@integraledger/lcp-authority

Delegated authority: whether a chain of grants actually attenuates, whether an acceptance signature holds, and whether either was revoked or expired as of the moment that matters.

npm install @integraledger/lcp-authority

Attenuation

A delegation chain is only meaningful if each link is no wider than the one above it. isWithin decides that, dimension by dimension:

import { isWithin } from "@integraledger/lcp-authority";

const parent = {
  jurisdictions: ["US-NY", "US-CA"],
  caps: { USD: "1000000" },
  forbiddenClauseCategories: ["arbitration-waiver"],
};

isWithin({ jurisdictions: ["US-NY"], caps: { USD: "250000" },
           forbiddenClauseCategories: ["arbitration-waiver"] }, parent);            // true
isWithin({ jurisdictions: ["US-NY"], caps: { USD: "5000000" },
           forbiddenClauseCategories: ["arbitration-waiver"] }, parent);            // false — cap raised
isWithin({ jurisdictions: ["US-TX"], caps: { USD: "250000" },
           forbiddenClauseCategories: ["arbitration-waiver"] }, parent);            // false — jurisdiction never held

This is the predicate whose absence lets a compromised officer holding a $10k grant mint itself a $50M link — entirely within its authority to delegate — while every signature and revocation check still passes, and the verifier then affirmatively asserts the forged chain valid.

One dimension runs the other way

jurisdictions, caps and disputeMethods are permission sets: a child attenuates by holding less. forbiddenClauseCategories is a restriction set, so it attenuates by forbidding more:

import { isWithin } from "@integraledger/lcp-authority";

const parent = {
  jurisdictions: ["US-NY", "US-CA"],
  caps: { USD: "1000000" },
  forbiddenClauseCategories: ["arbitration-waiver"],
};

// Adds a prohibition — more restrictive, therefore within.
isWithin({ jurisdictions: ["US-NY"], caps: { USD: "250000" },
           forbiddenClauseCategories: ["arbitration-waiver", "venue-waiver"] }, parent); // true

// Drops the one the parent imposed — that is a WIDENING.
isWithin({ jurisdictions: ["US-NY"], caps: { USD: "250000" },
           forbiddenClauseCategories: [] }, parent);                                     // false

An implementer who pattern-matches subset-checking from jurisdictions writes that fourth rule backwards, and the result is a silent forged-widening hole.

Absent means unbounded, so absence does not escape

import { isWithin } from "@integraledger/lcp-authority";

declare const parent: Parameters<typeof isWithin>[1];

isWithin({ jurisdictions: ["US-NY"], forbiddenClauseCategories: ["arbitration-waiver"] }, parent);
// false — the child states no caps, and unstated is unbounded

Every gate is on the parent's side. Where a parent restricts a dimension, the child must restrict it no wider — and a dimension the child leaves out is the widest possible value, not an exemption. This is why the forged empty link {} is rejected rather than affirmed. For the same reason, a bound key the predicate has no rule for fails closed: a dimension it cannot interpret is one it cannot check.

Depth, and delegability

import { linkAttenuates } from "@integraledger/lcp-authority";

declare const childGrant: Parameters<typeof linkAttenuates>[0];
declare const parentGrant: Parameters<typeof linkAttenuates>[1];

linkAttenuates(childGrant, parentGrant);

Beyond bounds containment this enforces three things: the parent permitted delegation at all, the parent had depth remaining, and the child did not mint itself more onward-delegation depth than the parent held. A link descending from a depth-bounded parent must state its own depth — inferring parent - 1 would be a silent fallback that also leaves the next hop's parent depth unstated, disengaging the gate for the rest of the chain.

delegable is non-delegable by default, so an omitted flag reads as refusal rather than permission.

Lifecycle and signatures

isActiveAsOf and revokedAsOf evaluate validity against the settlement's own timestamp, not against now — a grant that expired last week was valid at the moment it was used, and a grant revoked since then was not. Expiry and revocation are independent gates: a grant that expired before settlement is exactly as unusable as one revoked at it.

verifyAcceptance checks a buyer's signed acceptance over the fingerprint through an injected SignatureVerifier port, so this package carries no chain dependency. The EVM implementation — EOA EIP-191/712 plus smart-account ERC-1271/6492 — is in @integraledger/lcp-binding-evm-common.

Chain custody

Attenuation says a chain's bounds are coherent. Custody says the chain is one chain: each link signed by the key the link above it granted, rooted at the declared principal, ending at the key that signed the acceptance. walkChain verifies all of it over the presented VC grants:

import { walkChain } from "@integraledger/lcp-authority";

type WalkInput = Parameters<typeof walkChain>[0];
declare const principal: WalkInput["principal"];
declare const chain: WalkInput["chain"];
declare const acceptanceSigner: WalkInput["acceptanceSigner"];
declare const asOf: WalkInput["asOf"];
declare const statusSnapshots: NonNullable<WalkInput["statusSnapshots"]>;
declare const proofVerifier: Parameters<typeof walkChain>[1];

const walk = await walkChain(
  { principal, chain, acceptanceSigner, asOf, statusSnapshots },
  proofVerifier, // a GrantProofVerifier — cryptosuite implementations live with their producers
);
// { status: "walked", links }         — verified custody, flattened per-hop readout
// { status: "refused", code, … }      — a spliced link, a forged widening, a revoked grant …
// { status: "not-attempted", depth }  — an unwalkable input; a gap never passes and never impeaches

A spliced middle link, a root issued by someone other than the principal, a leaf granted to anyone but the acceptance signer, a proof that does not cover the grant as presented — each is a reasoned refusal. Everything linkAttenuates gates at issuance is applied per hop, and lifecycle is evaluated as-of the settlement instant against hash-pinned status-list snapshots, never a live dereference. The cryptographic proof gate is the injected port's; walkChainStructure is the deterministic half the conformance corpus certifies.

Requirement ids

This package's source and its messages cite short ids — ATA-3, RCS-5, CMP-6 and their kin. They are not LCP clause numbers. LCP is cited by section (§8.3.1, §C.2); anything shaped XXX-n comes from Integra's functional specification of what a complete agent transaction requires, the fourteen families below. Nothing in this package's behaviour depends on them, and where an id and an LCP section disagree the section governs.

| | | | | |---|---|---|---| | IDN identity | ASP authority to spend | ATA authority to accept terms | TRM the terms record | | RCS recourse | PAY payment and settlement | WLD the transactional weld | OFR offer integrity | | FRC fraud, risk, and compliance | OPS commercial operations | DSC discovery and reputation | ORC orchestration | | CMP composition | PRS persistence and verification infrastructure | | |

Requires Node >= 24. Part of the Legal Context Protocol open layer — see the documentation and the package index. Apache-2.0.