@speed-fullbar/gpt-image-2-mcp

v0.6.0

Published

20 days ago

MCP server exposing OpenAI's gpt-image-2 for image generation and iterative editing.

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zsnmwy

mcp model-context-protocol openai gpt-image gpt-image-2 image-generation

gpt-image-2-mcp

An MCP server that exposes OpenAI's gpt-image-2 family (default model gpt-image-2.5-sunburst) to any MCP client — Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, MCP Inspector, etc.

Eight tools:

| Tool | What it does | |---|---| | generate_image | text → image | | edit_image | 1–8 reference images (+ optional mask) → image | | get_image_job | poll a backgrounded generate/edit job by job_id | | list_image_jobs | recover a job_id after a reconnect or context reset | | start_edit_session | begin an iterative multi-turn edit | | continue_edit_session | apply another refinement turn — previous output becomes the new input | | end_edit_session | release a session | | list_edit_sessions | show active sessions |

Every generated image is saved to disk and returned inline so the calling model sees it.

Image work is slow — tens of seconds, sometimes minutes — so every image tool returns { job_id, state: "running" } straight away and you collect the result from get_image_job. See Background jobs.

Batch work, or clients that cannot run a stdio server? The same repository ships a queue-backed remote service with an HTTP API and a remote MCP endpoint (/mcp), built for thousands of images at a time — see Remote service.

Requirements

Node.js ≥ 20 for the stdio server (the published gpt-image-2-mcp package)
Node.js ≥ 24 for the remote service and for this repository's test suite: the SQLite driver is Node's built-in node:sqlite, which older versions do not ship (the service image is node:24 for the same reason)
An OpenAI API key on an org with gpt-image-2 access (Organization Verification may be required)

Install

Nothing to build. The server runs straight from npm over stdio — there is no port to open, no URL to host, nothing to keep running in the background. The client you configure below starts it on demand. Node.js ≥ 20 has to be available to that client.

Add this to your MCP client's config (claude mcp add, Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, … — per-client details below):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "gpt-image-2": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@speed-fullbar/gpt-image-2-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "OPENAI_API_KEY": "sk-...",
        "OPENAI_BASE_URL": "https://your-gateway.example/v1"
      }
    }
  }
}

OPENAI_BASE_URL is optional — only for a proxy/enterprise route. Drop the line when you talk to api.openai.com directly.
Put the key in this env block. Whether the server would also see variables exported in your shell depends on the client: a GUI client (Claude Desktop) does not, a client you launched from a shell (Claude Code, MCP Inspector) usually does. The env block works in both cases.
On Windows, some clients need "command": "cmd", "args": ["/c", "npx", "-y", "@speed-fullbar/gpt-image-2-mcp"] instead (npx is a shell script there).
The package is scoped (@speed-fullbar/gpt-image-2-mcp) because the bare name on npm belongs to the upstream project this one is forked from (see Credits); the executable it installs is gpt-image-2-mcp.

Check the install before wiring it in. This starts the server and sends one MCP initialize:

printf '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"check","version":"0"}}}\n' \
  | npx -y @speed-fullbar/gpt-image-2-mcp

Expect one JSON line containing "serverInfo":{"name":"gpt-image-2-mcp","version":"…"} (the version you just installed). That proves the process starts and speaks MCP — it does not prove the API key works: for that, call generate_image and poll get_image_job (see the worked example below).

From source (for development, or a pinned local checkout):

pnpm install
pnpm run build

This produces build/index.js, the server entry point. Point the client at "command": "node", "args": ["/absolute/path/to/gpt-image-2-mcp/build/index.js"].

Configure a client

Every client needs the same shape — a command that starts the server (the block above) and an env block holding OPENAI_API_KEY. The sections below only show where that block goes in each client; use npx -y @speed-fullbar/gpt-image-2-mcp (no checkout needed) or the node …/build/index.js form from a pinned checkout.

Claude Code

claude mcp add gpt-image-2 --env OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-... -- npx -y @speed-fullbar/gpt-image-2-mcp

Or add it to ~/.claude.json (or a project .mcp.json) with the JSON shape below.

Claude Desktop

Edit ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json (macOS) or %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json (Windows):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "gpt-image-2": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@speed-fullbar/gpt-image-2-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "OPENAI_API_KEY": "sk-..."
      }
    }
  }
}

Cursor and other stdio clients

Same shape — mcpServers (Cursor, Claude, most wrappers) or mcp.servers (VS Code):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "gpt-image-2": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@speed-fullbar/gpt-image-2-mcp"],
      "env": { "OPENAI_API_KEY": "sk-..." }
    }
  }
}

Local checkout instead of npx

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "gpt-image-2": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["/absolute/path/to/gpt-image-2-mcp/build/index.js"],
      "env": { "OPENAI_API_KEY": "sk-..." }
    }
  }
}

MCP Inspector (interactive testing)

pnpm run inspect

Launches the official inspector UI pointed at your local build.

Environment variables

| Var | Required | Purpose | |---|---|---| | OPENAI_API_KEY | ✅ | Auth | | OPENAI_BASE_URL | | Override for proxies / enterprise routes | | OPENAI_ORG_ID | | Forwarded as organization | | OPENAI_PROJECT_ID | | Forwarded as project | | OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS | | Per-request timeout (default 600000 = 10 min, generous because image calls are slow). Raise it for a very slow proxy. | | OPENAI_MAX_RETRIES | | SDK retries for 429/5xx (default 2). | | GPT_IMAGE_2_OUTPUT_DIR | | Global default for where images are saved. Absolute paths used as-is, relative resolved from the server's working directory (process.cwd()), not yours. | | GPT_IMAGE_2_ALLOW_UNSAFE_OUTPUT_DIR | | Set to 1 to let output_dir / GPT_IMAGE_2_OUTPUT_DIR point into OS-sensitive directories (/etc, ~/.ssh, …), which are refused by default. | | GPT_IMAGE_2_MCP_DEBUG | | Set to 1 to emit verbose debug logs on stderr. | | GPT_IMAGE_2_SESSION_MAX | | Max concurrent in-memory edit sessions, LRU-evicted beyond this (default 20; 0 = no cap). | | GPT_IMAGE_2_SESSION_TTL_MS | | Idle TTL before an edit session is swept (default 3600000 = 1h; 0 = never expire). | | GPT_IMAGE_2_ASYNC_AFTER_MS | | How long generate_image / edit_image / the edit-session tools may block before handing off to a pollable job (default 1 = hand off immediately; a larger value waits inline, keep it below your MCP host's tool-call timeout; <= 0 never backgrounds). See Background jobs below. | | GPT_IMAGE_2_JOB_MAX | | LRU cap on finished image jobs kept for polling (default 20; 0 = no cap). | | GPT_IMAGE_2_JOB_TTL_MS | | Age before a finished job becomes un-pollable (default 1800000 = 30 min; 0 = never expire). Running jobs are never expired or evicted. | | GPT_IMAGE_2_SANITIZATION | | Cleaning applied to every returned image before it is written or sent inline: metadata-v2 (default — container cleaning plus a re-encode), metadata-v1 (container cleaning only, provider's pixels kept), or off. See What an image carries. | | OPENAI_FORCE_RESPONSES_EDITS | | Set to 1 to pin edits to the Responses-API fallback route instead of /v1/images/edits. See Edit routing below. | | OPENAI_RESPONSES_EDIT_MODEL | | Host model used by the Responses-API fallback edit route (default gpt-4.1-mini). See Edit routing below. |

Where images go

Unless overridden, each tool writes to:

<OS config dir>/gpt-image-2-mcp/output/<project-name>-<hash>/

macOS/Linux: ~/.config/gpt-image-2-mcp/output/<project>-<hash>/
Windows: %APPDATA%\gpt-image-2-mcp\output\<project>-<hash>\

<project>-<hash> is derived from the git root (if any) or the server process's current working directory — each project gets its own folder so generations don't collide.

⚠️ When a client launches the server (npx, Claude Desktop, …) that working directory is the client's, not your shell's, so the folder name is not predictable. If you care where images land, set GPT_IMAGE_2_OUTPUT_DIR (or pass output_dir per call) to an absolute path.

Per-call override: pass output_dir: "/some/path" to any tool.

Filenames look like image-20260422-150301-a1b2c3.png. If you pass filename_prefix: "hero-banner", it becomes image-20260422-150301-a1b2c3-hero-banner.png.

What an image carries

Every image this server returns — the file it writes and the inline copy in the tool result — is cleaned first. Image origins attach provenance metadata to what they return: measured against two gateways in production, every output PNG carried a caBX chunk, a ~22 KB C2PA/Content Credentials manifest naming the tool that made it. Cleaning removes it before the bytes reach you:

| Profile | What it does | Pixels | |---|---|---| | metadata-v2 (default) | container rewrite and a re-encode: the image is decoded and written again with this server's own deflate | byte-identical | | metadata-v1 | container rewrite only: provider metadata is dropped, the provider's compressed stream is kept verbatim | untouched |

The container rewrite keeps only what a decoder needs — PNG IHDR/PLTE/tRNS/IDAT/IEND, JPEG coding segments, WebP VP8/VP8L/ALPH/VP8X — and drops everything else: C2PA/Content Credentials, EXIF, XMP, ICC, text chunks, and any bytes appended after the end of the file. metadata-v2 goes further and re-encodes, which also removes the encoder fingerprint that survives in the compressed bytes; on a real 1.5 MP output that produced a 6-9% smaller file in ~1 s with AE = 0 against the original, i.e. not one pixel differs.

A shape that cannot be re-encoded faithfully (16-bit, indexed, interlaced, above the pixel ceiling) is delivered under metadata-v1 and says so. Each entry of structuredContent.images[] carries a sanitization receipt — { status, policy, source_bytes, removed, reencoded } — plus a note in the summary when something could not be cleaned:

{ "file_path": "…/image-….png", "sanitization": { "status": "clean", "policy": "metadata-v2",
  "source_bytes": 1595439, "removed": ["caBX"], "reencoded": true } }

GPT_IMAGE_2_SANITIZATION=off writes the provider's bytes verbatim and records status: "disabled". An unrecognised value is not guessed at: the image is still written (it was already paid for) and the result says cleaning did not run. Two limits worth stating plainly — this is a container-level guarantee (it removes what an image says about itself and, under v2, the encoder fingerprint, but makes no claim about watermarks inside the pixels), and a file the profile cannot parse at all is still delivered, flagged skipped with the reason rather than thrown away.

The queue-backed service applies the same profiles to what it stores; see What a downloaded image carries in the service half of this README.

What the tools return

Image tools hand off first. generate_image, edit_image, start_edit_session, and continue_edit_session answer with a job hand-off:

{ "job_id": "img-1761149123-a1b2c3d4", "state": "running", "poll_hint": "…", … }

Poll get_image_job with that job_id until it reports state: "completed". The completed poll is the result those tools would have returned inline:

An inline ImageContent block per generated image (so the LLM sees the image)
A text summary: applied settings, file path, token usage, estimated cost
structuredContent for programmatic consumers:

{
  "model": "gpt-image-2.5-sunburst",
  "prompt": "…",
  "requested": { "size": "auto", "quality": "auto", "n": 1, "format": "png" },
  "applied":   { "size": "1024x1024", "quality": "high", "background": "opaque", "output_format": "png" },
  "images": [ { "file_path": "…", "filename": "…", "size_bytes": 123456, "mime_type": "image/png" } ],
  "usage":   { "input_tokens": …, "output_tokens": …, "total_tokens": …, "input_tokens_details": { … } },
  "cost_usd_estimated": 0.2112,
  "notes": []
}

requested is what you asked for, applied is what the origin actually used, and notes (always present, [] when empty) explains any difference. A job poll additionally carries job_id, state, tool, started_at, completed_at, elapsed_ms, error, and poll_hint (while running). Session tools also return session_id and turn.

Worked example: generate, poll, then edit the result

generate_image      prompt: "a red fox in a snowy pine forest, photorealistic"
  → { job_id: "img-…", state: "running" }

get_image_job       job_id: "img-…"
  → state: "running" (elapsed 6s)                       # poll again in a few seconds
get_image_job       job_id: "img-…"
  → state: "completed"
    images: [ { file_path: "/home/me/.config/gpt-image-2-mcp/output/my-app-1a2b3c/image-20260921-101500-a1b2c3.png" } ]

edit_image          prompt: "give the fox a small gold crown, keep everything else identical"
                    images: ["/home/me/.config/…/image-20260921-101500-a1b2c3.png"]
  → { job_id: "img-…", state: "running" }               # feed file_path straight back in

get_image_job       job_id: "img-…"
  → state: "completed", images: [ { file_path: "…-edited.png" } ]

Background jobs (the normal path)

Image work is slow — tens of seconds through a fast route, sometimes minutes — past the tool-call timeout of many MCP hosts. Every image tool (generate_image, edit_image, start_edit_session, continue_edit_session) therefore hands off immediately: the first response is { job_id, state: "running" } and the request continues in-process. Keep calling get_image_job with that job_id every few seconds:

state: "running" → keep polling
state: "completed" → content is identical to a synchronous success: inline images, summary text with file paths / usage / cost, and structuredContent carrying the model, requested/applied settings, usage, cost estimate, and route the call would have returned
state: "failed" → error carries the reason; content mirrors the error

GPT_IMAGE_2_ASYNC_AFTER_MS controls how long a call may block before that hand-off: 1 (the default, milliseconds) hands off immediately; a larger value waits inline for that long — keep it below your MCP host's tool-call timeout; 0 never backgrounds, so every call blocks until it finishes.

Job state lives in memory: finished jobs are kept up to GPT_IMAGE_2_JOB_MAX and expire after GPT_IMAGE_2_JOB_TTL_MS; a server restart drops all jobs. If you lose a job_id (reconnect, context reset), call list_image_jobs and pick the running/completed job back up instead of re-running it and paying twice.

Models

generate_image, edit_image, start_edit_session, and continue_edit_session accept an optional model argument:

gpt-image-2.5-sunburst — the default
gpt-image-2.5-flare
gpt-image-2

The 2.5 variants accept the same parameters (sizes, quality, formats). Omitting model keeps using gpt-image-2.5-sunburst; in an edit session, continue_edit_session inherits the model the session was started with unless you override it per turn. Token/cost estimates assume gpt-image-2 pricing.

Sizes

Default is auto (the model picks). You can pass:

A preset: 1024x1024, 1536x1024, 1024x1536
Any custom WxH where:
- Both edges are multiples of 16
- Max edge ≤ 3840px (outputs above 2K are beta)
- Aspect ratio within 1:3 and 3:1
- Total pixels between 655,360 and 8,294,400

Invalid sizes fail before the API call with a clear error — no wasted requests.

What actually comes back is the origin's call, not yours. Some upstreams normalize the controls: a gateway on a ChatGPT subscription (for example sub2api routing to its OAuth/Codex backend) ignores the requested size, quality, and format, and answers with its own — commonly 1254×1254 PNG for the 2.5 models, whatever you asked for. The tool reports what came back in applied, and adds a notes entry when it differs from requested. To have size/format honored, point OPENAI_BASE_URL at an API-key upstream (sub2api relays the fields unmodified on that path).

Transparent PNGs work via background: "transparent" (pair it with output_format: "png"). When the origin honors it, the response reports background: "transparent" and the file carries a real alpha channel (only the artwork is opaque).

The origin decides, though, and this gateway picks transparency from the prompt/content rather than your argument — verified at byte level on the same origin: a vector-logo prompt came back with 68% fully transparent pixels even when background: "opaque" was requested, and a scene prompt came back fully opaque (0 transparent pixels) even when "transparent" was requested. Always check applied.background and the file's alpha channel; a notes entry explains any disagreement. (For the other controls on this gateway, pnpm run smoke:matrix reports what your own origin honors — on the sub2api ChatGPT path size/quality/format/n are normalized away.)

Iterative editing example

start_edit_session    prompt: "A coastal lighthouse at dawn, photorealistic", images: ["./sketch.png"]
  → session_id: edit-1761149123-a1b2c3d4, turn 1, saved to …/session-…-turn1.png

continue_edit_session session_id: "edit-…-a1b2c3d4", prompt: "Make the sky more orange. Keep everything else the same."
  → turn 2

continue_edit_session session_id: "edit-…-a1b2c3d4", prompt: "Add a small boat on the horizon."
  → turn 3

end_edit_session      session_id: "edit-…-a1b2c3d4"

A turn hands off like any other slow call: start_edit_session and continue_edit_session answer with { job_id, state: "running" } and the turn finishes in the background. The session_id arrives with the job's "completed" result (for a start, the session only exists once its first turn has landed), and the session stays busy until then — continuing it early returns an error, and list_edit_sessions reports state: "running" plus the pending_job_id to poll. A turn is claimed the moment it starts, so two overlapping continue_edit_session calls can't edit the same input image twice.

Every follow-up turn inherits what the session already uses — model, size, quality, background, output format — unless that turn overrides it, and list_edit_sessions reports those settings for each session.

Sessions are in-memory only and discarded on server restart — this is intentional (keeps the server stateless on the wire) and mirrors the Gemini MCP pattern.

Image inputs for `edit_image` and `start_edit_session`

Accepts any mix of:

Absolute path: /Users/me/photo.png
Relative path: ./photo.png (resolved from CWD)
file:///Users/me/photo.png
https://example.com/photo.png (downloaded, size-capped)
…

Up to 8 images per call. Each ≤ 50MB. PNG/WEBP/JPG supported.

Pass the file_path from any earlier result straight back in images — that is how you iterate on an image, and how you combine several references into one composition. More than 8 images is refused before anything is uploaded (verified live: 8 accepted, 9 refused). continue_edit_session takes no images; it reuses the session's last output. The same summary is in the server's own initialize instructions, so a client sees it without reading this file.

Cost guardrails

The server ships no hard spending limits — you should watch your OpenAI usage dashboard. Each tool result includes an estimated cost in USD computed from the token usage returned by the API, plus an approximate pre-flight estimate logged to stderr.

Rough per-image cost at common sizes:

| Quality | 1024×1024 | 1024×1536 / 1536×1024 | |---|---|---| | low | ~$0.006 | ~$0.005 | | medium | ~$0.053 | ~$0.041 | | high | ~$0.211 | ~$0.165 |

Custom sizes scale with pixel count. Edit calls additionally tokenize input images at high fidelity — large reference images are expensive.

Edit routing

edit_image, start_edit_session, and continue_edit_session call POST /v1/images/edits directly. This is the canonical endpoint: it supports n > 1, masks, and returns accurate per-call token usage for cost estimation.

History: at launch (2026-04-21) the endpoint rejected gpt-image-2 (and gpt-image-1.5) with 400 Invalid value: 'gpt-image-2'. Value must be 'dall-e-2'. — an OpenAI-side bug. Versions ≤ 0.2.0 of this server therefore routed edits through the Responses API by default. OpenAI fixed the endpoint silently in early May 2026 (verified live 2026-06-11), and since 0.3.0 the direct endpoint is the default again.

The Responses-API workaround is kept as a fallback (src/utils/edit-via-responses.ts):

It engages automatically if the direct endpoint ever returns the launch-era 400 again (matched narrowly; the rejection is remembered for 10 minutes so only the first call in that window pays the failed attempt, then the direct endpoint is re-probed).
Set OPENAI_FORCE_RESPONSES_EDITS=1 to pin it explicitly.
The legacy OPENAI_USE_DIRECT_EDITS toggle from 0.2.0 is deprecated and ignored (its only meaningful setting was 1 — opt into the direct endpoint, which is now the default).

Fallback mechanics: input images are uploaded via the Files API (purpose: "vision"), a cheap host model (default gpt-4.1-mini, override with OPENAI_RESPONSES_EDIT_MODEL) is forced to invoke the image_generation tool, the base64 result is extracted, and uploaded files are deleted afterwards.

Fallback trade-offs versus the direct endpoint (only apply when the fallback is active — the tool result carries route: "responses" and a note when they do):

n > 1 is not supported — the Responses path returns one image per call.
Cost accounting undercounts — usage only reports the host chat model's text tokens; the image tool is billed separately (~$0.04–0.05 extra for a 1024×1536 medium edit).
Masks still work — uploaded and referenced via input_image_mask.file_id.

Remote service (HTTP API + remote MCP)

The same repository also ships a queue-backed service for batch work: it accepts generation/editing requests over HTTP and MCP, stores them in SQLite, and processes them with background workers against one or more image providers. The stdio server above is untouched — this is a second entry point (pnpm run service).

cp .env.example .env      # set SERVICE_TOKENS, KRILL_TOKEN, RUSTFS_* secrets
docker compose up -d --build
curl localhost:8787/v1/ready

Three containers: the service, Redis (BullMQ transport) and RustFS (S3-compatible storage for uploaded inputs and generated outputs). The service's SQLite database lives on the app-data volume; nothing else is required. All service variables are documented in .env.example.

Deploying on a single VM

docker-compose.prod.yml is the overlay for a machine that also runs other things (a local gateway stack, a reverse proxy on :80/:443). It publishes the app and rustfs on 127.0.0.1 only, mounts an image directory for input_paths, joins the provider stack's docker network, and caps memory and log growth.

git clone https://github.com/FullBars/gpt-image-2-mcp.git /root/gpt-image-service
cd /root/gpt-image-service
cp .env.example .env && chmod 600 .env     # then set the values below
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d --build
curl localhost:8788/v1/ready               # the app listens on 127.0.0.1:8788

Settings that matter on a shared host (all in .env):

| Variable | Why | |---|---| | SERVICE_TOKENS | bearer token(s) for MCP and REST — long random, e.g. ops:$(openssl rand -hex 32) | | SERVICE_S3_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT | where clients reach rustfs (the proxy's TLS URL, or http://<host>:9002); the signature covers the host, so it must match what clients send | | SERVICE_IMAGES_DIR | host directory mounted at /data/images for input_paths (a 3000-image manifest of paths) | | SERVICE_PROVIDER_NETWORK | docker network of a local gateway stack, so SERVICE_SUB2API_BASE_URL=http://sub2api:8080/v1 stays on the host | | SERVICE_PUBLIC_URL | the address clients use (e.g. https://images.example.com/images), so MCP instructions and tool results carry absolute URLs instead of paths the agent must prefix | | SERVICE_WORKER_CONCURRENCY | worker slots; keep it near the vCPU count on a small box (a synchronous provider holds a slot for a whole generation) |

Reverse proxy (Caddy, host network — the app under a path prefix so an existing service can keep /v1/*, and storage on its own port with the path and Host header forwarded untouched so S3 signatures stay valid):

images.example.com {
	# MCP at /images/mcp, REST at /images/v1/...
	handle_path /images/* {
		# Compress the JSON/NDJSON API responses — a batch manifest is ~9x smaller
		# (27 KB -> 3 KB for 24 items) and it is the one thing here that is text.
		# Caddy's default list covers text/* and application/json but not NDJSON, so
		# the content type is matched explicitly. The event stream is excluded: it
		# must flush as it happens, never through a compressor.
		@compressible not path /v1/events*
		encode @compressible zstd gzip {
			match {
				header Content-Type *json*
			}
			minimum_length 1024
		}
		reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8788
	}
}

https://images.example.com:9000 {
	reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:9002
}

Then SERVICE_S3_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT=https://images.example.com:9000, and open exactly two inbound ports in the firewall/security group: the proxy's HTTPS port and the storage port (clients upload and download straight from storage, so it cannot be loopback-only). Upgrades are git pull && docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d --build; the SQLite record lives on the app-data volume, so back that up if the job history matters.

Retention: stored images are deleted once they are older than SERVICE_RETENTION_DAYS (default 3 days); the task records stay. The sweep deletes

the output of every job that succeeded more than the window ago, and
input images older than the window that nothing still needs — an input is kept while any job that references it is unfinished (queued/submitting/accepted/downloading) or was created inside the window, however old that job is.

A purged job keeps its request, result metadata, provider and attempt history, moves to the expired phase and stops being handed to a worker — it is still listed and exported, just without a download URL. Re-uploading input content that was purged re-opens the asset with a fresh lifetime. Retrying a job whose inputs are gone is refused with 409 (and a job that discovers a missing input at submit time fails immediately with input_missing, before any charge) instead of waiting forever. Set SERVICE_RETENTION_DAYS=0 to keep everything forever.

Endpoints

| Method | Path | Purpose | |---|---|---| | POST | /v1/assets/presign | sign a direct upload (content addressed by sha256) | | POST | /v1/assets/:id/complete | confirm the object exists, making the asset usable | | GET | /v1/assets/:id/download | signed download URL | | POST | /v1/jobs | submit one job (edit when input_asset_ids or input_paths is given) | | GET | /v1/jobs, /v1/jobs/:id | list / inspect (add ?attempts=1 for provider receipts, ?resolutions=1 for the operator audit trail) | | POST | /v1/jobs/:id/cancel | stop before it finishes (a submission already in flight cannot be recalled: its attempt is recorded as ambiguous and may still be billed) | | POST | /v1/jobs/:id/resolve | handle a needs_attention/failed/canceled job: retry (needs acknowledge_duplicate_charge: true, grants exactly one extra submission) or fail; both close an attempt that was still in flight as ambiguous | | POST | /v1/batches, /v1/batches/import | batch create / NDJSON import (accepts request_key, or an Idempotency-Key header, to make a retried batch a no-op) | | GET | /v1/batches/:id, /v1/batches/:id/export | progress / per-item reconciliation as NDJSON (add ?sign=1 to get a download_url per line, instead of calling /v1/jobs/:id for each result) | | GET | /v1/providers | provider health and cooldown | | GET | /v1/health, /v1/ready | liveness / readiness (public; everything else needs a bearer token) | | GET | /v1/events | live notifications (SSE): job events as jobs change, resumable via Last-Event-ID, filterable with ?batch_id= / ?job_id= | | ALL | /mcp | remote MCP (streamable HTTP), same bearer token |

Images never travel through the service: clients PUT straight to a presigned URL and download through a presigned URL, so a 3000-image batch does not stream through Node.

Instead of polling

Two ways to stop sleeping between polls, both of which react the moment a job settles:

Blocking reads. GET /v1/jobs/:id?wait_ms=25000 and GET /v1/batches/:id?wait_ms=25000 (and wait_ms on the MCP tools get_image_job / get_image_batch) return as soon as the job is terminal or the batch has nothing pending — or at the deadline, with the ordinary current state, in which case the caller simply asks again. MCP clients have no push channel, so this is the one to use from an agent.
A live stream. GET /v1/events is server-sent events: each job event carries the job, its batch and item index, and the phase it just moved into. Subscribe with ?batch_id= (or ?job_id=) to see only your own work, and reconnect with the standard Last-Event-ID header to replay what you missed — the underlying journal is append-only, so nothing is skipped and nothing is delivered twice.

# Follow one batch's progress; stop when nothing is pending (Ctrl-C, or a counter).
curl -N "http://localhost:8787/v1/events?batch_id=$BATCH_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'accept: text/event-stream'
#   event: ready            <- the cursor you are starting from (fetch the snapshot now)
#   data: {"cursor":8123}
#
#   event: job
#   id: 8124
#   data: {"job_id":"job_…","batch_id":"batch_…","item_index":7,"phase":"succeeded","occurred_at":…,"finished_at":…,"purged_at":null}

An event says that something changed, not what the new state is: read GET /v1/jobs/:id (or the batch export) for the result, the download URL and the provider's applied parameters. The journal starts with migration 0007, so history predating it is only visible through the ordinary read routes.

Files in, files out

The whole interaction is file-oriented, at both ends.

Upload (client → service). Either the file is already on the service's machine and you pass its path, or you upload bytes straight to storage with a presigned URL:

# 1. ask for a slot (MCP: presign_image_asset returns the same values)
curl -sS -X POST http://localhost:8787/v1/assets/presign \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -d "$(jq -nc --arg sha "$(sha256sum fox.png | cut -d' ' -f1)" \
        '{sha256:$sha, extension:"png", content_type:"image/png"}')"
# 2. PUT the file itself — bytes never pass through a prompt or a JSON payload
curl -sS -T fox.png -H 'content-type: image/png' "$UPLOAD_URL"
# 3. confirm, then use the asset id in input_asset_ids
curl -sS -X POST "http://localhost:8787/v1/assets/$ASSET_ID/complete" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"

Download (service → client). get_image_job returns a download URL (valid for six hours by default) and the MCP reply also carries it as a resource link, so the client saves it as a file:

curl -sSL "$DOWNLOAD_URL" -o result.png
# bulk: one manifest for the whole batch, one line per item, each with its own URL
curl -sS "http://localhost:8787/v1/batches/$BATCH_ID/export?sign=1" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"

Presigned URLs are signed for SERVICE_S3_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT, so set it to the address your clients reach rustfs on (for a LAN deployment, e.g. http://10.0.0.5:9000) — localhost:9000 only works for a client on the same machine as the stack.

What a downloaded image carries

Generated images arrive from the providers with provenance metadata attached. Measured on the production bucket, every sampled output PNG carried a caBX chunk — a ~22 KB C2PA/Content Credentials manifest naming the tool that made it (c2pa.claim, OpenAI, gpt-image). Publication therefore cleans every image before storing it, under one of two versioned profiles:

| Profile | What it does | Pixels | |---|---|---| | metadata-v2 (default) | container rewrite and a re-encode: the image is decoded and written again with this service's own deflate | byte-identical | | metadata-v1 | container rewrite only: provider metadata is dropped, the provider's compressed stream is kept verbatim | untouched |

The container rewrite keeps only what a decoder needs, and drops everything a decoder does not:

| Container | Kept | Dropped | |---|---|---| | PNG | IHDR, PLTE, tRNS, IDAT, IEND | caBX (C2PA), tEXt, iTXt, zTXt, eXIf, iCCP, gAMA, sRGB, pHYs, … and any bytes after IEND | | JPEG | coding segments (DQT, DHT, SOFn, DRI, SOS + scans, EOI) | every APPn (EXIF/XMP/ICC/Adobe) and COM | | WebP | VP8/VP8L, ALPH, VP8X (metadata flags cleared) | ICCP, EXIF, XMP , and the RIFF trailer |

metadata-v1 copies the kept bytes verbatim, so the compressed pixel stream and its CRCs are untouched. metadata-v2 goes further: it inflates the IDAT stream, un-filters the scanlines, re-filters them (Paeth) and re-deflates with fixed parameters (level 9, Z_FILTERED) — which removes the encoder fingerprint that survives in the compressed bytes, at the cost of holding one decoded image in memory. On a 1.5 MP output (2,231,063 bytes) that produced 2,056,971 bytes (−8%) in ~2.3 s with AE = 0 against the original, i.e. not one pixel differs; the result is deterministic and re-running it on its own output is a no-op. Both are covered by tests that decode the result with an independent decoder (tests/helpers/png-fixtures.ts).

A shape metadata-v2 cannot re-encode faithfully is delivered under metadata-v1 and records that it was: 16-bit, indexed (palette), interlaced, above SERVICE_REENCODE_MAX_PIXELS (default 16,777,216 = 4096²), or a decode/encode failure. JPEG and WebP get the container profile only, with reencode_reason: "unsupported_format" — re-encoding them would mean a second encoder (and, for JPEG, generation loss).

The result reports what happened: sanitization.status is clean (with the policy actually applied, reencoded, and the list of removed structures), skipped (with a reason, for a file the profile cannot parse — it is still delivered and should be treated as carrying metadata), or disabled (SERVICE_OUTPUT_SANITIZATION=off). A crash-recovery adoption refuses an object that carries no receipt rather than adopting it as this attempt's output. Re-encoding runs at most SERVICE_REENCODE_MAX_CONCURRENT (3) images at a time per process; the work itself is in libuv's thread pool, so it does not block the event loop.

Two limits are worth stating plainly. This is a container-level guarantee: it removes what an image says about itself and, under v2, the encoding fingerprint — it makes no claim about watermarks inside the pixels, and no re-encode can rule out steganographic content. And a skip is not an error: the image was already generated and paid for, so it is delivered with the reason recorded rather than thrown away.

Existing objects are brought forward with scripts/clean-stored-outputs.mjs, which skips an object whose recorded policy already matches SERVICE_OUTPUT_SANITIZATION and re-cleans one that does not (so raising the profile re-encodes the store on the next run).

The test suite verifies this with parsers written independently of the rewriter (see tests/helpers/png-fixtures.ts and tests/helpers/image-fixtures.ts) and with real encoder output committed as fixtures (baseline/progressive/greyscale/CMYK JPEG, lossy/ lossless/animated WebP).

Downloading a batch quickly

Results are plain PNG/JPEG/WebP files served by rustfs through the proxy. Two facts decide how fast they arrive:

Images are already compressed. gzip on a 1.4 MB PNG saved 0.04% (1.43 MB → 1.42 MB) because PNG's own deflate has nothing left to give. Size comes from the output format and dimensions, not from transport compression: output_format: "webp" and a smaller size are the only real levers on the bytes.
A single connection is the slow unit. Measured on the production host: 20 MB/s locally through the proxy, ~0.75 MB/s for one connection from the public internet, and 5.4 MB/s with eight parallel connections — the limit is per flow, so parallelism scales roughly 7x until the host's total egress (~11 MB/s) is hit. If your client is far away or lossy, download items concurrently rather than segments of one file.

# One manifest for the whole batch, then pull it with 8 connections.
curl -sS "https://<host>/v1/batches/$BATCH_ID/export?sign=1" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  | jq -r 'select(.download_url) | .download_url' > urls.txt
xargs -P 8 -n 1 curl -sS -C - -O < urls.txt          # -C - resumes a partial file
# or, if aria2 is available:
aria2c -x8 -j8 -i urls.txt -d results/

Range requests work (206), so interrupted downloads resume rather than restart. The manifest itself is gzipped by the proxy when the client asks for it (26.9 KB → 2.9 KB for 24 items, ~360 KB for 3000), which matters most on a slow link.

Input images: files, not base64

Two ways to hand over a reference image, neither of which puts image bytes in a payload:

input_paths (with mask_path) — absolute paths on the machine running the service. The service reads, hashes and stores each file itself, so a manifest of 3000 paths is a small NDJSON file. This is the one to use for a bulk edit run.
input_asset_ids — for images the service cannot read (a client on another machine): sign with POST /v1/assets/presign, PUT the file to the URL, POST /v1/assets/:id/complete, then reference the asset id.

Both are content addressed, so re-listing the same file is free. A path that does not exist, is relative, or is not a PNG/JPEG/WebP is rejected with a 400 naming the problem, and a batch import reports it against that line without dropping the rest.

# One JSONL line per input image; the service reads the files (mount them into the
# container, e.g. `-v /data/images:/data/images:ro`).
find /data/images -name '*.png' | jq -c '{prompt:"clean up the background", input_paths:[.]}' > batch.jsonl
curl -sS -X POST http://localhost:8787/v1/batches/import \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Idempotency-Key: cleanup-2026-09' \
  --data-binary @batch.jsonl

Remote MCP

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "gpt-image-service": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://images.internal.example/mcp",
      "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer <SERVICE_TOKENS value>" }
    }
  }
}

Eleven job-oriented tools (submit_image_job, presign_image_asset, confirm_image_asset, get_image_job, list_image_jobs, cancel_image_job, resolve_image_job, submit_image_batch, import_image_batch_jsonl, get_image_batch, list_image_providers). They return job/batch references and signed links rather than inline bytes, so the same tools work for one image and for a batch of thousands. submit_image_batch / import_image_batch_jsonl take a request_key, so a retried call returns the batch it already created.

Generation: submit_image_job {prompt, size?, quality?, output_format?} → get_image_job {job_id} (returns object_key and a download_url that stays valid for hours — SERVICE_PRESIGN_TTL_SEC, six by default — and attaches the image as a resource link so the client fetches it as a file). The reply also carries applied_diffs: whatever the provider changed on the way through. Gateways are not exact — one may answer a 1024x1024 request with 1374x1145, or quietly raise low to medium — and a silently different image is worth knowing about before a 3000-image run is signed off.

Editing (prompt + reference image): submit_image_job {prompt, input_paths: ["/abs/path/fox.png"]} when the file is on the service's machine — the service reads it, so nothing about the image enters the conversation. When it is not (an MCP client on a laptop, say): presign_image_asset {sha256, extension, content_type} → PUT the file to the returned upload_url → confirm_image_asset {asset_id} → submit_image_job {prompt, input_asset_ids: [asset_id]}. Up to 8 references, with an optional mask_asset_id / mask_path.

Batch from files: import_image_batch_jsonl with one line per image, e.g. {"prompt":"…","input_paths":["/data/images/0001.png"]} — a 3000-image manifest of paths, no base64 anywhere.

MCP has no server→client push, so the instructions tell an agent with many jobs to open the event stream itself: curl -sN '<service>/v1/events?batch_id=…' with the same bearer token, resuming with Last-Event-ID. With SERVICE_PUBLIC_URL set the instructions (and get_image_batch's results_path) spell out the full address; without it they say how to derive it from the /mcp URL you already have. Single jobs need no shell at all — wait_ms blocks the tool call until the job settles.

Tools for agents, REST for scripts. The tool names, arguments and descriptions are written for a model to choose from; they are the interactive surface, and they are free to change. Anything a program drives — a script, a cron job, a CI step, a 3000-image ingest — should call the REST API directly with the same bearer token: every tool is a thin wrapper over those routes, so nothing is missing, and the paths above are the supported client interface. The MCP instructions say the same thing to the agent, so one that is asked to "write a script" reaches for POST /v1/batches/import instead of mimicking tool calls.

To collect a finished batch, GET /v1/batches/:id/export?sign=1 returns one NDJSON line per item with a fresh download_url (also reported by get_image_batch as results_path), so 3000 results do not need 3000 per-job calls — just one manifest to loop over with the client's own downloader.

A quick check:

curl -s -X POST localhost:8787/mcp \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -H 'accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list","params":{}}'

Live smoke test

pnpm run smoke:service -- --yes --count=3 --providers=krill,sub2api runs the real pipeline (queue-shaped submission → executor → provider → object storage) against real accounts for a few images, then reads each published object back and checks it is a real image. It refuses to start without --yes.

How the service spends money safely

Five billed submissions per image, across providers. Polling, downloading, waiting for capacity and switching provider do not consume the budget. The wall-clock SERVICE_JOB_DEADLINE_MS budget starts with the first authorised submission — never while waiting for capacity — so a saturated upstream cannot make a 3000-item batch fail items that were never submitted.
The authorisation is persisted before the request is sent, and a job whose outcome is unknown (a lost response, a crash mid-submission) becomes needs_attention instead of being retried automatically — a duplicate submission costs real money, so the service parks it for a human.
Idempotency: POST /v1/jobs defaults to a request key derived from the request content, so a retried HTTP call returns the existing job. Batch items are keyed by position instead, so identical prompts in one batch stay separate jobs.
A batch is one billed decision covering thousands of items, so it takes a client key (request_key in the body, or an Idempotency-Key header). Replaying the same key with the same payload returns the original batch and resumes only the items that never made it into the database (created reports how many were new, replayed that the batch already existed); the same key with a different payload is answered with 409 rather than silently reusing another batch's id. Without a key, every call is a new batch.
At-least-once dispatch, at-most-once billing: wake-ups are stored in a transactional outbox, each under its own durable intent id (which is also the transport id), and re-created by a reconciler if Redis loses them — a new intent is always delivered, even though the transport still retains the delivery it replaced. The exclusive claim and lease fencing in SQLite keep one job to one worker, and the lease is renewed for as long as an activation runs, so a slow synchronous provider cannot be reclaimed and worked twice.
Free retries are retried, paid ones are not: publication to object storage is retried inside the activation (it costs nothing), and output keys are per attempt, so a worker that lost its claim cannot overwrite the winner's image. If storage stays down, a job whose provider still holds the task goes back to downloading; a job whose bytes arrived inline — and therefore cannot be fetched again — is parked as needs_attention instead of being regenerated and billed. A crash between the write and the row update is recovered by adopting the object that attempt already published.
The ceiling is enforced where the money is spent: per-provider in-flight limits are re-checked inside the transaction that authorises a submission, so two workers that both read "one slot free" cannot both submit — the loser waits in queued without spending an attempt. A provider-specific rejection (permanent: bad parameters, moderation) is recorded but does not count against provider health, so a healthy cheap tier is not taken out of rotation by one bad prompt. A rejection that is really about the provider — a missing endpoint or model, which a gateway answers with 404/405/501 (provider_unavailable) — is treated the other way round: the provider steps aside for the hard-failure window, and the retry of that same job lands on the next tier instead of dying with the request.
Decisions are auditable: resolve records the action, the reason, the free-text operator and the authenticated token that made the request (actor, which the client cannot set) in an append-only trail (GET /v1/jobs/:id?resolutions=1, MCP get_image_job{include_resolutions:true}, newest-last and stable within the same millisecond). It survives the job succeeding and clearing its current error — and max_attempts counts the extra submissions an operator authorised, so a job never looks as if it ran past its own limit.
Explicit resolution: a job that ends with an unknown outcome parks as needs_attention and is never retried on its own. POST /v1/jobs/:id/resolve (or the resolve_image_job MCP tool) is the only way past that: action: retry requires acknowledge_duplicate_charge: true, grants exactly one extra billed submission and re-queues the job immediately; action: fail closes it out with no spend. Both record the operator and the note on the job.
Provider economics: providers sit in preference tiers (SERVICE_SUB2API_PRIORITY 0, SERVICE_KRILL_PRIORITY 10) — the subscription-backed provider is filled first and a per-image billed provider only absorbs the overflow once the cheaper tier is at its ceiling or out of rotation. A single transient failure does not spill (SERVICE_PROVIDER_FAILURE_THRESHOLD, default 2), because retrying the cheap provider is cheaper than paying another one. A deliberate mix is available too: SERVICE_KRILL_SPILL_RATIO=0.2 sends ~20% of requests to krill even while sub2api has room.
Provider ceilings: SERVICE_KRILL_MAX_IN_FLIGHT (15) / SERVICE_SUB2API_MAX_IN_FLIGHT (8) cap how many jobs each provider holds at once — that capacity is what triggers the spill to the next tier. Occupancy is derived from live job rows, so a restart reconstructs it instead of oversubscribing the upstream; jobs over the ceiling wait in queued and spend nothing.

Troubleshooting

"OPENAI_API_KEY is not set" — add it to the env block of your MCP config.
A tool result is a job_id, not an image — that is the normal path. Poll get_image_job every few seconds until state is completed or failed. (Set GPT_IMAGE_2_ASYNC_AFTER_MS=0 to make calls block instead.)
"Unknown or expired image job" — the server restarted, or the job aged past GPT_IMAGE_2_JOB_TTL_MS. A finished result cannot be recovered; call list_image_jobs to see what is still held, and re-run only if the image is really gone (images already written to disk stay on disk).
continue_edit_session says the session is busy — its previous turn is still running in the background. Poll the pending_job_id from list_edit_sessions, then continue. Sessions are also lost on server restart.
403 / organization verification — gpt-image-2 may require Organization Verification on your OpenAI org. Check the dashboard.
429 — you hit the IPM (images per minute) cap for your tier. Lower n, or wait.
Size / quality / format came back different — the origin normalized them (a ChatGPT-subscription gateway does this: see Sizes). applied and notes report what happened; point OPENAI_BASE_URL at an API-key upstream to have your settings honored.
Image doesn't appear in the client — check the file path in the text block; the image is saved regardless of inline display.
Images land in an unexpected directory — the default is keyed on the server's working directory; set GPT_IMAGE_2_OUTPUT_DIR to an absolute path.
Client times out anyway — raise OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS (if the proxy is slow) or lower GPT_IMAGE_2_ASYNC_AFTER_MS (if your host's tool timeout is short).
Protocol disconnects silently — something printed to stdout. Check src/**/*.ts — all logs must use utils/logger.ts (stderr). This is the single biggest MCP footgun.

Getting help

Bugs and feature requests: github.com/FullBars/gpt-image-2-mcp/issues
Source, changelog, and the parameter-matrix write-up: github.com/FullBars/gpt-image-2-mcp
GPT_IMAGE_2_MCP_DEBUG=1 on stderr shows every API call, route, and job transition.

Smoke test against the real API

tests/smoke/features/*.feature describe the capability in Gherkin and run it against the real endpoint — generation, editing, multi-turn sessions, and the background-job queue:

pnpm run smoke              # every feature (~4 min, a few cents of images)
pnpm run smoke -- editing   # one feature, or scenarios whose name matches

Each step reports pass/fail on its own line; artifacts (the generated images) land in a per-run temp directory printed at the top — set SMOKE_OUT_DIR to put them somewhere stable. Requires OPENAI_API_KEY (and OPENAI_BASE_URL if you go through a proxy).

Two deliberate choices: the suite runs queue-first (the default window), so every call exercises the background-job path — set GPT_IMAGE_2_ASYNC_AFTER_MS to a larger value to run the inline path instead (the queue feature is then skipped); and it asserts what the upstream actually returned rather than assuming — a proxy that ignores output_format or size shows up as a reported observation, not a false failure. These tests are not part of pnpm test or CI, which run without credentials.

SMOKE_TRANSPORT=stdio pnpm run smoke drives the built server (pnpm run build first) over stdio — a real MCP client, the same way your host calls it — instead of the default in-process transport.

Which parameters the origin honors

pnpm run smoke:matrix runs a one-parameter-at-a-time matrix — a baseline plus model, size, quality, background, output_format, and n, then the same for edit_image — and compares what the API reports (applied) with what the bytes are (container, dimensions, alpha). A control only counts as honored when the response agrees and the bytes differ from the baseline row: a gateway can echo a field back and still ignore it.

It writes outcomes.json (re-render with --report <file>) and parameter-matrix.md into the artifacts directory. It is a study, not a gate: it takes minutes and costs a few cents. Filter rows with an argument, e.g. pnpm run smoke:matrix -- size.

Development

pnpm run dev         # tsx watch
pnpm run typecheck   # tsc --noEmit for src, plus tsconfig.test.json for tests
pnpm run test        # offline unit + integration tests (node:test, no credentials)
pnpm run build       # compile to build/
pnpm run inspect     # launch MCP Inspector

pnpm run scale (optionally -- --jobs=10000) seeds a throwaway SQLite file with thousands of jobs and prints per-query timings plus EXPLAIN QUERY PLAN output, so a missing index shows up as a scan-and-sort before it shows up in production.

pnpm test is the fast, offline suite — every test runs against a local HTTP mock, and CI runs it on Node 24 (the version the service and its node:sqlite driver require) with a Redis service container, so the queue integration tests run too. pnpm run smoke (below) is the live suite and spends money.

Releasing

Bump version in package.json, add a CHANGELOG section for the new version, commit, then tag it:

git tag v0.5.1 && git push origin v0.5.1   # must match package.json

The Release workflow verifies the tag matches package.json, runs typecheck + tests + build, publishes with --provenance, and opens the GitHub release. It needs an NPM_TOKEN repository secret (npm automation token for the @speed-fullbar scope). Running the workflow manually defaults to a --dry-run publish, and tagging a version that is already on npm skips the publish (with a notice) instead of failing — useful when a release was published by hand.

Credits

This is a fork of Borys520/gpt-image-2-mcp by Borys Kusmirek (MIT) — the original server, tool surface, and research brief are theirs, and the copyright notice in LICENSE is retained. This fork adds the background job queue (get_image_job, list_image_jobs), edit sessions that inherit their settings, the transparent-PNG and parameter-matrix work, the BDD smoke suite, and the packaging/docs here.

License

MIT