@trelyan/verify-pqc

Post-quantum readiness scanner + verification toolkit. Find where quantum-vulnerable cryptography lives in your code (A–F grade + a CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM), build/verify signed Evidence Packs, and verify Falcon-1024 / ML-DSA-87 post-quantum signatures. Dependency-free core; Node ≥18 + browser. MIT.

npm install @trelyan/verify-pqc

Scan a repo for quantum-vulnerable crypto (CLI)

npx -p @trelyan/verify-pqc pqcbom .        # A–F grade + cbom.cdx.json (CycloneDX 1.6) + SARIF + a report

Detects RSA/ECDSA/ECDH/DH (Shor-broken), AES-128/192 + SHA-256 (Grover-weakened), MD5/SHA-1/RC4/3DES/legacy-TLS (classically broken), and the NIST PQC standards ML-KEM/ML-DSA/SLH-DSA (FIPS 203/204/205) as resistant — and it flags already-broken PQ candidates (SIKE/SIDH, GeMSS). It also decodes hardcoded JWT/JOSE token headers (base64url segment 1 only — the payload is never decoded) and classifies the alg (RS/PS/ES → Shor-broken, HS → Grover-weakened, none → critical unsigned), and tags harvest-now-decrypt-later urgency on key-establishment findings (KEM/DH/ECDH and RSA key transport like RSA-OAEP / static-RSA TLS — recorded ciphertext is decryptable once a CRQC exists, so migrate those FIRST; signatures are forge-later). Need to skip test fixtures? --exclude test-fixtures/,examples/ or .pqcbomignore lines containing / — excluded paths are counted in the output, never silently dropped. Lexical scan — findings are leads to verify, not a complete inventory, and not a certification. A scan that examines zero files refuses to grade rather than reporting "A". Prefer a browser, nothing uploaded? → https://throndar.ai/cbom · CI GitHub Action + a signed Evidence Pack → https://throndar.ai/evidence

Sign / verify an Evidence Pack (CLI)

npx -p @trelyan/verify-pqc pqevidence keygen --out signer --slh
npx -p @trelyan/verify-pqc pqevidence pack ./repo --keys signer.keys.json --org "Acme"   # ML-DSA-87 ∧ SLH-DSA signed
npx -p @trelyan/verify-pqc pqevidence verify evidence-pack.json --pub signer.pub.json --require-hybrid

The pack's grade is recomputed from the findings at verify time, so an altered grade fails the signature.

Verify an on-chain post-quantum inscription

const { verifyOnChain } = require('@trelyan/verify-pqc');
const r = await verifyOnChain('763809096'); // Algorand TestNet app
// { verified: true, signature: { headerHex:'0xba', totalLen:1236, deterministic:true, fmt:'compressed', logn:10 },
//   inscriptionBox: true, sigTxid: 'SQEPDOZ4…' }

In the browser, drop in index.js and call verifyPQC.verifyOnChain(appId) (public CORS-enabled algonode indexer by default; override with { indexer: 'https://…' }).

Verify THRONDAR's dual post-quantum signature (in your browser)

THRONDAR signs each transparency-log Signed Tree Head with two independent PQ families — ML-DSA-87 (FIPS-204, load-bearing) + an additive SLH-DSA-256f (FIPS-205, hash-based) diversity leg — checked against pinned full public keys, not the keys the server sends:

import { verifyThrondarStrong } from '@trelyan/verify-pqc/verify';
const j = await (await fetch('https://throndar.ai/api/transparency/ledger')).json();
const v = await verifyThrondarStrong(j.signed_tree_head);
// { verified: true /* ← the ML-DSA-87 result, ONLY */, slhdsa: { slhPresent: true, slhValid: true }, ... }

The SLH-DSA leg is non-authoritative: verified is exactly the ML-DSA-87 result — a missing/invalid SLH co-signature can never flip the verdict. Rotation-ready via THRONDAR_STH_PINS ({current, previous}). Peer deps: @noble/post-quantum + @noble/hashes (independently audited — that audit covers @noble's primitives, NOT this toolkit, which remains unaudited; pure-JS FIPS-204/205). Conformance KAT: npm run test:kat.

Inspect / compare raw signatures

const { inspectFalconSig, abiDecodeBytes, compareSigs } = require('@trelyan/verify-pqc');
inspectFalconSig(sigBytes);   // { headerHex:'0xba', logn:10, deterministic:true, fmt:'compressed', bodyLen:1235 }
abiDecodeBytes(appArgBytes);  // strips the Algorand ABI byte[] 2-byte length prefix
compareSigs(sigA, sigB);      // localizes the first divergence to header / salt / body

Honest framing (please keep it)

0xBA = the standard Falcon-1024 compressed header 0x3A OR'd with a 0x80 bit and a 0x00 version byte that are trelyan-pq's deterministic-wrapper convention — not NIST Round-3 Falcon or FIPS-206 (FN-DSA) fields. verifyOnChain trusts the single indexer you point at and reads the contract's write-once i_ box as proof that falcon_verify accepted the signature; it does not re-run the opcode locally. Targets Algorand TestNet; the reference system is unaudited. Nothing here is "quantum-safe" or a certification — it's post-quantum tooling you can read and re-run yourself.

MIT.