@node9/proxy
v1.40.0
Published
The Sudo Command for AI Agents. Execution Security for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor, Opencode, Pi, and any MCP server.
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Node9 sits between your AI agent and the tools it can use — discover what it's already been doing, protect against risky actions in real time, and review what happened over any time window.
Works with Claude Code · Codex CLI · Antigravity (agy) · GitHub Copilot CLI · Gemini CLI · Cursor · Windsurf · VSCode · Claude Desktop · Opencode · Pi · Hermes Agent · any MCP server.
What Node9 does
- 🔍 Discover — scan every past AI session for credential leaks, agent loops, blocked operations, and every secret on disk an agent could reach right now
- 🛡 Protect — review or block risky commands before they run —
rm -rf,git push --force,DROP TABLE, credential reads,curl | bash, AWS/GitHub/Stripe key leaks - 📊 Review — period-windowed report (today / week / month / 90 days) — cost per agent, top tools, shields fired, blast radius
Retrospective scan
This is my own machine — 90 days while building Node9. Score 25/100, 5 credential files an AI agent could reach right now.
npx node9-ai scan # before installation, runs in ~10s, nothing uploads
node9 scan # after installation, same outputSecurity posture scorecard
node9 posture grades how exposed this machine is to a compromised agent — isolation, egress, secrets on disk, supply chain, privilege — and hands you the exact command to fix each finding.
node9 posture # scorecard with the #1 risk and a fix for every finding
node9 posture --ship # send a redacted snapshot to your node9 dashboard (fleet view)Findings are grouped by who can fix them: 🔒 the ones node9 reduces (just run the command) and 🧱 the ones only you can. Each carries a plain-language what / why / who and a real remediation — e.g. the "agent runs unsandboxed on the host" finding points straight at node9 sandbox run (below).
🛡️ Node9 Posture — agent on this host Score: 100/100 (Good)
2 advisories below don't affect the score — OS-level exposure, yours to weigh.
🟢 node9 is already protecting you
✅ Secrets node9 DLP is blocking this
✅ Egress node9 egress is approval-gating this
✅ Approval gate node9 is blocking this
✅ Privilege node9 is approval-gating this
🔒 node9 reduces these — run the command, the rest is yours
⚠️ Isolation Running directly on the host — no container
The agent runs loose on your whole machine, not in a sandbox.
→ node9 sandbox run <agent> — jail it: kernel egress + scoped mounts + node9 inside
→ node9 shield enable project-jail — or shrink the blast radius, keep host access
⚠️ Network exposure 4 services on 0.0.0.0 (node :3000/:4000, PostgreSQL :5432, Redis :6379)
Reachable from your whole network, not just this laptop.
→ node9 shield enable postgres|redis — node9 blocks DROP TABLE / FLUSHALL
→ bind to 127.0.0.1 / firewall the port (your part)
✅ Supply chain no issues found
✅ Coverage no issues found
Track this across your fleet & keep it green → node9.aiLive monitoring
node9 monitor opens an interactive terminal dashboard with two views:
[1]Realtime — live activity, approvals, security alerts, current risk score[2]Report — period-windowed summary: cost, top tools, shields fired, blast radius
Report
Press [2] in monitor for a period-windowed summary. Toggle the window with [T]oday · [W]eek · [M]onth · [N]inety — same panels as the scan above, driven by your post-install audit log.
node9 monitor # press [2] for Report view
node9 report --period 7d # CLI form, no TUIInstall
# macOS / Linux
brew tap node9-ai/node9 && brew install node9
# or via npm (any platform)
npm install -g node9-ainode9 init # auto-wires all detected agents + MCP servers
node9 doctor # verify everything is wired correctlyRequires Node.js 18+.
Shields — curated rule packs
Each shield is a curated rule set for a service or domain. Enable only what you need.
| Shield | What it catches | Enable |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------- |
| project-jail | Blocks reads of ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, .env, credentials via Bash and Read tool | node9 shield enable project-jail |
| bash-safe | curl \| bash, rm -rf /, disk overwrite, eval of remote | node9 shield enable bash-safe |
| postgres | DROP TABLE, TRUNCATE, DROP COLUMN, DELETE without WHERE | node9 shield enable postgres |
| mongodb | dropDatabase, drop(), deleteMany({}), index drops | node9 shield enable mongodb |
| redis | FLUSHALL, FLUSHDB, CONFIG SET on a live server | node9 shield enable redis |
| aws | S3 delete, EC2 terminate, IAM changes, RDS destroy | node9 shield enable aws |
| k8s | namespace delete, helm uninstall, cluster role wipes | node9 shield enable k8s |
| docker | system prune, volume prune, rm -f containers | node9 shield enable docker |
| github | gh repo delete, remote branch deletion, settings changes | node9 shield enable github |
| filesystem | chmod 777, writes under /etc/, /boot/, /usr/ | node9 shield enable filesystem |
| mcp-tool-gating | unapproved MCP tools silently activating new capabilities | node9 shield enable mcp-tool-gating |
node9 shield list # show all shields + statusAlways on — no config needed
- Git — catches
git push --force,git reset --hard,git clean -fd - SQL — catches
DELETE/UPDATEwithoutWHERE,DROP TABLE,TRUNCATE - Shell — catches
curl | bash, unauthorizedsudo - DLP — flags AWS keys, GitHub tokens, Stripe keys, PEM private keys in any tool argument, file contents, or shell config (
~/.zshrc,~/.bashrc) - Response DLP — background scanner reads Claude's conversation history and alerts you if Claude wrote a secret in its response text
- Auto-undo — git snapshot before every AI file edit →
node9 undoto revert - Skills pinning — SHA-256 verification of installed Claude skills / plugins between sessions
Sandbox — run an agent in a jail
When watching isn't enough, node9 sandbox runs the agent inside a disposable container with a kernel-enforced egress allowlist and scoped mounts — while node9's hooks govern and audit every tool call inside the box. The hard version of protection: the agent can only touch the folder you mount and reach the hosts you allow; everything else is dropped at the kernel.
cd ~/my-project
node9 sandbox new # write node9.sandbox.yaml — what to mount + which hosts to allow
node9 sandbox run # build + boot the jailed agent (your project at /workspace)
node9 sandbox tail # watch the agent's actions live, from the host- Disposable — the container is destroyed on exit; your project edits land on your real disk, nothing else survives.
- Same policy — your existing shields / egress rules / approvals apply inside the box, streamed to the same audit log and dashboard.
- Closes the posture loop — running it flips the Isolation / Egress findings green.
Honest scope (Phase 1): single container, Claude first (Codex next); the agent still holds its own credentials in the box (the egress wall confines them to the allowed hosts) — "the agent never holds a secret" is the credential-broker phase on the roadmap. Requires Docker.
MCP gateway
Wrap any MCP server transparently. The agent sees the same server — Node9 intercepts every tool call.
{
"mcpServers": {
"postgres": {
"command": "node9",
"args": ["mcp", "--upstream", "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-postgres postgresql://..."]
}
}
}Or just run node9 init — it wraps your existing MCP servers automatically.
MCP servers can change their tool definitions between sessions. A compromised or malicious server could silently add, remove, or modify tools after you first trusted it — a rug pull attack.
Node9 pins tool definitions on first use:
- First connection — gateway records a SHA-256 hash of every tool's name, description, and schema
- Subsequent connections — hash is compared; if tools changed, the session is quarantined and every tool call is blocked until a human reviews and approves the change
- Corrupt pin state — fails closed (blocks), never silently re-trusts
node9 mcp pin list # show all pinned servers and hashes
node9 mcp pin update <serverKey> # remove pin, re-pin on next connection
node9 mcp pin reset # clear all pinsOther commands
Beyond the three flow commands above (scan / monitor / report):
| Command | What it shows | When to use |
| ---------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------- |
| node9 blast | What an AI agent can reach right now — files, creds, env | First thing to run on any machine |
| node9 tail | Live stream of every tool call (text-only, no TUI) | Piping into other tools, CI, logs |
| node9 sessions | Session history with prompt, tool trace, cost, snapshot | Reviewing a handoff or past work |
| node9 dlp | Credential-leak findings in Claude response text | Any time a DLP desktop alert fires |
| node9 mask | Redact plaintext secrets from local session history files | After a DLP finding — cleans local disk |
Plus a live HUD in your Claude Code statusline:
🛡 node9 | standard | [bash-safe] | ✅ 12 allowed 🛑 2 blocked 🚨 0 dlp | ~$0.43
📊 claude-opus-4-7 | ctx [████████░░░] 54% | 5h [██░░░░░░░░] 12% | 7d [█░░░░░░░] 7%
🗂 2 CLAUDE.md | 8 rules | 3 MCPs | 4 hooksReading the data — what the numbers mean
Node9 surfaces the signal. Here are the patterns worth knowing:
| Signal | Likely meaning |
| ---------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Would have blocked ≥ 5 in a week | Agent is attempting high-impact ops; shields are worth reviewing |
| Single review-git-push rule >50% of findings | Your own rule is firing as intended — not a risk, just supervision |
| DLP finding in user-prompt tool | You pasted a secret into your own prompt — rotate the key |
| Agent Loop ×50+ on same file | Agent stuck in edit/test/fix cycle — check context or slow down |
| MCP tool pin mismatch | Server changed its tools — review before re-trusting |
| Large MCP response warning | That server is inflating your context window for every subsequent turn |
| Response DLP alert | Claude wrote a secret in its response text — not blocked, rotate immediately |
| DLP finding in tool-result | Claude read a file containing a secret (.env, credentials) — rotate the key and run node9 mask |
| DLP finding in [Shell] | Plaintext secret in ~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc — every AI session can see it |
One-off signals are normal; persistent patterns are what you act on.
Python SDK — govern any Python agent
from node9 import configure, protect
configure(agent_name="my-agent", policy="require_approval")
@protect("bash")
def run_command(cmd: str) -> str:
...Python SDK → · CI code review agent example →
Under the hood
- Scan reads raw agent history from
~/.claude/projects/,~/.gemini/tmp/,~/.gemini/antigravity-*/brain/,~/.copilot/session-state/,~/.codex/sessions/— no API calls, fully offline - Runtime intercepts tool calls via pre-execution hooks (Claude Code, Codex, Antigravity, GitHub Copilot CLI, Gemini CLI, Opencode, Pi) or via the MCP gateway (Cursor, Windsurf, VSCode, Claude Desktop). All decisions land in
~/.node9/audit.logatomically. - MCP gateway is a stdio proxy; intercepts
tools/list+tools/callJSON-RPC, forwards the rest - Policy engine uses mvdan-sh for bash AST analysis — defeats obfuscation via backslash escaping, variable substitution, eval of remote download
- Shadow repo for auto-undo lives at
~/.node9/snapshots/<hash16>/— never touches your.git - Sandbox generates a Dockerfile + entrypoint that seal an
ipset/iptablesdeny-by-default egress wall, then drop to a non-root agent with node9's daemon + hooks running inside; only the agent's credential file is mounted, never your whole~/.claude
Full docs
Config reference, smart rules, stateful rules, trusted hosts, approval modes, CLI reference — at node9.ai/docs.
Related projects
- node9-python — Python SDK
- node9-pr-agent — GitHub Action that reviews PRs through Node9
Enterprise
Node9 Pro adds governance locking, SAML/SSO, central audit export, and VPC deployment. See node9.ai.
License
Apache-2.0
