@val-protocol/demo

Records prove what your agents did. VAL proves they were allowed to. See it in 60 seconds:

npx @val-protocol/demo

No install, no account, no network calls after the package download. The demo:

1. Mints a live chain — a human (Alice) roots two grants with a fresh P-256 key: one delegating scoped read + record.append to an agent, one keeping sign-class authority to herself. The agent reads a document and derives a record from it (grounding); Alice signs a consent bond.
2. Verifies it offline — the reference verifier re-derives integrity, lineage, scope, grounding, delegator authority, and the root signatures from the chain bytes plus one pinned capability policy. Zero reads against any operator. Conformance floor: Profile B (device-key-signed root).
3. Attacks it, four ways:

| Act | Attack | What catches it | |---|---|---| | 1 | Edit one committed block in place | integrity: red — any hash chain catches this | | 2 | Rewrite the whole history (recompute every hash, re-link every parent, upgrade the key-binding claim) | integrity and lineage stay green — a tamper-evident log alone calls the forged chain intact. signature: red — the self-attestation binding challenge breaks. This is the seam VAL exists for. | | 3 | Strip the signatures (and drop the consent bond they cannot re-sign) | everything green — but the conformance floor drops B → A: the report now says human-attributed, no longer human-signed. Forgery cannot be hidden, only demoted. | | 4 | Silently truncate the tail, present the valid prefix | nothing — honestly. A self-held chain cannot prove completeness; that is the §8 external anchor's job (an independent RFC 3161 timestamp authority holds the head). |

Every act asserts its expected verdict — the demo doubles as an integration test of the reference verifier.

Flags

npx @val-protocol/demo --out=chain.ndjson --html=report.html

• --out=<path> — write the pristine minted chain (NDJSON). Re-verify it yourself: npx @val-protocol/chain-verifier-cli --export=chain.ndjson
• --html=<path> — write the self-verifying HTML report: a single file embedding the chain bytes and the full verifier source; opening it re-runs verification in your browser, offline.

Honesty notes

• The demo key is generated in software, so the chain declares key_binding: 'unattested' — §5.2 forbids claiming device_bound without a verified WebAuthn attestation statement. The profile letter (B) grades the instrument; the binding is the orthogonal hardware axis, surfaced verbatim.
• Act 4 is a feature, not a bug: no record system can self-certify capture completeness, and the demo says so instead of hiding it. See the spec's external anchor.

Apache-2.0 · spec + protocol: val-protocol/verifiable-authorization-lineage