worm-sign

v4.2.0

Published

4 days ago

A security scanner that detects npm packages compromised by supply chain attacks, including the TanStack wave 4 attack (May 2026), the Axios attack (March 2026), and Shai-Hulud malware.

Downloads

499

Worm Sign 🪱🚫

"We have wormsign the likes of which even God has never seen."

Worm Sign is a static-analysis scanner that finds npm supply-chain worms in your package.json and lockfile — focused on what npm audit misses: install-time manifest tampering, dropped-file hashes, campaign IOC strings, and suspicious binary-fetch hosts.

Coverage in numbers

~100 currently-actionable IOCs across the three active campaigns covered (TanStack wave 4, Axios, Shai-Hulud 2.0).
~1,700 historical Shai-Hulud entries also bundled for archival/forensic scans. Most of these versions have already been unpublished from npm; their value is in detecting old package-lock.json files that were committed before the unpublish.
17 heuristic rules covering script-level patterns (network calls, code obfuscation, reverse shells, RAT droppers), manifest tampering (malicious git refs, phantom optionalDependencies, commit-pinned deps), and install-time vectors (non-standard binary.host).

The package count alone isn't a strong differentiator — npm audit already covers the GHSA-listed name@versions. Worm Sign's value is the heuristic layer that catches install-time vectors before they're catalogued.

Now detecting the May 2026 TanStack supply chain attack — the fourth wave of the Shai-Hulud worm, which republished 42 @tanstack/* packages (84 versions) with valid SLSA provenance after extracting an OIDC token via GitHub Actions cache poisoning.

TanStack Supply Chain Attack (May 2026)

On May 11, 2026, attacker group TeamPCP poisoned the tanstack/router GitHub Actions cache via a fork pull request, extracted the legitimate OIDC publishing token, and republished 42 @tanstack/* packages with malware — producing valid SLSA Build Level 3 attestations. The worm then propagated to 170+ secondary victim packages (including @mistralai/mistralai, @uipath/*, @draftlab/*, @squawk/*, safe-action, cmux-agent-mcp, nextmove-mcp, ts-dna, cross-stitch).

Tracked as CVE-2026-45321 / GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx.

If you installed any @tanstack/* package between 11:29 UTC and 19:15 UTC on May 11, 2026, run worm-sign immediately.

Worm Sign detects this attack through multiple layers:

84 Compromised Versions: All 42 affected @tanstack/* packages × 2 versions each from GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx, plus secondary victim @mistralai/[email protected]–2.2.4.
Payload Hashes: SHA-256 verification of router_init.js (ab4fcadaec…) and tanstack_runner.js (2ec78d556d…).
Manifest Tampering: New analyzeManifest heuristic flags the malicious optionalDependencies entry "@tanstack/setup": "github:tanstack/router#79ac49eedf…", including the truncated form and any commit-pinned git ref in optionalDependencies.
Campaign Strings: Detects EveryBoiWeBuildIsAWormyBoi (campaign ID), IfYouRevokeThisTokenItWillWipeTheComputerOfTheOwner (dead-man's-switch trigger that runs rm -rf ~/ on token revocation), OhNoWhatsGoingOnWithGitHub (token-recovery magic string), and the unique PBKDF2 salt svksjrhjkcejg.
C2 Infrastructure: Detects filev2.getsession.org, api.masscan.cloud, git-tanstack.com, and second-stage payload URLs at litter.catbox.moe/h8nc9u.js / litter.catbox.moe/7rrc6l.mjs.
Persistence Files: Flags dropped files router_init.js, tanstack_runner.js, router_runtime.js, gh-token-monitor.sh, gh-token-monitor.service, and com.user.gh-token-monitor.plist.
Worm Forensics: Detects dependabout/ branch impersonation and [email protected] spoofed commit author used by the worm to push exfiltration commits.

Axios Supply Chain Attack (March 2026)

On March 31, 2026, the axios HTTP client was compromised after the primary maintainer's npm account was hijacked. Two malicious versions (1.14.1 and 0.30.4) injected plain-crypto-js as a phantom dependency — a package whose sole purpose was to execute a postinstall script that drops a cross-platform RAT targeting macOS, Windows, and Linux.

If you installed axios between ~00:21 and ~03:30 UTC on March 31, run worm-sign immediately.

Worm Sign detects this attack through multiple layers:

Compromised Packages: Flags [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]/4.2.0, and related attacker packages (@shadanai/openclaw, @qqbrowser/openclaw-qbot).
C2 Infrastructure: Detects C2 domains (sfrclak.com, calltan.com, callnrwise.com) and IP (142.11.206.73).
RAT Payload Hashes: SHA-256 verification of stage-2 payloads for macOS (com.apple.act.mond), Windows (6202033.ps1), and Linux (ld.py).
Dropper Patterns: Identifies execSync+nohup background execution, self-deleting setup.js scripts, XOR obfuscation with key OrDeR_7077, and the spoofed IE8 User-Agent string.
PowerShell Vectors: Catches irm|iex remote execution patterns used in Windows payload delivery.

Features

Safe Static Analysis: Uses @npmcli/arborist to inspect the dependency tree without executing any lifecycle scripts — the malware never gets a chance to run.
Multi-Campaign Detection: TanStack wave 4 (May 2026), Axios (March 2026), and the broader Shai-Hulud archive.
Manifest Tampering Detection: Flags malicious optionalDependencies entries and commit-pinned git refs used to smuggle payloads (the TanStack wave 4 vector).
Install-Time Binary Fetch Detection: Flags package.json binary.host pointing at non-standard domains — install-time binaries are not covered by lockfile integrity hashes.
FP-Tested Heuristics: All script-level rules have negative tests (tests/unit.test.ts) asserting they do NOT fire on common benign inputs (RFC1918 IPs, curl --version, bun run, JWT-like strings, etc.).
Hash-Based Detection: Verifies packages by integrity hash (SHA-1/SHA-512), catching variants even if renamed or version-spoofed.
Heuristic Analysis: Scans package.json scripts for suspicious patterns — RAT droppers, curl | bash, reverse shells, XOR obfuscation, self-deleting scripts, and more.
Entropy Analysis: Detects high-entropy files (>5MB) that indicate packed/obfuscated malware payloads.
C2 Signature Matching: Identifies known command & control domains, IPs, and beacon patterns.
Lockfile Support: Scans package-lock.json, yarn.lock, or pnpm-lock.yaml.
SARIF Output: Generates SARIF 2.1.0 reports for GitHub Security integration.
CI/CD Ready: Integrates into GitHub Actions or any CI pipeline. Fails the build on detection (exit code 1).

Safety & Trust

🛡️ Safe Static Analysis

Worm Sign parses your lockfile directly (using Arborist.loadVirtual()) to build an in-memory dependency graph. It never runs npm install or executes preinstall/postinstall scripts during scanning — this is critical because both the Axios attack (postinstall RAT dropper) and Shai-Hulud 2.0 (retaliatory wiper "Dead Man's Switch") activate through lifecycle scripts.

🔍 Transparency & Signatures

All malware signatures (filenames, patterns, hashes) are stored in plain text within the source code. We explicitly avoid obfuscation techniques to distinguish this security tool from the malware it detects. You can inspect the signatures in src/generated/signatures.ts.

🔐 Trusted Publishing

This package is published with npm provenance. You can verify the build attestation on the npm registry to confirm that the package you are installing was built from this specific GitHub repository and has not been tampered with.

Shai-Hulud 2.0 Detection

Worm Sign also covers the Shai-Hulud 2.0 worm campaign (1,717+ compromised packages) with detection for high-entropy packed payloads, destructive wiper commands (shred, del), PowerShell installation vectors, and C2 signatures.

Installation

npm install -g worm-sign

Usage

Basic Scan

Run the scanner in your project root. It uses the bundled list of banned packages by default.

worm-sign

Fetch Latest Data

Fetch the latest list of vulnerable packages from configured remote sources (e.g., Datadog, Koi).

worm-sign --fetch

Configured Remote Sources:

Datadog: consolidated_iocs.csv
Koi: export?format=csv

Custom Data Source

You can also fetch from a custom URL. You must specify the data format (json or csv).

JSON Format: Expects an object with a packages array: { "packages": [ { "name": "pkg", "version": "1.0.0" } ] }.

worm-sign --url "https://example.com/vulns.json" --data-format json

Note: The scanner will attempt to fetch from this URL in addition to other configured sources. If the fetch fails, it will warn you but continue scanning with other available sources.

CSV Format: Expects a CSV with name and version columns (headers are ignored if they don't look like package names, but standard format is name,version).

worm-sign --url "https://example.com/vulns.csv" --data-format csv

Hash Support: The CSV format also supports an optional integrity column (or hash, shasum). If provided, the scanner will verify the package integrity against your lockfile.

name,version,integrity
safe-package,1.0.0,sha512-badhash...

Output Formats

Generate a SARIF report for security tools:

worm-sign --format sarif > results.sarif

Git Hook

Install a pre-commit hook to automatically scan before every commit:

worm-sign --install-hook

Caching

Disable caching if you need to force a fresh fetch:

worm-sign --fetch --no-cache

CI/CD Integration

Add this to your GitHub Actions workflow:

- name: Run Worm Sign
  run: npx worm-sign --format sarif

By default, worm-sign will:

Load all local .csv package lists from the sources/ directory.
Fetch updates from any remote sources configured in sources/*.json (e.g., Datadog, Koi).
Fail the build if any banned packages are found (exit code 1).

You do not need to pass --fetch explicitly; the scanner automatically processes all configured sources.

Network Requirements

Worm Sign fetches threat intelligence from the following public endpoints. Ensure your firewall allows outbound HTTPS (443) access to:

Datadog: raw.githubusercontent.com
Koi: docs.google.com

Proxy Support

Worm Sign respects standard proxy environment variables. If you are behind a corporate proxy, set:

HTTPS_PROXY (or https_proxy)
HTTP_PROXY (or http_proxy)
NO_PROXY (or no_proxy)

Enterprise Usage

For large organizations or high-volume CI/CD environments, we recommend mirroring the data sources internally to avoid rate limiting or external dependency failures.

Option 1: Internal Mirror (Recommended)

To avoid rate limiting or external dependency failures, you can host the data sources on an internal server (e.g., Artifactory, S3).

If using the npm package directly: Use the --offline flag to disable default remote fetches, and provide your internal mirror URL via the --url flag.

CSV Example:

npx worm-sign --offline --url "https://internal.example.com/compromised-packages.csv" --data-format csv

JSON Example:

npx worm-sign --offline --url "https://internal.example.com/compromised-packages.json" --data-format json

Self-Signed Certificates: If your internal server uses a self-signed certificate, use the --insecure flag to bypass SSL verification:

npx worm-sign --offline --insecure --url "https://internal.example.com/compromised-packages.json" --data-format json

If maintaining a fork: Update the sources/*.json files in your repository to point to your internal URLs. This allows you to distribute a pre-configured version of the scanner to your team.

Option 2: Offline Mode

If you prefer to rely solely on the bundled local CSVs (which are updated with each package release), you can disable remote fetching:

npx worm-sign --offline

This will only scan against the local .csv files found in the sources/ directory.

Command Line Options Reference

| Option | Description | Default | | ------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------- | ------- | | -f, --fetch | Fetch the latest compromised packages from the API | false | | -u, --url <url> | Custom API URL to fetch compromised packages from | - | | --data-format <format> | Data format for custom URL (json, csv) | json | | -p, --path <path> | Path to the project to scan | . | | --format <format> | Output format (text, sarif) | text | | --no-cache | Disable caching of API responses | false | | --install-hook | Install a pre-commit hook to run worm-sign | false | | --dry-run | Run scan but always exit with 0 (useful for CI) | false | | --offline | Disable network requests (implies --no-fetch) | false | | --insecure | Disable SSL certificate verification | false | | --debug | Enable debug logging | false |

Advanced Examples

Scan a specific directory:

worm-sign --path ./projects/my-app

Run in CI (Dry Run): Use --dry-run to see what would be found without failing the build (exit code 0).

worm-sign --dry-run

Debug Mode: Enable verbose logging to troubleshoot issues.

worm-sign --debug

Acknowledgements

Threat intelligence is aggregated from the security research community, including:

TanStack Attack (Wave 4):

Axios Attack:

Shai-Hulud:

License

This project is licensed under the MIT License - see the LICENSE file for details.