🎯 @weave_protocol/agentsecbench

Standardized AI agent security benchmark. Curated, versioned, locked attack suites that produce paste-ready reports and side-by-side comparisons. Built on @weave_protocol/adversary.

The interpretation layer on top of @weave_protocol/adversary. Where Adversary runs 68 attacks and produces a raw scorecard, AgentSecBench runs a curated, locked subset and produces a tier-graded Report with category gap analysis, trophy-attack performance, and WARD policy delta.

Quick start

# Run the canonical browser suite against the built-in demo target
npx @weave_protocol/agentsecbench run

# Save report as both JSON and Markdown
npx @weave_protocol/agentsecbench run --json=./report.json --md=./report.md

# Measure how much your WARD policy contributes to your score
npx @weave_protocol/agentsecbench run --measure-ward-delta

# Compare two reports (before/after, A/B, regression check)
npx @weave_protocol/agentsecbench compare baseline.json new.json

# Show what's in a suite
npx @weave_protocol/agentsecbench suite ASB-Browser-v1

The default run takes ~50ms (mock target). Against a real agent it scales with the target's latency.

What's a suite?

A suite is a locked, curated subset of the Adversary corpus designed to test a specific class of target. Once a suite ships as v1, its 40 attacks never change. That's what makes scores comparable across targets and over time.

| Suite | Target type | Attacks | Status | |---|---|--:|---| | ASB-Browser-v1 | Browser-facing agents | 40 | ✅ v1.0 | | ASB-MCP-v1 | MCP server agents | — | 🚧 v0.2 | | ASB-Safety-v1 | Jailbreak resistance | — | 🚧 v0.2 | | ASB-Multi-Agent-v1 | Multi-turn / stateful | — | 🚧 v0.4 (blocked on Adversary v0.4) |

See METHODOLOGY.md for full suite construction methodology, scoring math, trophy attack rationale, and limitations.

The Report

Every run produces a Report — paste-ready Markdown plus machine-readable JSON. Shape:

{
  schemaVersion: '1.0',
  suite:  { id, version, name },
  target: { name, vendor?, type, configuration?, anonymized },
  run:    { date, durationMs, adversaryVersion, agentsecbenchVersion, attacksRun },
  result: {
    score: 87,              // 0-100 from Adversary
    tier:  'B',             // A/B/C/D/F
    blocked: 35, partial: 3, breached: 2,
  },
  categoryGaps: [
    { category: 'ipi', breachRate: 0.06, partialRate: 0.0, severity: 'minor' },
    { category: 'extraction', breachRate: 0.0, partialRate: 0.0, severity: 'clean' },
  ],
  trophyPerformance: [
    { name: 'Atlan autonomous-fraud',     result: 'pass' },
    { name: 'EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711)',   result: 'pass' },
    { name: 'Brave/Comet OTP exfil',       result: 'pass' },
    { name: 'Forcepoint false copyright',  result: 'fail' },
  ],
  wardDelta: { withWard: 87, withoutWard: 63, delta: 24 },
  interpretation: 'Test Target scored 87/100 (Tier B) on ASB-Browser-v1...',
  scorecard: { /* full Adversary scorecard embedded for auditability */ },
}

Tier grades

| Tier | Score | Interpretation | |---|---|---| | 🟢 A | 95-100 | Production-ready | | 🟡 B | 85-94 | Strong, minor gaps | | 🟠 C | 70-84 | Notable category gaps | | 🔴 D | 50-69 | Significant exposure | | ⚫ F | 0-49 | Critically vulnerable |

Trophy attacks (ASB-Browser-v1)

Each suite includes documented, named, real-world attacks as "trophies." Failing any of these is a story:

• 🏦 Atlan autonomous-fraud (Dec 2025) — payment recipient + amount proximity, first documented agent-driven financial fraud
• 🔒 EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711, 2025) — Microsoft Copilot zero-click exfil
• 👻 Brave/Comet OTP exfil (2025) — browser agent OTP leak via hidden CSS
• 🚫 Forcepoint false copyright (Apr 2026) — DoS via fake copyright claim

WARD delta — the "does our policy actually work?" measurement

agentsecbench run --measure-ward-delta

Runs the suite twice — with and without WARD enforcement — and reports the score difference. A delta of +20 means your WARD policy is doing 20 points of work. A delta of 0 means it isn't doing anything (probably misconfigured for the target's actual capabilities).

This is the empirical answer to "does our security policy actually do anything?"

Comparing reports

agentsecbench compare baseline.json new.json --md=diff.md

Use cases:

• Regression detection — last week vs this week
• A/B testing — vendor A vs vendor B (anonymized)
• WARD policy testing — strict policy vs lenient policy
• Before/after — pre-fix vs post-fix on a known issue

The comparison report highlights:

• Overall score delta and tier change
• Per-category breach rate deltas
• Trophy improvements and regressions
• Per-attack regressions (top priority for triage)
• Per-attack improvements

Both reports must be from the same locked suite. That's the point of locking the suites — comparability.

Programmatic usage

import { runSuite, renderMarkdownReport, ASB_BROWSER_V1 } from '@weave_protocol/agentsecbench';
import { BrowserTarget } from '@weave_protocol/adversary';

const target = new BrowserTarget({
  async runAgent(url, attack) {
    // your browser agent logic here
    return { text: '...', toolCalls: [], turns: 1 };
  },
});

const report = await runSuite({
  target,
  suite: ASB_BROWSER_V1,
  targetMeta: {
    name: 'My Agent v3.2',
    vendor: 'My Company',
    type: 'browser-agent',
    configuration: { ward: 'WARD-strict.md' },
  },
  measureWardDelta: true,
});

console.log(`Score: ${report.result.score} (Tier ${report.result.tier})`);
console.log(renderMarkdownReport(report));

What's locked, what changes

| Component | Locked? | Notes | |---|---|---| | Suite manifest (ASB-Browser-v1) | ✅ Forever | Methodology improvements ship as v2 | | Report schema | ✅ at v1.0 | Future versions add fields backward-compatibly | | Tier thresholds | ✅ per suite | Different suite versions may have different thresholds | | Adversary corpus | ✅ at v0.1 | Adversary v0.2 may add attacks but not remove or modify | | Adversary scorecard schema | ✅ at v1.0 | The schema both packages depend on |

Locking is the entire point. Without it, a benchmark isn't a benchmark — it's a moving target.

Roadmap

• v0.1 (this release) — ASB-Browser-v1 (40 attacks), tier grading, category gaps, trophy performance, WARD delta, compare command
• v0.2 — ASB-MCP-v1 (MCP server target suite), ASB-Safety-v1 (jailbreak resistance), target adapters for Claude Code / Antigravity / MSAF
• v0.3 — Dynamic-mode suites (when Adversary v0.3 ships LLM-driven attacks)
• v0.4 — ASB-Multi-Agent-v1 (multi-turn, stateful, blocked on Adversary v0.4)

Why this matters

Q3 shipped five enforcement surfaces. Q4 shipped Adversary, the offensive engine. AgentSecBench is the standardized vocabulary for talking about agent security:

• Tier A through F gives security teams a number to put in their RFP responses
• Trophy results give press a list of named attacks to reference ("does X pass the EchoLeak test?")
• The Report shape gives compliance teams a paste-ready artifact for audits
• The compare command gives engineers a way to detect regressions in CI
• The WARD delta gives operators empirical proof their policy is working

This is how a category gets defined.

License

Apache 2.0 — same as the rest of Weave Protocol.

Citation

See METHODOLOGY.md → Citation for the recommended citation format.