@runestone-labs/gatekeeper-mcp
v0.1.2
Published
MCP server that runs agent tool calls (shell, files, HTTP, …) through Runestone Gatekeeper — policy enforcement, human approval, and audit for any MCP client
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Runestone Gatekeeper — MCP Server
An MCP server that lets any MCP client (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, …) run real tool calls — shell, file writes, HTTP, or any Gatekeeper tool — only through Runestone Gatekeeper. Every call is policy-checked, may require human approval, and is audited. The model never touches your systems directly; Gatekeeper sits in front.
MCP client (LLM) ──tools/call──▶ gatekeeper-mcp ──policy-gated──▶ Gatekeeper ──▶ shell / files / HTTPRequirements
A running Gatekeeper server (see the repo root). This package is just the MCP front door; it does nothing on its own.
Install / configure
It runs over stdio. Add it to your MCP client config, e.g. Claude Desktop
(claude_desktop_config.json):
{
"mcpServers": {
"gatekeeper": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@runestone-labs/gatekeeper-mcp"],
"env": {
"GATEKEEPER_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:3847",
"GATEKEEPER_ROLE": "openclaw"
}
}
}
}| Env | Required | Default | Meaning |
|-----|----------|---------|---------|
| GATEKEEPER_ROLE | yes | — | The policy role this server presents to Gatekeeper for every call. |
| GATEKEEPER_URL | no | http://127.0.0.1:3847 | Gatekeeper base URL. |
| GATEKEEPER_AGENT_NAME | no | mcp-client | Name recorded in audit logs. |
Shared approvals for unattended agents
Local Gatekeeper and this MCP integration are free. Need a teammate to handle approvals while your agents run unattended? We're testing Gatekeeper Team at $49/month, for up to five members and five instances. The proposed Cloud service would coordinate a held action, a teammate's approval or denial, and a record of the outcome. Cloud is planned, not publicly available, and no payment is collected during this test. Only actions actually routed through Gatekeeper are covered; installing the MCP server does not cover a client's other tools.
See the proposed workflow and share your team's needs. The form also lets you optionally report a first real routed action or return use on a later day. These are manual self-reports, not verified external activation. Don't send commands or raw audit logs; this test adds no automatic usage reporting to the MCP server.
Tools
| Tool | Gatekeeper tool | Use |
|------|-----------------|-----|
| shell_exec | shell.exec | Run a shell command. |
| files_write | files.write | Write a file. |
| http_request | http.request | HTTP GET/POST (egress-policed). |
| gatekeeper_call | (any) | Generic escape hatch — call any Gatekeeper tool (e.g. memory.query) by name. |
| gatekeeper_health | — | Check the Gatekeeper server is reachable. |
Every gated call returns one of:
- allow → the tool output.
- deny → an error result explaining why (the call did not run).
- approve → an error result saying a human must approve it in Gatekeeper; the call did not run.
Security model
This server is a policy boundary, so it is deliberately strict:
- Identity is pinned server-side. Role comes from
GATEKEEPER_ROLE; origin is fixed tomodel_inferredand taint tomcp_client. The MCP client cannot set or override actor / role / origin / taint / capability tokens via tool arguments — there is no code path from a tool argument to any of those. - Fail closed. A deny, a pending approval, or any malformed/unexpected Gatekeeper response is surfaced as an error — never as a successful result.
- No endpoint traversal. Generic tool names are validated as strict dotted
identifiers;
../, slashes, and the like are rejected before any request. - No leakage. The Gatekeeper URL and anything resembling a credential are scrubbed from error messages before they reach the client.
These invariants are covered by an adversarial test suite (src/*.test.ts).
Distribution
Published to npm as @runestone-labs/gatekeeper-mcp and listed on the MCP
Registry as io.github.runestone-labs/gatekeeper (see server.json). The MCP
Registry is in preview.
License
Apache-2.0
