noble-post-quantum

Auditable & minimal JS implementation of post-quantum public-key cryptography.

• 🔒 Auditable
• 🪶 Minimal: 7KB (gzipped) ML-KEM, unused code is excluded from your builds
• 🏎 Fast: hand-optimized for caveats of JS engines
• 🔍 Reliable: ACVP / wycheproof tests ensure correctness
• 🦾 ML-KEM & CRYSTALS-Kyber: lattice-based KEM from FIPS-203
• 🔋 ML-DSA & CRYSTALS-Dilithium: lattice-based signatures from FIPS-204
• 🐈 SLH-DSA & SPHINCS+: hash-based Winternitz signatures from FIPS-205
• 🦅 Falcon: lattice-based signatures from Falcon Round 3
• 🍡 Hybrid algorithms (combining classic & post-quantum)

[!IMPORTANT] NIST published draft IR 8547, which proposes prohibiting classical cryptography (RSA, DSA, ECDSA, ECDH) after 2035. Australia's ASD does the same after 2030. Take this into account when designing new cryptographic systems.

This library belongs to noble cryptography

noble cryptography — high-security, easily auditable set of contained cryptographic libraries and tools.

• Zero or minimal dependencies
• Highly readable TypeScript / JS code
• PGP-signed releases and transparent NPM builds
• All libraries: ciphers, curves, hashes, post-quantum, 5kb secp256k1 / ed25519
• WASM version: awasm-noble
• Check out the homepage for reading resources, documentation, and apps built with noble

Usage

npm install @noble/post-quantum

deno add jsr:@noble/post-quantum

We support all major platforms and runtimes. For React Native, you may need a polyfill for getRandomValues. A standalone file noble-post-quantum.js is also available.

// import * from '@noble/post-quantum'; // Error: use sub-imports instead
import { ml_kem512, ml_kem768, ml_kem1024 } from '@noble/post-quantum/ml-kem.js';
import { ml_dsa44, ml_dsa65, ml_dsa87 } from '@noble/post-quantum/ml-dsa.js';
import {
  slh_dsa_sha2_128f,
  slh_dsa_sha2_128s,
  slh_dsa_sha2_192f,
  slh_dsa_sha2_192s,
  slh_dsa_sha2_256f,
  slh_dsa_sha2_256s,
  slh_dsa_shake_128f,
  slh_dsa_shake_128s,
  slh_dsa_shake_192f,
  slh_dsa_shake_192s,
  slh_dsa_shake_256f,
  slh_dsa_shake_256s,
} from '@noble/post-quantum/slh-dsa.js';
import {
  falcon512, falcon512padded, falcon1024, falcon1024padded,
} from '@noble/post-quantum/falcon.js';
import {
  ml_kem768_x25519, ml_kem768_p256, ml_kem1024_p384,
  KitchenSink_ml_kem768_x25519, QSF_ml_kem768_p256, QSF_ml_kem1024_p384,
} from '@noble/post-quantum/hybrid.js';

• ML-KEM / Kyber
• ML-DSA / Dilithium
• SLH-DSA / SPHINCS+
• Falcon
• hybrid: X-Wing, KitchenSink and others
• What should I use?
• Security
• Contributing & testing
• Speed
• License

ML-KEM / Kyber shared secrets

import { ml_kem512, ml_kem768, ml_kem1024 } from '@noble/post-quantum/ml-kem.js';
import { equalBytes, randomBytes } from '@noble/post-quantum/utils.js';
const seed = randomBytes(64); // seed is optional
const aliceKeys = ml_kem768.keygen(seed);
const { cipherText, sharedSecret: bobShared } = ml_kem768.encapsulate(aliceKeys.publicKey);
const aliceShared = ml_kem768.decapsulate(cipherText, aliceKeys.secretKey);

// Warning: Can be MITM-ed
const malloryKeys = ml_kem768.keygen();
const malloryShared = ml_kem768.decapsulate(cipherText, malloryKeys.secretKey); // No error!
console.log(equalBytes(aliceShared, malloryShared)); // false: different key!

Lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism, defined in FIPS-203 (website, repo). Can be used as follows:

1. Alice generates secret & public keys, then sends publicKey to Bob
2. Bob generates shared secret for Alice publicKey. bobShared never leaves Bob system and is unknown to other parties
3. Alice gets and decrypts cipherText from Bob Now, both Alice and Bob have same sharedSecret key without exchanging in plainText: aliceShared == bobShared.

There are some concerns with regards to security: see djb blog and mailing list. Old, incompatible version (Kyber) is not provided. Open an issue if you need it.

[!WARNING] Unlike ECDH, KEM doesn't verify whether it was "Bob" who've sent the ciphertext. Instead of throwing an error when the ciphertext is encrypted by a different pubkey, decapsulate will simply return a different shared secret. ML-KEM is also probabilistic and relies on quality of CSPRNG.

webcrypto: friendly wrapper

WebCrypto-backed ML-KEM and ml_kem768_x25519 wrappers are also available. Their methods are async and require a runtime that implements the corresponding experimental WebCrypto API.

import { ml_kem768 } from '@noble/post-quantum/webcrypto.js';

if (await ml_kem768.isSupported()) {
  const aliceKeys = await ml_kem768.keygen();
  const { cipherText, sharedSecret: bobShared } = await ml_kem768.encapsulate(aliceKeys.publicKey);
  const aliceShared = await ml_kem768.decapsulate(cipherText, aliceKeys.secretKey);
}

The ML-KEM wrappers serialize private keys as 64-byte raw-seed values; the X25519 hybrid uses a 32-byte seed. They can be passed to the corresponding synchronous implementation's keygen(seed), but are not expanded decapsulation keys.

ML-DSA / Dilithium signatures

import { ml_dsa44, ml_dsa65, ml_dsa87 } from '@noble/post-quantum/ml-dsa.js';
import { randomBytes } from '@noble/post-quantum/utils.js';
const seed = randomBytes(32); // seed is optional
const keys = ml_dsa65.keygen(seed);
const msg = new TextEncoder().encode('hello noble');
const sig = ml_dsa65.sign(msg, keys.secretKey);
const isValid = ml_dsa65.verify(sig, msg, keys.publicKey);

Lattice-based digital signature algorithm, defined in FIPS-204 (website, repo). The internals are similar to ML-KEM, but keys and params are different.

sign / verify accept optional parameters:

import { ml_dsa65 } from '@noble/post-quantum/ml-dsa.js';
import { sha512 } from '@noble/hashes/sha2.js';
const keys = ml_dsa65.keygen();
const msg = new TextEncoder().encode('hello noble');
const ctx = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]);
const sigCtx = ml_dsa65.sign(msg, keys.secretKey, { context: ctx }); // verify needs same context
const sigDet = ml_dsa65.sign(msg, keys.secretKey, { extraEntropy: false }); // deterministic
const hml = ml_dsa65.prehash(sha512); // HashML-DSA
const sigPre = hml.sign(msg, keys.secretKey);
const isValidPre = hml.verify(sigPre, msg, keys.publicKey);

• context: domain-separation byte string, up to 255 bytes; must match between sign and verify
• extraEntropy: hedged-signing randomness. Default is 32 random bytes; false produces deterministic signatures; custom 32-byte value is also allowed
• prehash(hash): pre-hash variant (HashML-DSA) from FIPS-204

Unknown option keys are rejected rather than ignored, so a misspelling such as { ctx } fails loudly instead of silently signing with no domain separation.

externalMu, which treats msg as the precomputed 64-byte message representative µ, is available on ml_dsa*.internal.sign / internal.verify only. The public wrappers reject it: sign formats M' before the 64-byte check so it could never accept a µ, and verify did not forward it, returning false for a valid external-mu signature.

SLH-DSA / SPHINCS+ signatures

import {
  slh_dsa_sha2_128f as sph,
  slh_dsa_sha2_128s,
  slh_dsa_sha2_192f,
  slh_dsa_sha2_192s,
  slh_dsa_sha2_256f,
  slh_dsa_sha2_256s,
  slh_dsa_shake_128f,
  slh_dsa_shake_128s,
  slh_dsa_shake_192f,
  slh_dsa_shake_192s,
  slh_dsa_shake_256f,
  slh_dsa_shake_256s,
} from '@noble/post-quantum/slh-dsa.js';

const keys2 = sph.keygen();
const msg2 = new TextEncoder().encode('hello noble');
const sig2 = sph.sign(msg2, keys2.secretKey);
const isValid2 = sph.verify(sig2, msg2, keys2.publicKey);

Hash-based digital signature algorithm, defined in FIPS-205 (website, repo). We implement spec v3.1 with FIPS adjustments.

• sha2 vs shake (sha3): indicates internal hash function used
• 128 / 192 / 256: indicates security level in bits
• s / f: indicates small vs fast trade-off

sign / verify accept the same optional context, extraEntropy and prehash(hash) (HashSLH-DSA) parameters as ML-DSA. With extraEntropy: false, signing is deterministic.

SLH-DSA is slow: see benchmarks for key size & speed.

Falcon signatures

import { falcon512, falcon1024 } from '@noble/post-quantum/falcon.js';
import { randomBytes } from '@noble/post-quantum/utils.js';
const seed3 = randomBytes(48); // seed is optional
const keys3 = falcon512.keygen(seed3);
const msg3 = new TextEncoder().encode('hello noble');
const sig3 = falcon512.sign(msg3, keys3.secretKey);
const isValid3 = falcon512.verify(sig3, msg3, keys3.publicKey);

Lattice-based digital signature algorithm, submitted to NIST PQC Round 3 (website, Round 3 submissions).

[!WARNING] This is Falcon Round 3, not FN-DSA. FN-DSA is not final yet. FN-DSA (FIPS-206) would most likely be backwards-incompatible with Falcon. The implementation passes the published Round 3 KATs.

• falcon512, falcon1024: variable-length detached signatures
• falcon512padded, falcon1024padded: fixed-length detached signatures
• attached.seal(...) / attached.open(...): attached-signature API for Round 3 vectors and interop

[!WARNING] Falcon signing is randomized by design. Leave signing options unset in production so every signature receives a fresh 40-byte public nonce and a fresh 48-byte sampler seed from the system CSPRNG. Falcon's extraEntropy option does not have the hedged semantics used by ML-DSA and SLH-DSA:

• extraEntropy: false seeds an AES-CTR-DRBG with 48 zero bytes. It makes signatures deterministic for a fixed key and message, and reuses the same nonce and initial random stream across different messages. This is outside the Falcon Round 3 randomized-hash design.
• A 48-byte extraEntropy value replaces system randomness; it is not mixed with fresh entropy. Reusing a value therefore reuses the signing stream.
• The raw random callback overrides extraEntropy and supplies both the nonce and sampler seed. It exists for test-vector reproduction and should not be used as a production randomness hook.

In particular, do not copy ML-DSA examples that use extraEntropy: false into Falcon code.

attached.open(...) throws when verification fails and returns a fresh copy of the embedded message when it succeeds. The result does not alias the attached signature or public-key buffers. Detached verify(...) returns false for an invalid signature.

hybrid: X-Wing, KitchenSink and others

import {
  ml_kem768_x25519, ml_kem768_p256, ml_kem1024_p384,
  KitchenSink_ml_kem768_x25519,
  QSF_ml_kem768_p256, QSF_ml_kem1024_p384,
} from '@noble/post-quantum/hybrid.js';

The hybrid submodule combines post-quantum algorithms with elliptic curve cryptography:

• ml_kem768_x25519: ML-KEM-768 + X25519, implementing X-Wing under the descriptive ml_kem768_x25519 export name. There is no separate XWing alias.
• ml_kem768_p256: ML-KEM-768 + P-256 using the current CG framework construction
• ml_kem1024_p384: ML-KEM-1024 + P-384 using the current CG framework construction
• KitchenSink_ml_kem768_x25519: ML-KEM-768 + X25519 with HKDF-SHA256 combiner
• QSF_ml_kem768_p256, QSF_ml_kem1024_p384: legacy compatibility presets for the older QSF/C2PRI naming and labels. New code should use ml_kem768_p256 and ml_kem1024_p384.

Security note: _ecdhKem(curve) is an internal raw-ECDH component adapter, not a standalone IND-CCA-secure KEM. It has no KDF and does not bind the encapsulation or recipient public key, so different accepted point encodings can derive the same bytes. Use it only within a specified combiner that performs that binding, or use a standardized DHKEM. The built-in hybrid presets retain their specified combiners and test-vector-compatible behavior.

The current ml_kem* presets are tested against these work-in-progress specifications:

• irtf-cfrg-hybrid-kems-12
• irtf-cfrg-concrete-hybrid-kems-03
• connolly-cfrg-xwing-kem-10

QSF(...) is the legacy API name for the construction now called the C2PRI combiner. It derives the final secret from ssPQ || ssT || ctT || ekT || label; omitting the PQ ciphertext and encapsulation key is intentional and relies on the PQ KEM's C2PRI property. The QSF_* presets retain older draft labels and vectors for compatibility, so they do not implement the current concrete preset encodings. They are also unrelated to the separate universal-combiner example in NIST SP 800-227.

What should I use?

| | Speed | Key size | Sig / CT size | Created in | Popularized in | Post-quantum? | | ------- | ------ | ----------- | ------------- | ---------- | -------------- | ------------- | | RSA | Normal | 256B - 2KB | 256B - 2KB | 1970s | 1990s | No | | ECC | Normal | 32 - 256B | 48 - 128B | 1980s | 2010s | No | | ML-KEM | Fast | 0.8 - 1.6KB | 0.8 - 1.6KB | 1990s | 2020s | Yes | | ML-DSA | Normal | 1.3 - 2.5KB | 2.5 - 4.5KB | 1990s | 2020s | Yes | | SLH-DSA | Slow | 32 - 128B | 17 - 50KB | 1970s | 2020s | Yes | | FN-DSA | Slow | 0.9 - 1.8KB | 0.6 - 1.2KB | 1990s | 2020s | Yes |

ML-KEM is a KEM, not a signature scheme: its last column is ciphertext (CT) size. We suggest using ECC + ML-KEM for key agreement, ECC + SLH-DSA for signatures.

ML-KEM and ML-DSA are lattice-based. SLH-DSA is hash-based, which means it is built on top of older, more conservative primitives. NIST guidance for security levels:

• Category 3 (~AES-192): ML-KEM-768, ML-DSA-65, SLH-DSA-192
• Category 5 (~AES-256): ML-KEM-1024, ML-DSA-87, SLH-DSA-256

NIST recommends cat-3+, while Australian ASD only allows cat-5 after 2030.

It's also useful to check out draft NIST SP 800-131Ar3 for "Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths".

For hashes, use SHA512 or SHA3-512 (not SHA256); and for ciphers ensure AES-256 or ChaCha.

Security

The library has not been independently audited yet.

• at version 0.6.1, in Apr 2026, it was audited by ourselves (self-audited)
  • Scope: everything
  • Changes since audit

If you see anything unusual: investigate and report.

Constant-timeness

This pure JavaScript implementation does not claim constant-time execution. JavaScript engines, JIT compilers, garbage collection, floating-point operations and bigint arithmetic do not offer the execution guarantees needed for a formal constant-time claim.

• ML-DSA signing uses rejection loops, early-exit norm checks and conditional arithmetic whose execution depends on secret-key and per-signature state. Fresh randomized signing is the default, but it does not turn the implementation into a constant-time one.
• Falcon signing uses data-dependent Gaussian and rejection sampling, floating-point operations, and bigint paths. Its timing and microarchitectural side-channel posture is materially weaker than a hardened native implementation. Deterministic or repeated signing randomness can make observations easier to correlate and should be avoided.
• These limitations matter most when an attacker can measure signing closely, such as hostile co-tenancy, shared hardware, or a high-resolution local timing oracle. Use an isolated execution environment or a reviewed native/constant-time backend when that is part of the threat model.

We actively research how to improve this property for post-quantum algorithms in JS. Even hardware ML-KEM implementations require careful side-channel engineering and have had practical attacks.

Supply chain security

• Commits are signed with PGP keys to prevent forgery. Be sure to verify the commit signatures
• Releases are made transparently through token-less GitHub CI and Trusted Publishing. Be sure to verify the provenance logs for authenticity.
• Rare releasing is practiced to minimize the need for re-audits by end-users.
• Dependencies are minimized and strictly pinned to reduce supply-chain risk.
  • We use as few dependencies as possible.
  • Version ranges are locked, and changes are checked with npm-diff.
• Dev dependencies are excluded from end-user installs; they're only used for development and build steps.

For this package, there are 3 dependencies; and a few dev dependencies:

• noble-hashes provides cryptographic hashing functionality, used internally in every algorithm
• noble-curves provides elliptic curve cryptography for hybrid algorithms
• noble-ciphers provides AES-CTR DRBG and ChaCha20, used internally in Falcon
• jsbt is used for benchmarking / testing / build tooling and developed by the same author
• prettier, fast-check and typescript are used for code quality / test generation / ts compilation

Randomness

We rely on the built-in crypto.getRandomValues, which is considered a cryptographically secure PRNG.

Browsers have had weaknesses in the past - and could again - but implementing a userspace CSPRNG is even worse, as there’s no reliable userspace source of high-quality entropy.

Speed

npm run benchmark

Noble is the fastest JS implementation of post-quantum algorithms.

There is experimental git branch, which uses WASM-based awasm-noble for hashing. It has 80% faster ML-KEM, 30% faster ML-DSA, 2.3x faster SLH-DSA-SHA256, 15x faster SLH-DSA-SHAKE. Try it out.

Benchmarks on Apple M4 (operations/sec, higher is better):

| Primitive | Keygen | Signing | Verification | Shared secret | | ----------------- | ------ | ------- | ------------ | ------------- | | ML-KEM-768 | 4661 | | | 4089 | | ML-DSA-65 | 719 | 294 | 610 | | | Falcon512 | 14 | 749 | 2160 | | | SLH-DSA-SHA2-192f | 321 | 11 | 198 | | | Pre-quantum x/ed25519 | 12648 | 6157 | 1255 | 1981 |

SLH-DSA (s variants have 2x shorter signatures; SHAKE is very slow):

| | keygen | sign | verify | | ---------- | ------ | ------ | ------ | | sha2_128f | 2ms | 47ms | 3ms | | shake_128f | 10ms | 237ms | 14ms | | sha2_192f | 3.2ms | 93ms | 5.1ms | | shake_192f | 15ms | 396ms | 21ms | | sha2_256f | 8.5ms | 187ms | 5.2ms | | shake_256f | 40ms | 813ms | 22ms | | sha2_128s | 140ms | 1068ms | 1.1ms | | shake_128s | 673ms | 5114ms | 5.2ms | | sha2_192s | 209ms | 2114ms | 1.9ms | | shake_192s | 974ms | 8779ms | 7.1ms | | sha2_256s | 137ms | 1941ms | 2.7ms | | shake_256s | 645ms | 7689ms | 11ms |

Key and signature sizes:

| Variant | Public key | Secret key | Signature / Ciphertext | |---|---:|---:|---:| | ML-KEM-512 | 800 | 1632 | 768 | | ML-KEM-768 | 1184 | 2400 | 1088 | | ML-KEM-1024 | 1568 | 3168 | 1568 | | ML-DSA-44 | 1312 | 2560 | 2420 | | ML-DSA-65 | 1952 | 4032 | 3309 | | ML-DSA-87 | 2592 | 4896 | 4627 | | Falcon512 | 897 | 1281 | 666 | | Falcon1024 | 1793 | 2305 | 1280 | | SLH-DSA-128f | 32 | 64 | 17088 | | SLH-DSA-128s | 32 | 64 | 7856 | | SLH-DSA-192f | 48 | 96 | 35664 | | SLH-DSA-192s | 48 | 96 | 16224 | | SLH-DSA-256f | 64 | 128 | 49856 | | SLH-DSA-256s | 64 | 128 | 29792 |

License

The MIT License (MIT)

Copyright (c) 2024 Paul Miller (https://paulmillr.com)

See LICENSE file.