aquaman-plugin: API Key Protection for OpenClaw

The aquaman adapter for the OpenClaw Gateway. Your API keys and tokens stay in your vault. The agent never sees them. Even a compromised agent can't steal credentials - they live in a separate process.

This plugin spawns aquaman-proxy (exact-pinned, same author) on Gateway startup, routes channel traffic through a UDS to that proxy, and lets you reach the same vault and policy engine from inside OpenClaw.

Agent / OpenClaw Gateway              Aquaman Proxy
┌──────────────────────┐              ┌──────────────────────┐
│                      │              │                      │
│  ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL  │══ Unix ═════>│  Keychain / 1Pass /  │
│  = aquaman.local     │   Domain     │  Vault / Encrypted   │
│                      │<═ Socket ════│                      │
│  fetch() interceptor │══ (UDS) ════>│  + Policy enforced   │
│  redirects channel   │              │  + Auth injected:    │
│  API traffic         │              │    header / url-path │
│                      │              │    basic / oauth     │
│                      │              │                      │
│  No credentials.     │  ~/.aquaman/ │                      │
│  No open ports.      │  proxy.sock  │                      │
│  Nothing to steal.   │  (chmod 600) │                      │
└──────────────────────┘              └──┬──────────┬────────┘
                                         │          │
                                         │          ▼
                                         │  ~/.aquaman/audit/
                                         │  (hash-chained log)
                                         ▼
                               api.anthropic.com / api.mistral.ai /
                               api.telegram.org / slack.com/api  …

What it does

1. Bring your own vault: aquaman has no house vault; secrets stay in the store you already run: Keychain, 1Password, HashiCorp Vault, Bitwarden, KeePassXC, systemd-creds, or encrypted-file.
2. Agent gets a proxy URL: requests route through ~/.aquaman/proxy.sock (UDS, chmod 0o600); the proxy injects auth headers on the fly.
3. Dangerous endpoints blocked: request policies deny admin APIs, prevent deletions, block sends - before credentials are even injected.
4. Tamper-evident audit log: every credential use logged with SHA-256 hash chains.

Quick Start

openclaw plugins install aquaman-plugin           # 1. install plugin + proxy
openclaw aquaman setup                            # 2. store your API keys, wire up plugin
openclaw                                          # 3. done - proxy starts automatically

The aquaman-proxy binary is bundled as an exact-pinned npm dependency - no separate download or install needed.

Using npm directly? npm install -g aquaman-proxy && aquaman openclaw setup does the same thing - installs the proxy CLI, stores your keys, installs the plugin into ~/.openclaw/extensions/aquaman-plugin/, and wires the credentials (SecretRef refs on OpenClaw ≥ 2026.6.5, the auth-profiles.json placeholder on older versions).

Troubleshooting: openclaw aquaman doctor (or aquaman openclaw doctor from a regular shell).

Security model

Aquaman keeps API credentials out of the agent process by running them in a separate proxy process. The agent never sees the secret - only a sentinel base URL that the proxy intercepts, authenticates, and forwards. See the architecture diagram in the main README.

Proxy process

• The plugin spawns the aquaman binary from the aquaman-proxy npm package, declared as an exact-pinned dependency (no semver range) and published by the same author (tech4242). After spawn, the plugin checks the running proxy's reported version against its own and logs a warning if they disagree.
• The spawn (aquaman openclaw plugin-mode) is what triggers the dangerous-exec finding in OpenClaw's static scanner. It's intentional and is the whole point of the plugin.

HTTP interceptor scope

• Only services listed in the plugin's services config get their traffic redirected to the local proxy. As of v0.11.4, the interceptor filters its known-host map by your services list. Channels you didn't opt into keep talking to the upstream directly.
• The interceptor uses a Unix Domain Socket (no TCP, no network exposure). UDS file permissions are chmod 0o600, enforced explicitly at proxy startup (v0.12.0+).

Credential wiring — SecretRef (v0.14.0+, OpenClaw ≥ 2026.6.5)

• On current OpenClaw, aquaman openclaw setup wires the plugin through OpenClaw's canonical SecretRef credential surface: the manifest declares an exec resolver (secretProviderIntegrations.aquaman → dist/secrets-resolver.mjs) and openclaw.json gets models.providers.<svc>.apiKey refs pointing at it. The resolver returns a static placeholder — real keys stay in your vault; the proxy strips the placeholder and injects the real credential per request.
• No openclaw doctor --fix import step, and the wiring survives OpenClaw's plaintext-scrub flows (openclaw secrets configure --apply). aquaman openclaw doctor reports the wiring state and suggests the upgrade on legacy installs.

Auth profiles (legacy path, OpenClaw < 2026.6.5)

• On load the plugin writes ~/.openclaw/agents/<id>/agent/auth-profiles.json with placeholder API-key entries for anthropic and openai so OpenClaw doesn't reject requests before they reach the proxy. The proxy strips the placeholder and injects the real credential. Skipped automatically when the SecretRef wiring is present.
• The plugin never overwrites an existing auth-profiles.json. To suppress generation entirely, set autoGenerateAuthProfiles: false in the plugin config (v0.11.4+).
• OpenClaw ≥ 2026.6.5 without SecretRef wiring: provider auth profiles moved into each agent's openclaw-agent.sqlite and the runtime read path for auth-profiles.json was removed (openclaw/openclaw#89102). The placeholder must be imported into SQLite once with openclaw doctor --fix — or better, re-run aquaman openclaw setup to get the SecretRef wiring. Run aquaman openclaw doctor; it detects the state and prints the exact remediation.

Audit log

• Every credential use is recorded in ~/.aquaman/audit/current.jsonl with a SHA-256 hash chain so tampering is detectable. The log stays local - no telemetry.
• aquaman openclaw doctor surfaces audit log issues; aquaman audit tail shows recent entries.
• Operators can constrain which upstream endpoints get proxied (and therefore credentialed) via the policy config in ~/.aquaman/config.yaml. Denied requests return 403 before any credential is injected.

Scanner findings

openclaw security audit --deep reports two expected findings:

• dangerous-exec on the proxy-manager module: the plugin spawns the proxy as a separate process. This is how credential isolation works.
• tools_reachable_permissive_policy: advisory about your tool policy, not an aquaman vulnerability. Set "tools": { "profile": "coding" } in openclaw.json if your agents handle untrusted input.

ClawHub's ClawScan additionally produces a higher-level review of plugin behavior. The current scan acknowledges credential isolation, proxy spawn, the host map, the auth-profiles generation, and the audit log. See the publisher note on the package page for context on each item.

aquaman openclaw setup adds the plugin to plugins.allow automatically so OpenClaw knows you trust it.

Available commands

All commands work via OpenClaw CLI or your terminal:

| OpenClaw CLI | Terminal | Description | |---|---|---| | openclaw aquaman setup | aquaman openclaw setup | OpenClaw bundle - vault wizard + plugin install + auth-profiles | | openclaw aquaman doctor | aquaman openclaw doctor | Deep diagnostic for the OpenClaw integration | | openclaw aquaman credentials list | aquaman credentials list | List stored credentials | | openclaw aquaman credentials add | aquaman credentials add | Add a credential (interactive) | | openclaw aquaman policy-list | aquaman policy list | Show request policy rules | | openclaw aquaman audit-tail | aquaman audit tail | Recent audit entries | | openclaw aquaman services-list | aquaman services list | List configured services | | openclaw aquaman status | aquaman openclaw status | Plugin lifecycle + sentinel env vars |

Slash commands in chat: /aquaman-status, /aquaman list, /aquaman doctor.

Config options

aquaman openclaw setup writes these to ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json automatically:

| Key | Type | Default | Description | |-----|------|---------|-------------| | backend | "keychain" | "1password" | "vault" | "encrypted-file" | "keepassxc" | "systemd-creds" | "bitwarden" | "keychain" | Credential store | | services | string[] | ["anthropic", "openai"] | Services to proxy (also gates which hostnames the interceptor redirects, v0.11.4+) | | autoGenerateAuthProfiles | boolean | true | Auto-generate auth-profiles.json with placeholder anthropic/openai entries when the file is absent. Set false to manage your own (v0.11.4+) |

Advanced settings (audit, vault, request policies) go in ~/.aquaman/config.yaml. See the request policy docs.

Documentation

• Root README: value prop, three-path Quick Start, security model
• aquaman-proxy: core CLI and daemon
• aquaman-coder: coding-agent adapter (Claude Code, Codex/OpenCode/Cursor planned)

License

MIT