload (auto-detected from local stat)
ssh_upload({
  profile: "production",
  local_path: "./dist",
  remote_path: "/var/www/app/current",
  mode: "755",
  concurrency: 8
})
// walks local tree, uploads to staging dir, atomic mv into place

// 3) sudo write to /etc — staged in /tmp, then `sudo install -m 644 -o root:root`
ssh_upload({
  profile: "production",
  local_path: "./nginx-site.conf",
  remote_path: "/etc/nginx/conf.d/site.conf",
  mode: "644",
  owner: "root:root",
  sudo: true
})
// Note: recursive + sudo is not supported in one shot — workaround:
//   1) upload to a user-writable staging path (no sudo)
//   2) sudo cp -r via ssh_exec
// Symlinks in recursive uploads are skipped (not dereferenced, not recreated).
// For symlink fidelity tar -czf locally and upload the tarball.

// 4) Download a binary back (verify on by default)
ssh_download({
  profile: "production",
  remote_path: "/var/log/nginx/access.log.1.gz",
  local_path: "./logs/access.log.1.gz"
})

ssh_download — Binary-safe download

| Parameter | Type | Default | Description | |-----------|------|---------|-------------| | profile | string | "default" | SSH profile name | | remote_path | string | required | Remote source path | | local_path | string | required | Local destination path | | recursive | boolean | auto | Force directory mode (auto-detected via remote test -d) | | verify | boolean | true | Compare local and remote sha256 after download | | concurrency | number | 4 | Parallel SFTP chunk concurrency for fastGet |

ssh_download({
  profile: "production",
  remote_path: "/var/backups/db",
  local_path: "./backups/db",
  recursive: true,
  concurrency: 4
})

🔍 Audit tools (v1.3.0+)

Specialized read-only audit primitives that collect evidence in one round-trip each. The big win is ssh_audit_baseline: one call replaces 5+ separate ssh_exec invocations (df, free, ss, docker ps, systemctl, sshd -T, ufw, …) — both the latency and the result-merging cost are gone.

For pipeline guidance and full section descriptions see docs/audit.md.

ssh_audit_baseline

One batched compound shell command, results split by sentinel markers, parsed into structured JSON + a CRITICAL/WARNING/OK shortlist. Replaces 5–10 separate ssh_exec calls (df, free, ss, docker, systemctl, sshd -T, ufw, apt …) with one round-trip.

Sections (toggle via include): system, disk, mem, net, ssh, services, docker, firewall, updates. By default all sections except ssh (sudo).

| Flag | Default | Purpose | |------|---------|---------| | include | all except ssh | Restrict to subset, e.g. ["disk", "services"] | | include_sudo_sections | false | Enables sshd -T (whole compound runs under sudo) | | compact | true | Trim long sections (listeners, interfaces, docker rows) for smaller LLM payload |

Output format: human-readable summary (host header → CRITICAL/WARNING shortlist → disk table → listeners → sshd → services → docker → firewall → updates) followed by --- raw JSON --- and the full structured result.

Auto red-flag rules:

• CRITICAL: filesystem ≥ 90%, PermitRootLogin yes, PasswordAuthentication yes on port 22
• WARNING: filesystem 70–90%, exited containers, failed systemd units, reboot pending, > 50 upgradable packages
• OK: filesystem < 70% per mount, everything nominal

ssh_audit_baseline({
  profile: "production",
  include_sudo_sections: true   // enables sshd -T section
})

// Restrict to a subset
ssh_audit_baseline({
  profile: "production",
  include: ["disk", "services", "docker"]
})

ssh_tls_check

Pipes openssl s_client -connect <domain>:<port> -servername <domain> into openssl x509, parses notAfter, SAN entries (X509v3 Subject Alternative Name), issuer; computes days_until_expiry. Also scans /etc/letsencrypt/renewal/*.conf for renew_hook and /etc/letsencrypt/renewal-hooks/deploy/.

• CRITICAL: expired, ≤ 7 days, or SAN does not include the requested domain
• WARNING: ≤ 30 days, or no Let's Encrypt deploy_hook configured

ssh_tls_check({
  profile: "production",
  domain: "app.example.com",
  port: 443,
  check_renew_hook: true
})

ssh_disk_breakdown

Single batched call. Use when ssh_audit_baseline flags a disk above 70%. Heavier than baseline (multiple du -shx traversals), so don't run unconditionally.

| Section | Command | |---------|---------| | df | df -hT | | du_<path> | du -shx <path>/* \| sort -rh \| head -<top_n> for each paths[] | | docker | docker system df -v (or NO_DOCKER) | | journald | journalctl --disk-usage (or NO_JOURNALD) | | var_log | du -sh /var/log/* \| sort -rh \| head -<top_n> | | cache | du -sh "$HOME"/.cache/* \| sort -rh \| head -<top_n> |

Defaults: top_n: 20, paths: ["/"]. paths is shell-quoted before interpolation.

ssh_disk_breakdown({
  profile: "production",
  top_n: 20,
  paths: ["/", "/var", "/home"]
})

ssh_service_status

Replaces systemctl status + journalctl -u for one systemd unit. All in one batched call, parsed into structured enabled / active / restart / status_head / log_tail.

| Section | Command | |---------|---------| | status | systemctl status <unit> --no-pager \| head -40 | | is_enabled | systemctl is-enabled <unit> | | show | systemctl show <unit> --property=Restart,RestartSec,LoadState,ActiveState,SubState | | log | journalctl -u <unit> -n <log_lines> --no-pager [--since <since>] |

Defaults: log_lines: 50. since accepts any journalctl --since value ("1h ago", "2026-05-03"). Unit name is validated against ^[a-zA-Z0-9@._-]+$ for shell-injection safety.

ssh_service_status({
  profile: "production",
  unit: "nginx.service",
  log_lines: 50,
  since: "1h ago"
})

Recommended audit pipeline

// 1) One-shot baseline → CRITICAL/WARNING shortlist
const baseline = ssh_audit_baseline({ profile: "production", include_sudo_sections: true });

// 2) If any disk warning/critical → drill down
ssh_disk_breakdown({ profile: "production", top_n: 20 });

// 3) For each public FQDN
ssh_tls_check({ profile: "production", domain: "app.example.com" });

// 4) For each failed systemd unit
ssh_service_status({ profile: "production", unit: "nginx.service" });

This pipeline covers ~80% of a typical server audit without touching ssh_exec.

🔧 Environment Variables

Required

• SSH_PROFILES_FILE - Path to SSH profiles JSON file

Optional (Logging)

• SSH_MCP_LOG_LEVEL - Log level: debug, info, warn, error (default: info)
• SSH_MCP_LOG_TIMESTAMP - Show timestamps in logs: true, false (default: true)
• SSH_MCP_LOG_COLORS - Enable colors in logs: true, false (default: false)

Optional (Connection Pool)

• SSH_MCP_POOL_IDLE_TIMEOUT - Idle timeout for connections in ms (default: 30000)
• SSH_MCP_POOL_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL - Keep-alive ping interval in ms (default: 10000)

Optional (Profiles)

• SSH_MCP_PROFILES_CACHE_TTL - Profile cache TTL in ms (default: 60000)
• SSH_MCP_PROFILES_WATCH - Watch profiles file for changes: true, false (default: true)

Example Configuration

# Required
export SSH_PROFILES_FILE="$HOME/.ssh/mcp-profiles.json"

# Optional - Logging
export SSH_MCP_LOG_LEVEL="debug"
export SSH_MCP_LOG_TIMESTAMP="true"

# Optional - Connection Pool
export SSH_MCP_POOL_IDLE_TIMEOUT="60000"

# Optional - Profiles
export SSH_MCP_PROFILES_WATCH="true"
export SSH_MCP_PROFILES_CACHE_TTL="60000"

Note: Profile reload happens automatically when SSH_PROFILES_FILE changes (if SSH_MCP_PROFILES_WATCH=true). You can also manually reload profiles using ssh_monitor(action="reload").

🔒 Security

Dangerous Command Warnings

The server automatically detects dangerous commands:

ssh_exec({
  command: "rm -rf /"
})
// ⚠️  DANGEROUS COMMAND: rm -rf / detected
// Command will execute but with warning

Dangerous patterns detected:

• rm -rf /, rm -rf ~, rm -rf *
• chmod 777
• reboot, shutdown, halt
• docker system prune -a
• DROP DATABASE, TRUNCATE

Recommendations

1. Use SSH keys instead of passwords
2. Limit user permissions (use non-root user with sudo)
3. Regularly rotate keys
4. Check MCP server logs

🏗️ Architecture

~/.cursor/mcp.json
      ↓
SSH MCP Server
      ↓
Profile Resolver → ~/.cursor/ssh-profiles.json
      ↓
Connection Pool (reuse connections)
      ↓
SSH Executor
      ↓
14 Tools (exec, file, log, snapshot, monitor, transfer, audit)
      ↓
Remote Server(s)

Key Principles:

• Connection Pool - reuse SSH connections for better performance (6-10× faster)
• Session-based metrics - metrics reset automatically when all connections close
• NO streaming - snapshot results only
• REST approach - arrays where logical
• Retry logic - automatic retries with exponential backoff
• Auto-reconnect - automatic reconnection on connection loss

🛠️ Development

Requirements

• Node.js 18+
• TypeScript 5+
• SSH access to remote servers

Development Setup

git clone https://github.com/hypnosis/ssh-mcp-server.git
cd ssh-mcp-server
npm install
npm run build

Run in Dev Mode

npm run dev

Project Structure

src/
├── index.ts                    # Entry point + routing
├── managers/
│   ├── ssh-executor.ts         # SSH commands
│   └── connection-pool.ts      # Connection pool + getSftp()
├── tools/
│   ├── exec-tool.ts            # ssh_exec
│   ├── file-tools.ts           # ssh_file_read/write/list (verify/atomic/binary)
│   ├── log-tools.ts            # ssh_log_tail/search
│   ├── snapshot-tool.ts        # ssh_snapshot
│   ├── monitoring-tool.ts      # ssh_monitor
│   ├── transfer-tool.ts        # ssh_upload, ssh_download (v1.3.0)
│   └── audit-tool.ts           # ssh_audit_baseline, ssh_tls_check,
│                               # ssh_disk_breakdown, ssh_service_status (v1.3.0)
└── utils/
    ├── logger.ts               # Logging
    ├── ssh-config.ts           # SSH configuration
    ├── profile-resolver.ts     # Load profiles
    ├── profiles-file.ts        # Parse profiles
    ├── path-validator.ts       # Path security
    ├── retry.ts                # Retry logic
    ├── sha256.ts               # Local + remote sha256 helpers (v1.3.0)
    └── tmp-name.ts             # Atomic temp / staging path generators (v1.3.0)

📝 Roadmap

v1.0 (MVP) ✅

• ✅ 7 core commands
• ✅ Profiles from file
• ✅ Retry logic
• ✅ Security (warnings)

v1.1 - v1.2.2 (Released) ✅

• ✅ Connection pooling (6-10× faster)
• ✅ Path security & tilde expansion
• ✅ Retry mechanism with exponential backoff
• ✅ Enhanced error messages
• ✅ Profile reload & monitoring
• ✅ Session-based metrics

v1.3.0 (Released) ✅

• ✅ SFTP transfer tools — ssh_upload, ssh_download (binary-safe, atomic, sha256 verify)
• ✅ ssh_file_write / ssh_file_read extended with verify, atomic, binary
• ✅ Audit tools — ssh_audit_baseline, ssh_tls_check, ssh_disk_breakdown, ssh_service_status
• ✅ Tool count: 8 → 14

Future (Planned)

• 📋 Recursive sudo upload (one-shot, without staging workaround)
• 📋 Extended snapshot (custom checks)
• 📋 Connection metrics dashboard

🤝 Contributing

1. Fork the repository
2. Create feature branch (git checkout -b feature/amazing-feature)
3. Commit changes (git commit -m 'Add amazing feature')
4. Push to branch (git push origin feature/amazing-feature)
5. Open Pull Request

🔒 Security

Path Handling & Quoting

SSH MCP Server uses a secure quoting strategy to prevent injection attacks:

Single Quotes (default):

• Used for regular paths without tilde
• Prevents ALL expansions (variables, commands, globs)
• Example: cat '/etc/hosts' - safest option

Double Quotes (for tilde):

• Used only when path contains ~ (expanded to $HOME)
• Everything except $HOME is escaped
• Prevents: variable expansion ($VAR), command substitution (`cmd`), history expansion (!)
• Example: cat "$HOME/.bashrc" - $HOME expands, but $VAR in filename won't

What's Protected:

• ✅ Command injection via ;, &&, ||
• ✅ Variable expansion ($VAR)
• ✅ Command substitution (`cmd`, $(cmd))
• ✅ History expansion (!)
• ✅ Glob expansion (*, ?)

Tilde Expansion:

• ~/file → $HOME/file (automatic)
• ~user/file → shell expands ~user (automatic)
• Works in: ssh_file_read, ssh_file_write, ssh_file_list, ssh_log_tail, ssh_log_search

Path Security (Optional)

Add pathSecurity to profiles for additional protection:

{
  "pathSecurity": {
    "allowedPaths": ["/home/admin", "/var/www"],
    "deniedPaths": ["/etc/shadow", "/root"],
    "allowTraversal": false,
    "maxPathLength": 1000
  }
}

See Quick Start for details.

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