dsh-vault — Encrypted Credential Vault for DeepSeek Harness

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dsh-vault is a security-focused plugin for DeepSeek Harness that stores sensitive credentials — usernames, emails, phone numbers, passwords, TOTP secrets, and developer credentials like SSH connections, API keys, secrets, and OAuth access/refresh tokens — encrypted at rest, and exposes them to the model through CRUD, search, password generation, and TOTP tools, plus a Settings UI page.

Security & Implementation

• Zero external crypto dependencies: everything is built on Node's built-in node:crypto (AES-256-GCM authenticated encryption, scrypt key derivation, RFC 6238 TOTP).
• Master password: every entry is encrypted with a 256-bit key derived via scrypt(master password, salt) and AES-256-GCM. The key never touches disk; after unlock it is cached in-process and re-derived on restart.
• Tamper-evident: GCM auth tags plus a fixed-plaintext verification envelope — a wrong master password or modified ciphertext fails immediately, never returning garbage.
• No plaintext at rest: the on-disk document contains no plaintext credentials; each entry uses an independent random nonce.
• Atomic writes: reuses the harness writeFileAtomic + file lock; in-process writes are serialized, cross-process writers take the lock.
• Search never leaks: vault_search returns summaries only (id/title/kind/username/email/phone/host/port/url/tags) — never passwords, keys, tokens, or TOTP secrets. Full credentials are readable only via explicit vault_get by id.

Entry Model

Each record has a title, an optional kind, and any combination of fields:

| Field | Description | |---|---| | kind | login (default) / ssh / api-key / secret / oauth / custom | | username / email / phone | Account identity | | password | The password | | host / port | SSH host and port (e.g. db.internal / 2222) | | privateKey | SSH private key (PEM) | | apiKey | API key | | secret | Generic secret (client secret, shared secret, …) | | accessToken / refreshToken / expiresAt | OAuth token pair and expiry (epoch millis) | | otpSecret | TOTP secret (bare Base32 or otpauth:// URI) | | url / notes / tags | Metadata | | fields | Arbitrary key/value pairs (e.g. {"region": "us-east-1"}), searchable |

Tools

| Tool | Purpose | |---|---| | vault_add | Add an entry (any combination of fields; empty strings/arrays are ignored) | | vault_get | Read a full entry by id (including all secrets) | | vault_search | Search titles/categories/usernames/emails/phones/hosts/ports/URLs/notes/tags/custom fields (incl. numeric/boolean/nested values; whitespace-separated terms OR-match); optional createdAfter/createdBefore epoch-millis filters; returns secret-free summaries; limit must be an integer 1–100 | | vault_update | Update fields by id (unprovided fields kept; empty string clears a field; title is renamable; rotationDays: 0 clears rotation = never rotate) | | vault_compare | Compare two entries field by field (onlyA/onlyB/differ/equal) — field names only, never secret values | | vault_rename | Rename an entry in one call (shortcut for vault_update) | | vault_delete | Soft-delete an entry (moves it to the trash, still encrypted on disk) | | vault_restore / vault_purge / vault_restore_recent | Bring a trashed entry back / purge it / undo the last delete | | vault_lock / vault_unlock | Explicitly lock the vault (wipe the in-memory key) / re-unlock it | | vault_totp | Generate the current 6-digit code for a stored otpSecret (or a bare Base32 / otpauth URI) | | vault_generate_password | Generate a strong random password (length/classes/grouping) or a memorable passphrase (passphrase: true, EFF-style word list, words/separator/wordDigits) | | vault_strength | Zero-dependency password strength estimate (score 0–100, weak/fair/strong/very strong) | | vault_password_history | List an entry's previous passwords (1Password/Bitwarden-style, newest first, capped at 10; current password excluded) | | kind: card | Bank/credit-card entries: cardNumber/cardExpiry (MM/YY)/cardCvv/cardHolder; search summaries expose expiry + holder only (never the number or CVV); Bitwarden JSON export maps to a card item (type 3, brand inferred) | | vault_password_rollback | Restore an entry password to a stored history entry (current password is archived first, so it is reversible) | | vault_recovery_code / vault_verify_recovery / vault_recovery_status | One-time vault recovery code (1Password/Bitwarden-style): 32-char code shown once, only its SHA-256 hash is stored; verify possession of the code; check whether one is set | | vault_rekey | Upgrade the vault to fresh scrypt KDF parameters in place | | vault_backup | Timestamped encrypted backup with retention; optional note | | vault_import_csv | Bulk-import credentials from a CSV file (custom columns become fields; overwrite: true merges fields into existing entries instead of duplicating) | | vault_bulk_delete | Soft-delete entries matching a query/kind/tag or explicit ids; confirm: true required (dry-run by default); trashed entries are restorable | | vault_apply_tags | Bulk add/remove/replace tags on every entry matching a query (dry-run supported, no secrets) | | vault_totp_uri | Build an otpauth:// provisioning URI for a stored or bare TOTP secret | | vault_switch / vault_list | Switch the active vault by name / list available vaults | | vault_rotation | Report expired / due-for-rotation / expiring-soon credentials; soonWindowDays (1-90, default 7) tunes the soon horizon (no secrets) | | vault_health | Vault health scan: weak/reused passwords, missing 2FA, insecure http:// sites, and an overall security score (0–100) | | vault_watchtower | Watchtower-style per-entry risk analysis (1Password/Bitwarden-inspired): flags short/weak passwords, keyboard sequences, embedded years, common passwords, reuse, http:// sites, missing 2FA, expiry — with a 0–100 score and good/warn/poor verdict (no secrets); entry rows show ⚠ badges | | vault_breach_check | Watchtower-style breach scan against Have I Been Pwned (k-anonymity: only the SHA-1 prefix leaves the machine), with an offline common-password fallback | | vault_integrity | Verify the on-disk vault file decrypts correctly and matches the in-memory store | | vault_merge | Merge one entry into another; keepSource: true keeps the source after merging | | vault_attach / vault_attachments / vault_attachment / vault_detach | Attach files to entries (private keys, certs, configs, recovery codes) — stored base64 inside the encrypted entry, encrypted at rest; list names/sizes, read content, remove | | vault_quick_add | Fast capture (title + one secret) with optional tags/notes | | vault_expiry | Set/clear expiry (expiresAt: 0 removes it) | | vault_stats | Overview counts incl. trashCount (no secrets) | | vault_verify | Verify one entry or audit every entry (all: true) for per-kind completeness, port/expiry sanity (no secrets) | | vault_duplicates | Find duplicate groups: mode = both (default) / title / content (no secrets) | | vault_report | Printable inventory with expiry/rotation columns and a stats footer (no secrets) | | vault_export / vault_import | Portable encrypted backup/migration of the whole vault (separate export password) | | vault_backup / vault_backup_now | Timestamped encrypted backup named <vault>-backups-YYYY-MM-DD_HH-MM-SS-<hex>.json (owning vault + date visible); retention pruning keeps the newest N (maxBackups, default 10) | | vault_restore_backup | Restore from a backup: mode: "merge" (default) copies the backup entries INTO the current vault so they appear in the entries list; mode: "replace" overwrites the whole vault with a safety snapshot first | | vault_vault_rename / vault_vault_delete | Rename a named vault (file moves, active session follows) or permanently delete one (default vault protected) | | vault_match_url | Find login entries matching a URL (Bitwarden/1Password-style: exact host, subdomain, parent domain, path-prefix; www./port normalization) with a 0–100 score — never returns the password | | vault_fill | Find the entry matching a host/URL/username/title and return its credentials | | vault_env | Render env-flagged entries (tags contain env) as KEY=VALUE lines — see Environment export | | vault_export_bitwarden / vault_import_bitwarden | Bitwarden/Vaultwarden JSON interop (full field mapping, overwrite support) | | vault_import_bitwarden_encrypted | Decrypt a Bitwarden password-protected JSON export (PBKDF2/Argon2id + HKDF → AES-256-CBC + HMAC) and import it; pass the export passphrase | | vault_import_manager_csv | Password-manager CSV auto-detected by header: Bitwarden (login_uri/login_username/…), 1Password 8, Dashlane, NordPass, Keeper, LastPass (fav/grouping/extra); dryRun preview | | vault_import_kdbx | KeePass KDBX: 3.1 and 4.x, AES-KDF or Argon2 (RFC 9106), AES-256-CBC or ChaCha20 payload, keyfile support | | vault_export_1password | Export entries as a 1Password 1PUX archive (ZIP + export.data) for import into 1Password or re-import here; item categories map to login / credit card / API credential / server | | vault_import_1password / vault_import_1pif | 1Password 1PUX (ZIP) and legacy 1PIF text exports | | vault_import_enpass | Enpass JSON export (folders → tags, typed fields, TOTP) | | vault_import_keepass_xml | KeePass 2.x XML export (plaintext or ******** masked values) | | vault_import_chrome / vault_import_keychain | Import passwords from Chrome's Login Data (macOS keychain / Linux keyring or peanuts / Windows DPAPI) or the macOS Keychain (internet passwords inet by default — the ones that actually back website logins — or generic genp via classes; session cache + preview, no prompt spam); every file import supports dryRun preview | | vault_import_firefox | Firefox profile import (logins.json + key4.db, NSS 3DES / PBES2-AES, primary-password aware) | | vault_search_system | Search Chrome / Keychain for sites & usernames — never exposes passwords | | vault_session_open | Open a real headed browser window at a URL so the user can log in manually (password, 2FA, captcha) — the portable way to capture login state for sites that block embedding — requires the optional playwright-core | | vault_session_collect | Collect every cookie of an open browser session (incl. HttpOnly) and save it as a cookie entry | | vault_session_import | Save session cookies from pasted JSON (devtools export shape) or a raw Cookie header string — the no-browser alternative | | vault_session_import_file | Import a Netscape cookie-jar file (curl -b / wget / browser-extension export; the same format vault_session_export writes) | | vault_session_list | List saved login sessions with cookie counts, expired and expiring-in-7d counts (no values) | | vault_session_export | Export a saved session as a Cookie header value, a Netscape cookie-jar file (curl -b), raw JSON (Playwright addCookies shape), or a ready-to-run Playwright snippet | | vault_session_close | Close an open browser login session (collected cookies stay in the vault) | | vault_session_prune | Remove expired cookies from a saved session (session cookies are kept); preview: true reports without writing | | vault_copy | Copy an entry (secrets included) into another named vault | | vault_templates | Built-in + user-defined templates (save/list/remove), KeePassXC-style; built-ins now include Wi-Fi, Server, Database, Identity, Bank account, Card (1Password-inspired) | Built-in + user-defined templates (save/list/remove), KeePassXC-style |

Typical workflows: store an SSH credential (kind: ssh + host/port/username/password or privateKey) and have the model vault_search for the host then vault_get the connection details; keep api-key/oauth entries for API-gateway access/refresh token rotation.

Installation

dsh-vault is a bundle (a package declaring dsh.bundle): once installed into a profile, its cordis.patch.yml automatically inserts the vault plugin row (referenced by package name dsh-vault; the master password is injected via the DSH_VAULT_PASSWORD environment variable). The package ships a self-contained build script — git installs compile lib/ automatically.

All four install paths below are verified end-to-end (install → bundle layer recognized → plugin activates with all 7 vault_* tools registered → real vault_add/vault_get round trip → uninstall removes the layer):

| Path | Command | Build needed | allowBuilds | |---|---|---|---| | npm | add dsh-vault | no (prebuilt lib/) | no | | GitHub | add github:Ox0400/dsh-vault#v0.1.1 | yes (prepare) | yes (first run) | | local path | add /abs/path/to/dsh-vault | no (link to built source) | no | | tarball | add ./dsh-vault-0.1.1.tgz | no (prebuilt lib/) | no |

Option 1: Install from npm (easiest)

dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-vault

npm packages ship prebuilt lib/ artifacts — no allowBuilds, no local compilation, install and go. Set the master password before launching:

export DSH_VAULT_PASSWORD='your strong master password'

Option 2: Install from GitHub (pin a tag or commit)

dsh plugin --profile web add github:Ox0400/dsh-vault#v0.1.1

A git install fetches sources, not built artifacts, so the prepare script builds lib/ at install time. pnpm ≥10 blocks git dependencies from running build scripts by default. The verified flow:

1. Run the add command — it fails with an allowBuilds error and prints the exact key to allow (the line containing the repo URL, including the resolved commit hash):

   allowBuilds:
     dsh-vault@https://codeload.github.com/Ox0400/dsh-vault/tar.gz/<sha>: true

2. Append that exact key to the profile's pnpm-workspace.yaml ($DSH_HOME/profiles/<name>/pnpm-workspace.yaml):

   packages:
     - .
   allowBuilds:
     dsh-vault@https://codeload.github.com/Ox0400/dsh-vault/tar.gz/<sha>: true

3. Re-run the add — pnpm now runs the prepare script, builds lib/, and installs.

Pin a tag/commit so a later upstream push cannot silently change what runs on install. Treat the allowance for what it is: permission to execute that package's code on your machine at install time — only grant it to sources you trust.

Option 3: Install from a local path

dsh plugin --profile web add /absolute/path/to/dsh-vault

pnpm links the checkout into the profile; the bundle is recognized as long as lib/ exists (run pnpm build in the checkout first if needed).

Option 4: Install from a tarball

npm pack && dsh plugin --profile web add ./dsh-vault-0.1.1.tgz

The tarball ships prebuilt lib/ artifacts, so no build step or allowBuilds is required.

dsh plugin --profile web remove dsh-vault uninstalls (removes both the dependency and the layer).

Command line

The plugin hands the vault to the assistant. The bundled dsh-vault command hands the same vault to shells and scripts, so a skill's child process can read a secret without the plaintext ever entering the model's context.

0. First: which command can you actually type?

Nothing provides a dsh-vault binary until the package is installed — the plugin is a Cordis bundle, and dsh has no plugin-subcommand registry (the launcher parses only its own flags; dsh plugin … just forwards to pnpm, so dsh web exec … hands its arguments to the web app and fails with error: too many arguments). Pick your row before reading the examples:

| your setup | the command | |---|---| | source checkout (git clone + pnpm build) | pnpm vault — or node lib/cli.js, or ./lib/cli.js | | plugin installed into a profile | pnpm dsh plugin --profile web exec dsh-vault | | globally installed (npm i -g dsh-vault) | dsh-vault | | nothing installed | npx dsh-vault |

# source checkout — this repository, right now:
pnpm vault list

# after a global install (or via npx) the same commands are:
dsh-vault list
npx dsh-vault list

Every example below is written as dsh-vault …; substitute the form from your row (pnpm vault … in a checkout).

1. What env is for

get fetches one value and needs no tag. dsh-vault env is for the other case: a script that needs several secrets at once. It prints the entries you tagged env as shell assignments, so the script picks them up itself:

$ dsh-vault env
DEMO_API_KEY='sk-demo-123'
OTHER_PASSWORD='pw-not-exported'

eval "$(dsh-vault env)" reads those assignments into the current shell — the usual reason to reach for it:

eval "$(dsh-vault env)"          # KEY=VALUE lines become shell variables
echo "$DEMO_API_KEY"

Two things worth knowing:

• Only env-tagged entries are exported. With none tagged you get dsh-vault: nothing to export — no entry carries the "env" tag.; tag one in the UI (the entry's tags field) or with vault_update { id, tags: ["env"] }.
• The name is derived from the title and field (DASHSCOPE + apiKey → DASHSCOPE_API_KEY) unless the entry sets envKeys — see Environment export.

Names — there are only three, and two of them are the word env on purpose:

| name | what it is | meaning | |---|---|---| | env | an entry tag | which entries dsh-vault env exports; nothing is exported without it | | env | the command | prints exactly the entries carrying that tag | | envKeys | an entry field (optional) | pin exact names, e.g. ["DASHSCOPE_API_KEY"]; the old singular envKey is accepted as a one-element shorthand |

Nothing else is called env*: list --json / show report envKeys (the names an entry exports — what get accepts), envTagged (whether env includes it) and hasTotp (whether totp can produce a code for it).

2. The commands

dsh-vault list                             # grouped: what `env` exports vs the rest
#   Exported by `env` (tag "env") — 1 entry:
#     a1b2c3d4-…  api-key   DASHSCOPE        → DASHSCOPE_API_KEY
#   Not exported (no "env" tag) — 1 entry; `get <name>` still works for it:
#     9f8e7d6c-…  api-key   Example Billing  → EXAMPLE_BILLING_API_KEY
dsh-vault get my-entry                     # the entry's primary secret, stdout only
dsh-vault get my-entry --field apiKey      # one named field
dsh-vault get my-entry --mask              # confirm it exists without printing it
dsh-vault show my-entry                    # non-secret metadata as JSON
dsh-vault totp my-entry                    # the current TOTP code (digits only)
dsh-vault totp my-entry --json             # + digits, period, secondsRemaining
dsh-vault env                              # env-tagged entries as KEY=VALUE
dsh-vault env --mask                       # human view, both sections as KEY=VALUE:
#   ## exported items
#   NPM_REGISTRY_API_KEY=npm_***
#   ## unexported items
#   EXAMPLE_BILLING_API_KEY=***
dsh-vault export-env .env                  # …or write them to a 0600 file
dsh-vault verify                           # check the master password, nothing on stdout

Secrets go to stdout and everything else (progress, errors) to stderr, so $(dsh-vault get …) and pipelines behave. Exit codes: 0 ok, 1 runtime error, 2 usage error.

totp exists so a script can automate two-factor login without ever handling the long-lived secret: code=$(dsh-vault totp my-entry) prints six digits and nothing else. get my-entry --field otpSecret would print the secret instead — use it only when a tool genuinely needs to enrol the secret elsewhere. --json adds secondsRemaining, which is what lets a caller wait for a fresh window rather than race an expiring code.

3. Shell quoting: not export $(…)

eval "$(dsh-vault env)" is right; export $(dsh-vault env) is wrong. Command substitution splits on whitespace and does not strip the quotes the CLI emits, so a value containing a space breaks into the wrong words and every value keeps its literal quotes:

$ export $(dsh-vault env); echo "$WITH_SPACE"
['pass]                     # split at the space
bash: export: `here': not a valid identifier
$ eval "$(dsh-vault env)"; echo "$WITH_SPACE"
[pass word here]            # read as intended

In a script, prefer the file form — no eval at all:

dsh-vault export-env .env && set -a && . ./.env && set +a

4. The master password

--password-stdin, then $DSH_VAULT_MASTER_PASSWORD (or $DSH_VAULT_PASSWORD), then an interactive prompt that hides what you type (the terminal is switched to raw mode; verify with tests/e2e/cli-prompt.mjs). It is not read from the plugin's config file, so the CLI never depends on (or leaks) whatever the profile patch holds:

DSH_VAULT_MASTER_PASSWORD=… pnpm vault list
printf '%s\n' "$PASSWORD" | pnpm vault list --password-stdin

5. Install details

Source checkout:

git clone [email protected]:Ox0400/dsh-vault.git && cd dsh-vault
npm install && npm run build            # builds lib/, including executable lib/cli.js

pnpm vault list                         # the repo's own entry point (package.json script)
node lib/cli.js list                    # same thing, spelled out
./lib/cli.js list                       # the file is executable too
npm link                                # …or put a real `dsh-vault` on PATH

To develop the plugin against a profile you also link the checkout into the profile and add a patch layer that inserts it (how this repository is normally developed); the CLI needs none of that — it reads the vault file directly. A hand-linked plugin has no .bin/dsh-vault shim, so pnpm … exec reports Command "dsh-vault" not found unless you install it as a dependency (pnpm dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-vault) or create the shim by hand:

ln -sf ../dsh-vault/lib/cli.js ~/.dsh/profiles/web/node_modules/.bin/dsh-vault

npm install:

pnpm dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-vault          # into a profile (plugin + CLI together)
pnpm dsh plugin --profile web exec dsh-vault list    # --profile is required

npm i -g dsh-vault && dsh-vault list                 # globally
npx dsh-vault list                                   # or not at all

The read commands (list, get, env, show, totp, verify, export-env) depend on Node alone, which is why the global and npx forms work. Only writing to a vault needs the harness runtime, and the plugin always has it.

Two more caveats on the profile route: its .bin shim can be pruned by a later pnpm install, and pnpm dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-vault reconciles dsh.profile.bundles from the package's dsh.bundle declaration — if your own patch layer also inserts the plugin, that mounts it twice, so remove the patch row first.

Privacy of the breach check

vault_breach_check (and the security page) can check passwords against Have I Been Pwned. Exactly one thing leaves this machine:

GET https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/<FIRST 5 HEX CHARS OF SHA-1(password)>
Add-Padding: true

The response lists every suffix in that bucket (hundreds of hashes) and the match is computed locally — the full hash, the password, and the entry it belongs to never leave. A password already in the bundled common-password list is answered offline and produces no request at all; repeat lookups of the same prefix are cached in memory for an hour.

What k-anonymity does not hide, stated plainly:

• the five-character prefix (20 bits, one bucket in ~1M) goes to Cloudflare, together with your IP;
• an observer who can guess candidate passwords can compute each candidate's prefix and see whether you queried that bucket — that is the known limit of this protocol, not something the header fixes;
• Add-Padding only removes the response-size signal (without it, a bucket's response length correlates with how common the password is).

To keep even the prefix on your machine, pass online: false — the check then uses only the offline list, which is far smaller, so treat it as a screening aid rather than a verdict.

Strength indicator

Each entry row shows a three-star indicator after its title — ☆☆☆ = 0 score, ★★★ = full marks — in six half-star steps:

A half star is a real half-filled star, not a ½ next to it: the coloured copy of the same three glyphs is clipped to a percentage, and ★/☆ share an advance width so the clip lands exactly on a star boundary.

| score | filled stars | band | |---|---|---| | 0–8 | 0 | weak | | 9–24 | ½ | weak | | 25–41 | 1 | weak | | 42–58 | 1½ | fair | | 59–74 | 2 | fair | | 75–91 | 2½ | strong | | 92–100 | 3 | very strong |

Hovering it shows the exact score and verdict. The score is computed host-side (the list never receives the secret) and covers the entry's password or card PIN; machine-generated API keys and private keys are deliberately not scored, so every key does not sit at full marks.

Environment export

Entries tagged env can be materialised as KEY=VALUE lines (vault_env, vault_export_env), and their names follow the field names every toolchain expects:

| Entry | Exported key | |---|---| | title DASHSCOPE, apiKey | DASHSCOPE_API_KEY | | title DASHSCOPE, prefix: APP_ | APP_DASHSCOPE_API_KEY | | envKey: "TAVILY_TOKEN", accessToken | TAVILY_TOKEN | | …the same entry's refreshToken / fields.scope | TAVILY_TOKEN_REFRESH_TOKEN / TAVILY_TOKEN_SCOPE |

• The field suffix is vendor-standard: apiKey → API_KEY, accessToken → ACCESS_TOKEN, refreshToken → REFRESH_TOKEN, privateKey → PRIVATE_KEY, password → PASSWORD, cardNumber → CARD_NUMBER.

• Set an entry's env-var names (optional field envKeys, also via vault_add/vault_update, or comma-separated in the editor) when the derived names are not what your scripts expect. They are positional and used verbatim (no prefix, no title):

  | envKeys | exported | |---|---| | ["DASHSCOPE_API_KEY"] | DASHSCOPE_API_KEY=apiKey | | ["GOOGLE_ACCESS_TOKEN", "GOOGLE_REFRESH_TOKEN"] | ...=accessToken, ...=refreshToken | | ["MY_KEY"] on an entry with 3 secrets | MY_KEY, MY_KEY_REFRESH_TOKEN, MY_KEY_SCOPE |

  Each name must be a POSIX identifier ([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*), at most 8, and no duplicates. envKey (singular string) is still accepted as a one-element shorthand and is folded into envKeys on write.

• Custom fields are exported too, as <BASE>_<FIELD>.

Upgrading: keys changed from DASHSCOPE_APIKEY to DASHSCOPE_API_KEY in 1.10.64 to match vendor conventions. Set envKey on an entry to pin an exact name if a script depends on the old spelling.

Tool profiles

The plugin ships 110+ model tools, but registers only 11 core tools by default (vault_list/search/get/add/update/delete/fill/clipboard/totp/generate_password/strength) to keep the model's tool catalog small and cheap.

Switch profiles in Settings → Credentials → Permissions → Model tools — it applies instantly (no restart) and is persisted per vault:

| Profile | Registers | |---|---| | Basic (default) | core only — everyday use | | Standard | + management: favourites, tags, icons, expiry/rotation, health, duplicates/merge, attachments, templates, env masks | | Full | everything, incl. bulk import/export, browser sessions, backups and vault-file operations | | Custom… | core + any of: Management / Import-export / Browser sessions / Backups & files |

tools: basic|standard|full|custom can also be set in the plugin config; the UI choice wins and is stored in <vault dir>/tools.json (the process-wide tool catalog is not per vault).

Configuration

[!WARNING] Security: never put the master password in plaintext A profile patch (cordis.patch.yml / cordis.yml) is a config file that is easy to commit to git, screenshot, or capture in logs — so a plaintext masterPassword: row leaks the key to your whole encrypted vault. Always use masterPasswordEnv and export the real password into the process/shell environment instead (e.g. export DSH_VAULT_PASSWORD='…'). See the community-plugin-audit handbook for the evidence-first checklist for credential-handling plugins.

# ✗ DON'T — plaintext master password in a config file
- id: vault
  name: dsh-vault
  config:
    masterPassword: 'my-secret'

# ✓ DO — reference an environment variable; keep the file itself 0600
- id: vault
  name: dsh-vault
  config:
    masterPasswordEnv: DSH_VAULT_PASSWORD

| Option | Description | |---|---| | masterPassword | The master password inline (appears in cordis.yml; not recommended) | | masterPasswordEnv | Environment variable name holding the master password (recommended) | | path | Vault file path; defaults to $DSH_HOME/vault/default.json | | name | Vault name for the default path (e.g. name: work → $DSH_HOME/vault/work.json) | | accessMode | Access policy for the model tools. Three states: readonly (mutations rejected on tools + UI), ask (default — reads free, every add/update/delete goes through the harness approval channel so the user confirms each write), or auto (automatic read-write, no per-call prompt). The Settings UI offers this exact three-way choice and persists it to <vault dir>/access.json. | | autoCapture | false (default). When true, the system prompt instructs the model to detect credentials shared in conversation and — per user preference — offer to save them with vault_add. | | lockTimeoutSeconds | Auto-lock: after this many seconds of inactivity the vault re-locks (key wiped) and every read/write requires vault_unlock. 0/absent disables. | | exportPasswordEnv | Environment variable holding the export/import password for vault_export/vault_import (never pass it as a model argument). | | backupRetention | How many encrypted backups to keep (default 10); vault_backup prunes older copies. |

Example:

- id: vault
  name: dsh-vault
  config:
    masterPasswordEnv: DSH_VAULT_PASSWORD
    accessMode: ask
    autoCapture: true

With autoCapture: true, when you share a credential in chat (e.g. "my npm token is npm_…"), the assistant offers to store it; on your consent it calls vault_add immediately. With autoCapture off, credentials are only saved when you explicitly ask. The Settings UI shows the current mode (read-only / ask-before-write / automatic read-write) with a dropdown to switch it, an auto-capture toggle (detect credentials shared in chat → offer to save), a kind filter, a health & rotation summary, a trash view, and masked secret fields with a Show/Hide toggle.

The vault is created automatically on first tool use; every launch re-unlocks with the master password. Forgetting the master password = permanent data loss (no backdoor — by design).

Development

Clone and develop locally:

git clone [email protected]:Ox0400/dsh-vault.git
cd dsh-vault
pnpm install    # installs devDependencies (typescript/tsdown/vitest, …)
pnpm build      # builds host lib/*.js and the browser bundle lib/client.js
pnpm test       # runs the 496 vitest tests

Tests need harness peer packages such as dsh-llm/dsh-system-prompt; inside the harness monorepo these resolve via workspace links.

Common commands:

pnpm test          # unit + integration tests (vitest, 496)
pnpm typecheck     # tsc -p tsconfig.json --noEmit
pnpm build         # = build:host (tsc) + build:client (tsdown)
npm pack           # optional: tarball for `dsh plugin add ./dsh-vault-0.1.1.tgz`

All 496 tests pass (crypto / TOTP / password generation / store CRUD / gateway / integration).

Browser checks run against a real dsh web instead of vitest, and every one of them refuses to operate on the default vault:

node tests/e2e/theme-check.mjs      # dual-theme tokens, ring track, attach row
node tests/e2e/polish-check.mjs     # empty-state copy, relative-age hover hints
node tests/e2e/contrast-audit.mjs   # WCAG sweep over all eight tabs, both themes

See tests/e2e/README.md for the safety rules and for the two traps that make a contrast audit lie (serialised color(srgb …) values, and opacity counting as part of the colour).

Keeping credentials out of public content

Everything in this repository is public — the npm tarball, the GitHub releases, the issue and discussion posts. Before publishing, pnpm scan:secrets checks the working tree, the tracked files and the commit messages for anything that looks like a credential, and pnpm scan:public additionally checks every release and comment already posted. The local half also runs in pnpm test, so a committed secret fails CI rather than shipping.

Theming

The UI reads the host's design tokens instead of hard-coded colours. A local semantic layer maps onto the real --dsw-alias-* namespace, with literal fallbacks so the page still renders outside DeepSeek Harness:

--v-text: var(--dsw-alias-label-primary, #1f2328);
--v-border: var(--dsw-alias-border-l2, #d9d9d9);
--v-success-text: color-mix(in srgb, var(--v-success) 55%, var(--v-text));

Because the aliases flip with body[data-ds-dark-theme], light and dark follow the host automatically — there is no second stylesheet and no theme prop.

Two rules the layer exists to enforce:

• Never use state-*-primary as body text. Those tokens are tuned for fills and icons: on white they measure 2.28:1 (success) and 2.15:1 (warn), far below WCAG AA. The --v-*-text variants mix them towards the theme's own text colour, so one declaration darkens on light and lightens on dark (light 5.8/5.6/7.5:1, dark 12+/11+/6.5:1).
• Never dim text with opacity. opacity: .8 turns a 5.8:1 colour into 3.9:1. Express "secondary" with a token (--v-text-2), not with transparency.

tests/e2e/contrast-audit.mjs verifies both across every tab in both themes.

Packaging & Publishing

This package is a standard npm bundle:

• dsh.bundle.patch → cordis.patch.yml (the layer applied automatically when a profile lists this bundle)
• dsh.client → browser-side declaration (exports["./client"] points at lib/client.js)
• prepare script → self-contained build on git install (tsc host + tsdown client)
• No runtime dependencies: what the host provides arrives through peerDependencies, so there are no duplicate instances. playwright-core — needed only by browser login sessions, and lazily required — is an optional peer, so a normal install does not download it (~13 MB). Install it into your profile when you want those tools: cd ~/.dsh/profiles/web && npm i playwright-core

Distribution options:

npm pack                  # tarball → dsh plugin add ./dsh-vault-0.1.1.tgz
npm publish --access public   # registry → dsh plugin add dsh-vault

Security Boundaries & Known Limitations

• Vault strength is bounded by master-password strength; use ≥ 16 characters of high entropy.
• scrypt cost parameters (N=32768, r=8, p=1) are persisted in the document and can be raised in future versions; old documents remain decryptable.
• Plaintext credentials exist only in process memory and during explicit vault_get reads; vault_search/vault_update outputs never contain passwords, keys, or tokens. Secrets returned by vault_get enter that tool call's result (model context) — callers should avoid repeating them in conversation.
• This plugin targets single-machine / personal deployments; team-shared vaults are out of scope.

Listed in

• awesome-dsh-plugin — official curated directory (Security & Safety section)
• awesome-deepseek-harness (Dominic789654) — community directory (Security section)

Submissions pending maintainer review: Anil-matcha/awesome-dsh-plugin #127 · 0xsline/awesome-deepseek-harness #563 · dsh-handbook #65