bug-bounty-intelligence-mcp
v1.0.3
Published
MCP server for AI-powered smart contract security analysis. $5 USDC/scan via x402. Drawn from 27,681 Sherlock/Code4rena submissions, verified acceptance rates from 1,032 exact-reconciled findings. Includes a free, standalone dataset (vulnerability-accepta
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Bug Bounty Intelligence — MCP Server
AI-powered smart contract security analysis for AI agents and developers.
Drawn from a corpus of 27,681 submitted findings across 105 Sherlock and Code4rena contests.
Cost: $5 USDC on Base (eip155:8453) via x402.
Free tool: list_vulnerability_patterns — no payment needed.
list_vulnerability_patterns' acceptance-rate numbers are computed only from the subset where
results could be exactly reconciled against Sherlock's own published outcomes — 1,032 findings
across 10 contests. We'd rather show fewer, verified numbers than a bigger set we can't stand
behind. See METHODOLOGY.md for exactly why, and how to reproduce it.
Free dataset — no server, no MCP, no payment
vulnerability-acceptance-rates.json is the same data
list_vulnerability_patterns serves, as a static file. No API call, no account, no network
dependency at all — download it, or copy it into your own tool's rule set. CC0 licensed, use it
however you want, credit optional.
curl -sO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/holistis/bug-bounty-intelligence-mcp/main/vulnerability-acceptance-rates.jsonIf you're building a local-first / offline security scanner and the paid scan_contract tool
below isn't a fit for your project's architecture, this file might still be useful on its own.
Benchmark: vs Slither
On 3FLabs/grunt (ERC-4626 + Morpho vaults, 218 contracts): Slither reports 27 "High" findings. After analysis: 24 are in lib/solady (out-of-scope dependency with known Slither false positive patterns), and 3 are EIP-712 design patterns. False positive rate: 100%.
Bug Bounty Intelligence scopes to src/ only and filters through the Al-Mizaan 7-gate framework before reporting anything.
What it does
Submit a public GitHub repo containing Solidity smart contracts. Receive a full vulnerability report within 24 hours, powered by the Al-Mizaan v3 analysis framework.
Tools
| Tool | Description | Cost |
|------|-------------|------|
| scan_contract | Submit repo for security analysis | $5 USDC |
| get_scan_report | Poll status and get report URL | Free |
| list_vulnerability_patterns | Show acceptance rates from exact-reconciled Sherlock contests | Free |
Quick start (Claude Desktop / Claude Code)
Add to your claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"bug-bounty-intelligence": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "bug-bounty-intelligence-mcp@latest"]
}
}
}Or run directly:
npx -y bug-bounty-intelligence-mcp@latestPayment
If scan_contract returns PAYMENT REQUIRED, send exactly $5 USDC on Base to the address shown, then retry. Payment = acceptance of service terms.
x402 info:
- Network: Base mainnet (eip155:8453)
- Amount: 5,000,000 (= 5 USDC, 6 decimals)
- Asset: 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 (USDC)
- Wallet: 0xdffcC75a674257be6FE1b5549FE52e8f8a6A3A5A
Example session
> list_vulnerability_patterns({ protocol_type: "LENDING" })
Vulnerability patterns for LENDING protocols (from Sherlock audit findings, exact-reconciled contests only):
oracle-manipulation 36% accepted (131 cases)
liquidation 29% accepted (14 cases)
staleness 49% accepted (174 cases)
rounding 40% accepted (63 cases)
flash-loan 46% accepted (13 cases)
access-control 47% accepted (74 cases)
> scan_contract({ repo_url: "https://github.com/myprotocol/contracts", protocol_type: "LENDING" })
PAYMENT REQUIRED to start the scan.
Amount: 5.00 USDC
Network: Base mainnet (eip155:8453)
Pay to: 0xdffcC75a674257be6FE1b5549FE52e8f8a6A3A5A
Asset: USDC — 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913
After paying, retry scan_contract with the same repo_url.Sample scan output
Real scan of sherlock-audit/2025-03-crestal-network (Derivatives protocol, 29 contracts):
Summary: 0 Critical | 1 High | 0 Medium | 0 Low
Analyzed: 29 contracts | Model: qwen2.5:7b | Duration: 25min
FINDING #1 — HIGH
Title: Owner Can Arbitrarily Set Payment Addresses
File: Blueprint.sol
Functions: setCreateAgentTokenCost, setUpdateCreateAgentTokenCost,
addPaymentAddress, removePaymentAddress
Category: ACCESS
Description:
The owner can arbitrarily set payment addresses and costs without
any external validation or timelock.
Attack path:
An attacker with ownership calls setCreateAgentTokenCost or
addPaymentAddress to modify fees or redirect user payments to
an attacker-controlled wallet.
Impact:
Extremely high costs (griefing) or redirection of user funds.
Recommendation:
Implement a governance mechanism or timelock to restrict fee
and address changes.
Confidence: 0.90 (CONFIRMED by Al-Mizaan validation)About the analysis
The Al-Mizaan v3 framework checks 7 gates:
- Code reading (literal, not docs)
- Reachability chain (entry to exploit)
- Threat model (who can trigger it)
- Invariant breach (what rule is violated)
- Protocol intent (was this intended?)
- Impact (real financial damage)
- Formal proof (reproducible PoC)
Only findings that survive all 7 gates are reported.
Service info
- API endpoint: https://wazir-x402.duckdns.org/api/bug-intel
- Terms: https://wazir-x402.duckdns.org/terms
- Delivery: within 24h
- Source code: deleted after analysis
