@iden-q/post-quantum (TypeScript) — generated by iqcgen 1.2.0

Do not edit these sources. They are compiled from the IdenQ Crypto IR in specs/ and regenerated with iqcgen generate.

Requires: Node 20+ (LTS 22 and 24 tested); browsers from Chrome 111, Firefox 113, Safari 16.4, Edge 111.

npm install && npm test

Runs in the browser and in Node 20+: the only platform APIs used are crypto.getRandomValues and TextEncoder/TextDecoder. Base64 is implemented in runtime.ts, so nothing depends on btoa or Buffer.

Passphrase-rooted hybrid post-quantum secret encryption (cipher_payload v2)

A passphrase is stretched with Argon2id into a master key; an ML-KEM-768 keypair is derived deterministically from that master key (so nothing has to be stored or synced); encapsulating to it yields a post-quantum shared secret which is mixed with a symmetric KEK to wrap a random per-secret data key. An attacker needs the passphrase — breaking ML-KEM alone, or recording traffic today to decrypt after a quantum computer exists, does not help.

import { encrypt, decrypt } from '@iden-q/post-quantum';

• async encrypt(plaintext: string, passphrase: string) — Encrypt a secret under a passphrase.
• async decrypt(payload: struct, passphrase: string) — Decrypt a payload with the passphrase that produced it.

cipherPayloadToJson() produces exactly the wire object the IdenQ services expect (base64url); cipherPayloadFromJson() validates one.

Hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 public-key envelope (login_envelope v1)

Seals a short credential to a recipient's static hybrid public key. Classical and post- quantum defence in depth: an interceptor who strips TLS must break BOTH X25519 and ML- KEM-768 to recover the key-encryption key, and neither alone is enough. The recipient opens it with the matching private keys.

import { seal, unseal, deriveRecipientKeys } from '@iden-q/post-quantum';

• seal(plaintext: bytes, recipientXPk: bytes, recipientMlKemEk: bytes) — Seal a plaintext to a recipient's static hybrid public key.
• unseal(envelope: struct, xSk: bytes, mlKemDk: bytes) — Open an envelope with the recipient's private keys.
• deriveRecipientKeys(seed: bytes) — Derive a recipient key set deterministically from a 96-byte seed.

envelopeToJson() produces exactly the wire object the IdenQ services expect (base64); envelopeFromJson() validates one.

ML-DSA-44 detached signature (mldsa_signature v1)

Post-quantum digital signatures (FIPS 204, ML-DSA-44). A signer derives a key pair deterministically from a seed and signs a message; a verifier checks the signature against the pinned public key and fails closed on anything that does not verify. Pure ML-DSA with an empty context string, so the signing input is the message itself — the shape a JWS ML-DSA-44 assertion needs.

import { deriveSigningKeys, signingKeysFromPrivateJwk, sign, verify } from '@iden-q/post-quantum';

• deriveSigningKeys(seed: bytes) — Derive a signing key pair deterministically from a 32-byte seed.
• signingKeysFromPrivateJwk(jwk: struct) — Derive the signing key pair from a private AKP JWK.
• sign(sk: bytes, message: bytes) — Sign a message with a signing key.
• verify(signed: struct, pk: bytes) — Verify a signed message against a pinned verification key.

signedMessageToJson() produces exactly the wire object the IdenQ services expect (base64); signedMessageFromJson() validates one.

Licence

IdenQ Proprietary Licence. See LICENSE — this software is licensed, not sold. Third-party components keep their own terms; see THIRD-PARTY-NOTICES.md.