@reckona/mreact-compiler

@reckona/mreact-compiler contains the compiler passes used by mreact. It analyzes JSX modules, produces client and server output, and reports diagnostics for code that cannot be compiled safely.

Usage

import { transform } from "@reckona/mreact-compiler";

const result = transform({
  filename: "app/page.tsx",
  source: `export default function Page() { return <main>Hello</main>; }`,
  target: "server",
});

Boundary graph analysis is also available for tooling that needs to explain how route entries and imported modules cross server/client boundaries:

import { analyzeBoundaryGraph } from "@reckona/mreact-compiler";

const graph = await analyzeBoundaryGraph({
  entries: [{ file: "app/page.tsx", kind: "route-page" }],
  readModule: async (file) => sources.get(file),
  resolveModule: async ({ importer, source }) => resolveAppImport(importer, source),
});

console.log(graph.clientBoundaries, graph.serverActions, graph.trace);

Exports

• transform() is the public compiler entrypoint.
• analyzeBoundaryGraph() traces module classifications, rendered client boundaries, and inferred form server action sites across app-local static imports.
• @reckona/mreact-compiler/internal exposes lower-level IR analysis helpers used by the router and tests.
• @reckona/mreact-compiler/oxc exposes the Oxc-backed analyzer path.

Notes

This package is intended for framework integration and tooling. Application projects should normally consume it through @reckona/mreact-router or @reckona/mreact-vite.

The server target supports JSX spread attributes on HTML and SVG elements. Spread attributes use the same escaping and URL filtering as normal dynamic attributes, normalize common JSX aliases such as className, htmlFor, srcDoc, tabIndex, defaultValue, and defaultChecked, and drop key, ref, children, event handlers, invalid attribute names, unsafe URL values such as javascript:, and raw srcDoc strings. Use { __html: value } for srcDoc when you intentionally need trusted iframe document HTML; the value is escaped as an attribute but can execute inside the iframe document. Explicit dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: value }} on an element emits trusted raw children on server and reactive client output, which is intended for small root-level bootstraps such as inline scripts where the application owns the full string. The payload must have an own data property named __html whose value is a string; extra keys are ignored, while accessors, inherited values, invalid values, and null clear the element without coercion. A direct dangerouslySetInnerHTML prop takes precedence over JSX children. Direct props and spreads are applied in source order during initial client setup, so the later binding wins; after setup, the most recent reactive write wins.

Qualified JSX attributes such as xlink:href, xml:lang, and xmlns:xlink retain their namespace on server and client output. URL-bearing qualified attributes such as xlink:href use the same unsafe-scheme filtering as href. Namespaced JSX tag names are rejected because the compiler does not create custom namespace-qualified elements.