ship-safe
v9.3.2
Published
AI-powered multi-agent security platform. 23 agents scan 80+ attack classes including AI integration supply chain (Vercel-class attacks), Hermes Agent deployments (ASI-01–ASI-10), tool registry poisoning, function-call injection, skill permission drift, a
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Type ship-safe and you're in. 23 agents scan your codebase for secrets, injections, AI/LLM vulnerabilities, supply chain attacks, and 80+ other classes. The agent shows a diff for every proposed fix, asks before writing, and verifies the fix worked. Every change is logged and reversible.
npx ship-safeQuick Start
# Interactive REPL — scan, fix, ask questions in one session
npx ship-safe
# Full audit: secrets + 23 agents + deps + remediation plan
npx ship-safe audit .
# Interactive fix agent: plan → diff → accept → verify
npx ship-safe agent .
npx ship-safe agent . --severity critical # critical findings only
npx ship-safe agent . --branch --pr # fix on a branch + open a PR
# Undo the last fix
npx ship-safe undo
# CI/CD mode
npx ship-safe ci . --threshold 80 --sarif results.sarifNo signup. No API key required for scanning. Works offline.
23 Security Agents
All agents run in parallel. Each skips irrelevant projects automatically.
| Agent | Category | What It Detects | |-------|----------|-----------------| | InjectionTester | Code Vulns | SQL/NoSQL injection, command injection, XSS, path traversal, XXE, ReDoS, prototype pollution | | AuthBypassAgent | Auth | JWT flaws (alg:none, weak secrets), CSRF, OAuth misconfig, BOLA/IDOR, TLS bypass | | SSRFProber | SSRF | User input in fetch/axios, cloud metadata endpoints, internal IPs | | SupplyChainAudit | Supply Chain | Typosquatting, wildcard versions, suspicious install scripts, dependency confusion | | ConfigAuditor | Config | Docker (root user, :latest), Terraform, Kubernetes, CORS, CSP, Firebase, Nginx | | SupabaseRLSAgent | Auth | service_role key in client code, tables without RLS, anon key inserts | | LLMRedTeam | AI/LLM | OWASP LLM Top 10: prompt injection, excessive agency, system prompt leakage | | MCPSecurityAgent | AI/LLM | MCP server misuse, tool poisoning, typosquatting, unvalidated inputs | | AgenticSecurityAgent | AI/LLM | OWASP Agentic AI Top 10: agent hijacking, privilege escalation | | RAGSecurityAgent | AI/LLM | Context injection, document poisoning, vector DB access control | | MemoryPoisoningAgent | AI/LLM | Instruction injection in agent memory files, hidden Unicode payloads (ASI-01, ASI-05) | | PIIComplianceAgent | Compliance | SSNs, credit cards, emails, phone numbers in source code | | VibeCodingAgent | Code Vulns | AI-generated code anti-patterns: no validation, empty catches, TODO-auth | | ExceptionHandlerAgent | Code Vulns | Empty catches, unhandled rejections, leaked stack traces (OWASP A10:2025) | | AgentConfigScanner | AI/LLM | Prompt injection in .cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, malicious Claude Code hooks | | MobileScanner | Mobile | OWASP Mobile Top 10 2024: insecure storage, WebView injection, debug mode | | GitHistoryScanner | Secrets | Leaked secrets in git commit history | | CICDScanner | CI/CD | Pipeline poisoning, unpinned actions, secret logging (OWASP CI/CD Top 10) | | APIFuzzer | API | Routes without auth, mass assignment, GraphQL introspection, debug endpoints | | ManagedAgentScanner | AI/LLM | Claude Managed Agent misconfigs: always_allow policies, unrestricted networking (ASI-03–ASI-07) | | HermesSecurityAgent | AI/LLM | Tool registry poisoning, function-call injection, skill permission drift (ASI-01–ASI-10) | | AgentAttestationAgent | Supply Chain | Unpinned agent versions, missing integrity hashes, unsigned manifests (ASI-10, SLSA L0) | | AgenticSupplyChainAgent | Supply Chain | Over-privileged AI CI actions, OAuth scope creep, unsigned AI webhook receivers (ASI-02, ASI-06) |
Post-processors: ScoringEngine · VerifierAgent (secrets liveness) · DeepAnalyzer (LLM taint analysis)
The REPL
$ ship-safe
███████╗██╗ ██╗██╗██████╗ ███████╗ █████╗ ███████╗███████╗
...
v9.3.2 · DeepSeek · ~/my-project
/scan to find issues · /agent to fix them · /help for more
shipsafe ›| Command | What it does |
|---------|-------------|
| /scan | Re-scan the project |
| /agent | Run the interactive fix loop |
| /findings | List findings from the last scan |
| /show <n> | Full detail on finding n |
| /plan <n> | Preview fix plan for finding n (no writes) |
| /undo [--all] | Revert the last fix (or all fixes) |
| /share | Publish scan report as a public URL (7 days) |
| /diff | Show git working-tree diff |
| /provider <name> | Switch LLM provider mid-session |
| /quit | Exit (also Ctrl-D or Ctrl-C) |
Anything not starting with / is sent to the LLM as a free-form question, with your latest scan results as context.
CI/CD
# .github/workflows/security.yml
name: Security Audit
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
security:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Security gate
run: npx ship-safe ci . --threshold 75 --sarif results.sarif
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
if: always()
with:
sarif_file: results.sarifLLM Support
Works with any provider — auto-detected from environment variables. Use --provider <name> to override.
Anthropic · OpenAI · Google · DeepSeek · Groq · Together · Mistral · xAI · Perplexity · Ollama · LM Studio · any OpenAI-compatible endpoint
No API key required for scanning. AI is optional.
Suppress False Positives
password = get_password() # ship-safe-ignore# .ship-safeignore
tests/fixtures/
docs/Add a Badge
[](https://shipsafecli.com)Contributing
- Fork · add your pattern, agent, or config · open a PR
- See CONTRIBUTING.md
Sponsors
Ship Safe is MIT-licensed and free forever.
Star History
Ship fast. Ship safe. — shipsafecli.com
