@molecule/api-resource-device-auth-token
v1.0.1
Published
Per-device long-lived bearer tokens — hashed at rest, scoped, revocable, with last-used tracking. Distinct from human user session tokens.
Maintainers
Readme
@molecule/api-resource-device-auth-token
Auto-generated, AI-first package reference for the molecule.dev ecosystem. It is written to be read by coding agents as much as by people, and is generated from this package's source — edit
src/index.tsJSDoc, not this file.
Per-device long-lived bearer tokens — hashed at rest, scoped, revocable, with last-used tracking. Distinct from human user session tokens.
Apps depend on this package directly and read/write through the
abstract DataStore from @molecule/api-database. Mirrors
@molecule/api-resource-api-key but oriented at device entities for
headless device authentication (IoT fleets, smart home hubs,
monitoring agents).
Quick Start
import { issueToken, verifyToken, recordTokenUse } from '@molecule/api-resource-device-auth-token'
// Issue a new token. The plaintext is returned exactly ONCE.
const { token, plaintext } = await issueToken({
device_id: device.id,
scopes: ['telemetry:write'],
})
// Later — incoming request bearing the plaintext token:
const verified = await verifyToken(plaintext)
if (verified) await recordTokenUse(verified.id, request.ip)Type
resource
Installation
npm install @molecule/api-resource-device-auth-token @molecule/api-database @molecule/api-resourceAPI
Interfaces
DeviceAuthToken
A persisted device auth token record. The plaintext token is never stored — only its SHA-256 hash. The plaintext is returned exactly once at issue/rotation time.
interface DeviceAuthToken {
/** Primary key (UUID). */
id: string
/** ID of the device that owns this token. */
device_id: string
/** SHA-256 hash of the plaintext token (hex). */
hashed_token: string
/** Display string safe to surface in UIs (e.g. `dvt_…ABCD`). */
masked: string
/** Permission scopes granted to this token. */
scopes: string[]
/** Last time the token was successfully used to authenticate, or null. */
last_used_at: Date | null
/** Last IP address that used this token, or null. */
last_used_ip: string | null
/** Optional expiration timestamp. Null means never expires. */
expires_at: Date | null
/** Creation timestamp. */
created_at: Date
/** When the token was revoked, or null if still active. */
revoked_at: Date | null
/** Hash algorithm version — used for future migration paths. */
version: DeviceAuthTokenHashVersion
}IssueTokenInput
Input shape for {@link issueToken}.
interface IssueTokenInput {
/** ID of the device to own the new token. */
device_id: string
/** Permission scopes for the token. Defaults to an empty array. */
scopes?: string[]
/** Optional expiration time. Null/undefined means never expires. */
expires_at?: Date
/**
* Optional token prefix for masked display (e.g. `'dvt_live_'`).
* Defaults to `'dvt_'`.
*/
prefix?: string
}IssueTokenResult
Result of {@link issueToken} / {@link rotateToken}. The plaintext token is returned exactly ONCE in this object — callers must persist or display it immediately, because it cannot be recovered later.
interface IssueTokenResult {
/** The freshly persisted device auth token record. */
token: DeviceAuthToken
/** The plaintext token. Returned exactly once. */
plaintext: string
}Resource
Resource definition for use with the standard molecule resource registry.
interface Resource {
name: string
tableName: string
schema: unknown
}Types
DeviceAuthTokenHashVersion
The hash algorithm version stored on each row. Allows future migration from SHA-256 to a stronger algorithm without breaking verification of existing tokens.
type DeviceAuthTokenHashVersion = 1Functions
constantTimeEqual(a, b)
Constant-time compare of two strings of arbitrary length.
Uses Node's crypto.timingSafeEqual — when the lengths differ,
falsifies after a same-shape compare so the runtime does not leak
length information to an attacker.
function constantTimeEqual(a: string, b: string): booleana— First string.b— Second string.
Returns: True iff a and b are byte-identical.
generatePlaintextToken(prefix)
Generate a cryptographically random plaintext device token.
The returned string has the form <prefix><base64url>, where
<base64url> is {@link PLAINTEXT_BYTES} random bytes encoded
url-safely. Callers must treat the result as a secret — it is the
only chance to surface the plaintext to a device.
function generatePlaintextToken(prefix?: string): stringprefix— Optional token prefix (e.g.'dvt_live_'). Defaults to {@link DEFAULT_PREFIX}.
Returns: The newly generated plaintext token.
hashPlaintextToken(plaintext)
SHA-256-hash a plaintext token. Deterministic for a given input.
function hashPlaintextToken(plaintext: string): stringplaintext— The plaintext token to hash.
Returns: Hex-encoded SHA-256 digest.
issueToken(input)
Issue a new device auth token. Generates a fresh plaintext, hashes it with SHA-256, persists the row, and returns BOTH the persisted record and the plaintext.
The plaintext is returned exactly once — callers MUST surface it immediately to the device (or store it in their own provisioning vault). It cannot be recovered after this call returns.
function issueToken(input: IssueTokenInput): Promise<IssueTokenResult>input— Issuance parameters.
Returns: The persisted {@link DeviceAuthToken} plus its plaintext token.
listTokens(deviceId)
List all auth tokens for a given device, newest first.
function listTokens(deviceId: string): Promise<DeviceAuthToken[]>deviceId— ID of the device to enumerate tokens for.
Returns: Array of {@link DeviceAuthToken} rows. Empty if none exist.
maskPlaintextToken(plaintext, prefix)
Build a UI-safe display string of the form <prefix>…<last4>.
The middle of the token is replaced with an ellipsis; only the configured prefix and last {@link MASKED_TAIL_LENGTH} characters are kept.
function maskPlaintextToken(plaintext: string, prefix?: string): stringplaintext— The plaintext token.prefix— Optional prefix override. When omitted, the function infers it from the leading<word>_segment ofplaintext, falling back to {@link DEFAULT_PREFIX}.
Returns: The masked display string.
recordTokenUse(tokenId, ip)
Record that a device auth token was just used to authenticate. Sets
last_used_at to the current time and (optionally) updates
last_used_ip.
function recordTokenUse(tokenId: string, ip?: string): Promise<void>tokenId— ID of the token that was used.ip— Optional IP address to record.
revokeToken(tokenId)
Revoke a device auth token. Sets revoked_at to the current time.
Subsequent calls to {@link verifyToken} with the matching plaintext
will return null.
function revokeToken(tokenId: string): Promise<void>tokenId— ID of the token to revoke.
rotateToken(tokenId)
Rotate an existing device auth token. Revokes the old row and issues
a fresh token (new plaintext, new hash, new masked) that inherits the
original token's device_id, scopes, and expires_at.
The freshly generated plaintext is returned exactly once.
function rotateToken(tokenId: string): Promise<IssueTokenResult>tokenId— ID of the existing token to rotate.
Returns: The new {@link DeviceAuthToken} plus its plaintext token.
verifyToken(plaintext)
Verify a plaintext device auth token. Hashes the input, looks up the row by hash, then constant-time-compares the stored hash against the recomputed hash before performing any short-circuit return.
Returns null if the token is not found, has been revoked, or is
past its expiration.
function verifyToken(plaintext: string): Promise<DeviceAuthToken | null>plaintext— The plaintext token to verify.
Returns: The matching {@link DeviceAuthToken}, or null if no valid match exists.
Constants
DEFAULT_PREFIX
Default token prefix when one isn't supplied.
const DEFAULT_PREFIX: 'dvt_'MASKED_TAIL_LENGTH
Number of trailing plaintext characters to surface in the masked display.
const MASKED_TAIL_LENGTH: 4PLAINTEXT_BYTES
Number of random bytes that back each plaintext token (256 bits).
const PLAINTEXT_BYTES: 32resource
Device auth token resource definition with JSON schema for validation.
const resource: types.ResourceInjection Notes
Requirements
Peer dependencies:
@molecule/api-database^1.0.1@molecule/api-resource^1.0.1
Runtime Dependencies
@molecule/api-database@molecule/api-resourceMigration required. The
src/__setup__/device_auth_tokens.sqlmigration file ships with this package and must be applied to the target database before use.No routes ship — you own the HTTP surface AND the ownership checks.
rotateToken(id),revokeToken(id), andlistTokens(deviceId)are auth-agnostic: any endpoint exposing them must authenticate the caller and verify the target device belongs to them (via your device/fleet ownership model) before acting — id-only exposure is an IDOR.Never send
hashed_tokento a client — returnmasked. The plaintext exists exactly once, in theissueToken/rotateTokenresult.Scopes are stored, not enforced.
verifyToken()only proves the token is valid, unexpired, and unrevoked; your middleware must checkverified.scopesper route. CallrecordTokenUse(verified.id, ip)after successful auth if you wantlast_used_at/last_used_ipaccuracy.
E2E Tests
Integration checklist — SECURITY-critical (session/token management). Drive the real UI (live preview, no mocks), adapt each item to this app's actual screens/flows, and check every box off one by one. A box you can't check is a security bug to fix — not a skip:
- [ ] Logging in / provisioning a device issues a token and the raw plaintext
is handed to the client EXACTLY ONCE (the
issueTokenresult). Inspect the persisted row: it storeshashed_token(SHA-256 hex) +maskedonly — never the plaintext. Confirm the raw token is unrecoverable from anything the server stores or later returns. - [ ] The user's "active sessions/devices" list shows each active token with
its metadata —
masked,last_used_at/last_used_ip,created_at— and a used token updateslast_used_at(callrecordTokenUseafter auth). Thehashed_tokennever appears in any response. - [ ] Revoking a session invalidates it IMMEDIATELY: after
revokeToken, the very next request bearing that token is rejected (401) —verifyTokenreturns null the instantrevoked_atis set, with no grace window. - [ ] Expiry is enforced: a token past
expires_atis rejected (401) even though it was never revoked; a null-expires_attoken keeps working. - [ ] Rotation:
rotateTokenissues a fresh token (new plaintext/hash/masked, same device + scopes + expiry) AND revokes the old one. Replaying the rotated-out token afterward is rejected (401 — it is now revoked); only the new plaintext authenticates. - [ ] AUTHORIZATION — a caller sees and revokes only THEIR OWN sessions:
guessing another user's token id to view or revoke it is rejected. No routes
ship, so your endpoint MUST authenticate the caller and check device/fleet
ownership before
listTokens/revokeToken/rotateToken(id-only exposure is an IDOR). A verified token authenticates ONLY as its owner. - [ ] "Log out all other devices" revokes every session EXCEPT the current one: afterward every other token is rejected (401) while the current token still works.
