SAIHM MCP Server

Sovereign, encrypted, sharable, persistent memory protocol for AI agents.

v0.3.4 · Apache-2.0 · COTI V2 mainnet

What this is

A Model Context Protocol server that exposes eight tools any MCP-capable AI agent (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, custom agents) can call to gain a persistent, encrypted memory layer the user owns:

• saihm_remember — store an encrypted memory cell
• saihm_recall — retrieve and decrypt your memories
• saihm_forget — true cryptographic erasure (GDPR Art. 17)
• saihm_status — your protocol-runtime stats and storage tier dashboard
• saihm_share / saihm_revoke_share — selectively share a memory with another agent or user
• saihm_governance_propose / saihm_governance_vote — protocol governance via gSAIHM

Each tool forwards to a SAIHM operator endpoint that runs the full protocol stack on COTI V2 mainnet. The server itself holds no crypto, no storage, and no protocol runtime — those live behind the operator endpoint.

Companion package

This package speaks MCP. For production client-side cryptography — post-quantum sealing, authenticated sharing, and provable erasure performed on your own machine so the operator stays blind — pair it with @saihm/client-pro.

Install

npm install @saihm/mcp-server
# or run directly without install:
npx @saihm/mcp-server

Configure

The server needs two env vars:

SAIHM_ENDPOINT_URL=https://operator.example.com/mcp
SAIHM_AUTH_HEADER=Bearer <token-issued-by-your-operator>

• SAIHM_ENDPOINT_URL — the SAIHM operator endpoint. Operators publish their endpoint URLs at https://saihm.coti.global.
• SAIHM_AUTH_HEADER — the Authorization header value the operator expects (typically a Bearer <token> issued to you after key-bound enrolment). The server is authentication-agnostic and never transmits raw private keys; the operator's enrolment flow keeps your signing key on your machine.

Place these in a .env file alongside the server (the .gitignore excludes all .env* files from any future repo).

Wire into Claude Code

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "saihm": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["@saihm/mcp-server"],
      "env": {
        "SAIHM_ENDPOINT_URL": "https://operator.example.com/mcp",
        "SAIHM_AUTH_HEADER": "Bearer <token>"
      }
    }
  }
}

What gets persisted, where

The server itself persists nothing. The operator endpoint runs the full protocol stack: cells are encrypted under a per-cell DEK, sealed by a per-agent KEK, persisted to the operator's configured durable storage, and audited on COTI V2 mainnet. See the operator's documentation for tier details, and Storage is the operator's responsibility (by design) below.

Storage is the operator's responsibility (by design)

For operators — read this first. SAIHM does not hard-wire your durable storage to any single provider, and it does not silently provision storage for you. Choosing and configuring where cells are persisted is your job, on purpose. This is a deliberate design choice for operator convenience and data sovereignty — not a missing feature. If memory writes fail with a storage error, it almost always means the backend has not been configured yet.

Why it works this way:

• Provider sovereignty. You decide where your tenants' encrypted cells live. The protocol never locks you to one vendor or one network.
• Local-first, then deep-archive. A typical operator routes writes to a local IPFS (Kubo) node first — fast, authoritative, and under your own control — and then asynchronously to a Filecoin deep-archive provider such as Pinata, Synapse, or Lighthouse. The same content addressing spans both tiers.
• Your memory and your tenants' take the same path. Whatever backend you configure serves both the operator's own memory and every tenant's — there is no separate hidden sink hard-coded to one provider.

What you configure (your operator deployment guide lists the exact settings):

• a reachable IPFS / Kubo endpoint (a local node is recommended) for the authoritative low-latency tier, and
• credentials for at least one Filecoin / IPFS pinning provider for durable deep-archive.

If neither is configured, the endpoint has nowhere durable to put cells and will reject writes rather than lose data. That refusal is intentional.

Prefer not to run storage yourself? Join SAIHM.

You have two paths, and either is fine:

1. Run your own operator endpoint and configure the storage backend as described above — full sovereignty, your infrastructure.
2. Join the hosted SAIHM operator and let it provide durable storage for you. It runs blind / non-custodial: paired with client-side sealing (see @saihm/client-pro and @saihm/mcp-server-pro), it only ever stores ciphertext and never holds your keys — so you get managed storage without giving up custody. Enrol via Join SAIHM at https://saihm.coti.global (a paid hosted service).

Reporting engine

A reporting library is bundled as a sub-export, so operators can compose the eight MCP calls into bespoke reports with their own tooling (no extra dependency, no extra service):

import {
  validateBespokeTemplate,
  registerTemplate,
  generateRegistryAttestation,
  StubPublicRegistry,
  InMemoryReportingRuntime,
  GDPR_ART15_FIELDS,
  REGISTRY_ATTESTATION_FIELDS,
  type BespokeReportTemplate,
} from "@saihm/mcp-server/reporting";

What it covers

• Field universe (FIELD_UNIVERSE) — 280 fields (262 framework + 18 ledger). Templates that project a field outside this set are rejected at validation.
• Bespoke template schema — zod validator + universe-membership check + scope/cap enforcement.
• Authorization path validators — 4 paths: public / self / operator-self / operator-for-downstream.
• Receipt emission — 6 sub-kinds (report_generated / report_rejected / template_registered / template_superseded / erasure_chain_broken / rate_limit_exceeded) under a stable HKDF receipt domain.
• Framework smoke — registry-attestation (public auth) for end-to-end plumbing verification.

Constraints

• Every fieldProjections[] entry MUST be in FIELD_UNIVERSE.
• scope.customerIdHashes 64-hex; max 10,000 per template.
• scope.timeRange window ≤ 366 days.
• fieldProjections length 1–200.
• framework ∈ {gdpr-art-15, gdpr-art-17, soc2-t1, soc2-t2, iso27001, aml, audit-export, billing-history, registry-attestation}.
• format ∈ {pdfa3, json, csv}.

Worked example

const template: BespokeReportTemplate = {
  templateId: "acme-q1-summary",
  templateVersion: 1,
  operatorIdHash: "ab".repeat(32),
  scope: {
    customerIdHashes: ["cd".repeat(32)],
    timeRange: { from: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", to: "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z" },
  },
  framework: "gdpr-art-15",
  fieldProjections: [GDPR_ART15_FIELDS[0], GDPR_ART15_FIELDS[1]],
  format: "pdfa3",
};
const v = validateBespokeTemplate(template);
if (!v.valid) throw new Error(v.errors.join(", "));

const runtime = new InMemoryReportingRuntime(); // replace with your audit-ledger runtime
const reg = await registerTemplate(template, runtime);
if (reg.ok) console.log("registered:", reg.templateHash);

In production, replace InMemoryReportingRuntime with a runtime that persists audit payloads to your operator's audit ledger. Operators who inject signature verifiers should use pure-crypto libraries (@noble/curves for EIP-712, @noble/post-quantum for FIPS 204 ML-DSA) — the package itself bundles no EVM tooling.

Security

The server enforces a small set of defaults so misconfiguration cannot leak the Authorization header in transit:

• HTTPS-only endpoints. SAIHM_ENDPOINT_URL must use https://. Plain http:// is rejected at construction time, except for 127.0.0.1 and localhost (so a local operator endpoint works during development).
• Per-call abort window. Each request runs under an AbortController that aborts after 30s, preventing a hung endpoint from starving the MCP server.
• Response-size cap. Responses whose Content-Length exceeds 16 MB are rejected before deserialisation.
• No header echo. Authorization is never included in thrown error messages or stdout.
• No filesystem reads. The package never reads from disk; configuration flows entirely through env vars.
• Zero EVM tooling. No ethers, no eth_*, no Solidity. If operators inject signature verifiers via AuthVerifiers, they should use pure-crypto libraries (@noble/curves, @noble/post-quantum).

Trust model: this client trusts whatever endpoint the operator configures. Cell IDs, audit anchors, and report receipts returned from that endpoint are surfaced to the agent verbatim — operators are the authority for content shown via saihm_recall. Verifying receipts against COTI V2 mainnet anchors is out of scope for this server; consume the cellId and auditCellId fields and verify against your own SAIHM mainnet read path.

For distribution integrity, each release carries the npm registry signature; verify with npm audit signatures (and inspect npm view @saihm/mcp-server --json | jq .dist).

Dependencies

The published npm package has a minimal runtime surface:

| Dependency | License | Role | |---|---|---| | Node.js (≥ 20.x) | MIT | Runtime | | @modelcontextprotocol/sdk | MIT | MCP SDK; binds the eight-tool surface | | TypeScript | Apache-2.0 | Build-time only | | tsx | MIT | TypeScript runner for tests + CLI |

No copyleft, no proprietary dependencies. Cryptographic primitives at the operator-endpoint layer (ML-DSA-65 / HKDF / Ed25519) are not bundled into this MCP server; operators implementing the protocol stack are recommended to use @noble/post-quantum and @noble/curves (MIT) rather than rolling custom code.

Achievements

• OpenSSF Best Practices Passing badge — project 12898, 100% Passing criteria (2026-05-19). https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/12898
• IETF Independent Submission Stream — draft-saihm-memory-protocol-01 (2026-05-27) is In ISE Review in the Independent Submission Stream. It is not an Internet Standard, is not endorsed by the IETF, and has no formal standing in the IETF standards process. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-saihm-memory-protocol/
• npm registry — @saihm/[email protected] published (2026-06-22) adds a conspicuous "Storage is the operator's responsibility (by design)" section — documenting BYO storage and the Join-SAIHM hosted, non-custodial option. 0.3.3 (2026-06-22) was a documentation release that states the Independent-Submission status precisely (no implied IETF endorsement) and cross-references the companion package @saihm/client-pro. 0.3.2 (2026-06-22) corrected the documented operator-endpoint path to /mcp (the canonical SAIHM_ENDPOINT_URL path) across the README and client comments. 0.3.1 (2026-05-28) was a metadata patch that sources the MCP serverInfo.version from package.json (was hardcoded "0.1.0" from 0.1.0 through 0.3.0). 0.3.0 (also 2026-05-28) aligned the saihm_status response shape with draft-saihm-memory-protocol-01 §3.4 (full eight-field schema: prs, bfsi, bfsi_window_start_ts, bfsi_R, bfsi_M, shards, contracts, governance). 0.2.0 (also 2026-05-28) aligned the cell-tuple response shape with §2.1; 0.1.3 was the OpenSSF Best Practices Passing badge release (2026-05-19).
• MCP Registry / Glama — server listed for discovery (2026-05-16).

Roadmap

A 12-month roadmap is maintained in the project's AAIF proposal and will be mirrored to https://saihm.coti.global/roadmap with the v0.2.x release. Near-term tracks:

• 2026-Q2 — Operator-endpoint reference implementation; OpenSSF Silver pursuit (governance, code-of-conduct, DCO, signed releases, coverage tooling, assurance case).
• 2026-Q3 — First 2–3 external organization deployments; formal AAIF Project Proposal submission when adoption blockers clear.
• 2026-Q4 — NIST AI RMF crosswalk public review; EU AI Act compliance-checklist generator. OpenSSF Silver award (target).
• 2027-Q1 — Independent-stream (ISE) RFC publication, subject to RFC-Editor review — not an IETF-consensus standard; v1.0 reference implementation.

License

Apache-2.0 — see LICENSE.

Project

• Site: https://saihm.coti.global
• Issue tracker: https://github.com/SAIHM-Admin/saihm-mcp/issues
• Security: see SECURITY.md for private vulnerability disclosure
• Contributing: see CONTRIBUTING.md and CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
• Governance: see GOVERNANCE.md
• Changelog: see CHANGELOG.md